Psychological depth is the internalization of dialogical breadth: Modal clitics and mental states in Q’eqchi’-Maya

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Abstract

This essay provides a detailed account of the morphosyntax, semantics, and pragmatics of modal clitics in Q’eqchi’-Maya. It builds on previous arguments that status, or epistemic modality, is a shifter that marks the speaker’s commitment to a narrated event relative to the speech event; and that commitment should be understood as a kind of participant role. It details the complicated types of commitment events that are encoded and implicated in various contexts. It shows the ways in which multiple commitment events—inhabited by the speaker, addressee, and actor—combine in various contexts to serve complex functions, ranging from satiatives and dubitives to bluffatives and suprisitives. And it shows the ways in which these complicated, overlapping commitment events may be understood in terms of intentional states—from desire and worry to belief and hope. In this way, it grounds the ‘possible worlds’ of logicians and the ‘intentional worlds’ of psychologists in terms of participant roles; and it thereby reinterprets logical and psychological presumptions in terms of social and semiotic practices. In short, it shows the ways in which we are merely minding language when we talk about mind. Finally, while focused on the forms and functions of Q’eqchi’-Maya, it provides an analytic typology that may be used to analyze other languages (and other minds).

Keywords: Modality; Status; Intentionality; Shifters; Desire; Internalization; Counterfactuals; Mind; Q’eqchi’-Maya

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1. Introduction

This essay provides a detailed account of the morphosyntax, semantics, and pragmatics of modal clitics in Q'eqchi'-Maya. It builds on previous arguments (Kockelman, 2002, 2003b, 2004) that status, or epistemic modality, is a shifter that marks the speaker’s commitment to a narrated event relative to the speech event; and that commitment should be understood as a kind of participant role. It details the complicated types of commitment events that are encoded and implicated in various contexts. It shows the ways in which multiple commitment events—inhabited by the speaker, addressee, and actor—combine in various contexts to serve complex functions, ranging from satiatives and dubitives to bluffatives and suprisitives. And it shows the ways in which these complicated, overlapping commitment events may be understood in terms of intentional states—from desire and worry to belief and hope. In this way, it grounds the ‘possible worlds’ of logicians and the ‘intentional worlds’ of psychologists in terms of participant roles; and it thereby reinterprets logical and psychological presumptions in terms of social and semiotic practices. In short, it shows the ways in which we are merely minding language when we talk about mind. Finally, while focused on the forms and functions of Q’eqchi’-Maya, it provides an analytic typology that may be used to analyze other languages (and other minds).

Section 2 provides an overview of the form and function of modal clitics in Q’eqchi’-Maya. It is designed to give the reader a sense of how their morphosynatric, semantic, and pragmatic properties interrelate. Section 3 discusses the morphosyntax of the modal clitics in great detail, showing their grammatical distribution and logical scope, their interactions with each other, and their interactions with other obligatory grammatical categories (such as tense and mood). And Section 4 provides a detailed account of usage for each of the modal clitics in turn, analyzing their indexical objects and pragmatic functions, as well as speakers’ interpretations of their meaning.1

2. Overview of grammatical, semantic, and pragmatic properties

In this section, I provide an overview of the modal clitics.2 In Section 2.1, I discuss their grammatical distribution and informational scope. In Section 2.2, I discuss the semantic features they encode. These first two sections are adapted from Kockelman (2003b). Finally, Section 2.3 discusses the contexts these modal clitics index, the

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1 This essay is part of a larger project (Kockelman, 2002, 2003a,b,c, 2004) which examines stance, or the semiotic means by which we indicate our orientation to states of affairs, usually turning on evaluation and intentionality. Moreover, it instantiates an overarching argument that ‘subjectivity in language’ is not at issue; and that research should instead focus on the relation between formal structures and discursive practices that seem to mark modes of subjectivity, and speakers’ understandings of and strategies with these structures and practices (Kockelman, 2004).

2 Grammars that mention, but do not analyze the modal clitics in Q’eqchi’-Maya are Berinstein (1985), Carlson and Eachus (1980), and Stoll (1896).
functions they serve, and the interpretations of their use that are offered by speakers. I will offer a more detailed account of their morphosyntactic, semantic, and pragmatic features in later sections. For now, I want the reader to have a sense of how all these features contribute to their meaning in any particular context.

2.1. Grammatical properties of the modal clitics

The modal clitics may be thought of as operators that take clauses as their arguments. In Q’eqchi’, a clause usually consists of a predicate (for example, an intransitive verb), the obligatory arguments of this predicate (for example, a grammatical subject), the obligatory grammatical categories that occur with this predicate (for example, tense, aspect, or mood), and any non-obligatory arguments that may occur (for example, adjuncts such as prepositional phrases, adverbs, or relational nouns). If a modal clitic occurs in an utterance, it usually occurs after the predicate and before any arguments or adjuncts. However, if some constituent (such as an argument or adjunct) has been preposed into the verb-initial focus-position (for the purposes of emphasis, relativization, or questioning), the modal clitic occurs after the preposed constituent. In other words, while modal clitics have grammatical scope over clauses, they only have informational scope over the foci of utterances—that part of an utterance which is being asserted or questioned. Let me illustrate these points.

(1) x-Ø-hulak chaq ewer
   Perf-Abs(3s)-arrive hither yesterday
   ‘he arrived yesterday’

(2) t-at-x-k’am chaq sa’ li w-ochoch
   Fut-Abs(2s)-Erg(3s)-take hither inside Dm Erg(1s)-house
   ‘he will bring you inside my house’

(3) x-Ø-hulak pe’ chaq ewer
   Perf-Abs(3s)-arrive F hither yesterday

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3 As will be seen in Section 3, tense, aspect, mood, and evidence may also be understood as operators, but operators that act on cores (consisting of a predicate and its obligatory arguments) rather than clauses (consisting of a core and its adjuncts).

4 Q’eqchi’ is a language in the Kichean branch of the Mayan family, spoken by some 360,000 speakers in Guatemala and Belize (Stewart, 1980a). In Q’eqchi’, vowel length (signaled by doubling letters) is phonemic. /k/ and /q/ are velar and uvular plosives, respectively. /x/ and /j/ are palato-alveolar and velar fricatives, respectively. All other phonemes have their standard IPA values. I use the following notional conventions for transcribing Q’eqchi’: [ ] = intra- or inter-clausal pause; [line break] = interclausal pause and/or speaker-switch; [ ] = morpheme break; [S1] = speaker one (etc.). For interlinear glosses, I use the following notational conventions: Abs(1s) = absolutive case or Set B affix, first-person singular; Erg (3p) = ergative case or Set A affix, third-person plural (and so on for other person–number combinations); Perf = perfective aspect; Pres = present-habitual, or unmarked, tense-aspect; Fut = future tense; Inf = inferred, or non-experienced, evidential; F = factive clitic; CF = counterfactive clitic; AF = afactive clitic; Opt = optative clitic; NF = non-factive clitic; Positive = positive clitic; Nom = nominalized and/or non-finite form of predicate; Neg = negative; Comp = complementizer; Foc = focus particle; Dm = determiner; Dat = dative case; Imp = imperative form of predicate; SD = status designator; NS = nonspecific; Inter = interjection; Rflx = reflexive.
‘he did arrive yesterday’ (addressee-focused) or ‘he arrived yesterday!’ (speaker-focused)

(4) t-at-x-k’am tana chaq sa’ li w-ochoch
    Fut-Abs(2s)-Erg(3s)-take AF hither inside Dm Erg(1s)-house
    ‘perhaps he will bring you inside my house’

(5) moko laa’in ta x-in-hulak ewer
    NF Abs(1s) NF Perf-Abs(1s)-arrive yesterday
    ‘it was not I who arrived yesterday’

(6) joq’e raj t-at-x-k’am chaq sa’ li w-ochoch
    when CF Fut-Abs(2s)-Erg(3s)-take hither inside Dm Erg(1s)-house
    ‘when would he bring you inside my house’

(7) moko laa’at taxaq t-at-x-k’am chaq sa’ li w-ochoch
    NF Abs(2s) Opt Fut-Abs(2s)-Erg(3s)-take hither inside Dm Erg(1s)-house
    ‘if only it will not be you that he brings inside my house’

Example (1) shows a clause, consisting of the intransitive predicate hulak (to arrive), its obligatory argument (marked on the predicate with the third-person-singular absolutive infix -Ø-), its obligatory operator (marked on the predicate with the perfective-aspect prefix x-), the directional particle chaq (hither), and the temporal adverb ever (yesterday). Example (2) shows a clause, consisting of the transitive predicate k’amok (to take), its obligatory arguments (marked on the predicate with the second-person-singular absolutive infix -at- and the third-person-singular ergative infix -x-), its obligatory operator (marked on the predicate with the future-tense prefix t-), the directional particle chaq (hither), and the prepositional phrase sa’ li w-ochoch (in my house). Example (3) shows the clause from example (1) being operated on by the factive clitic pe’. And example (4) shows the clause from example (2) being operated on by the afactive clitic tana. As may be seen from these last two examples, the modal clitics occur after the predicate and before any adjuncts. In example (5), the nonfactive clitic moko...ta occurs circumfixed around the first-person-singular pronoun laa’in (which is cross-referenced on the predicate by the first-person-singular absolutive infix -in-). In example (6), the counterfactive clitic raj occurs after the Wh-word joq’e (when). As may be seen from these last two examples, the pronoun and the Wh-word are in the verb-initial focus-position. Their glosses reflect the fact that the modal clitics have scope over the foci of utterances. Lastly, in example (7), the optative clitic taxaq occurs after the nonfactive clitic moko...ta, which occurs circumfixed around the second-person-singular pronoun laa’at (which is cross-referenced on the predicate by the second-person-singular absolutive infix -at-). Here, then, two modal clitics occur together (with morphophonemic fusing: moko...ta taxaq becomes moko...taxaq), indicating that the modal clitics do not form a paradigm, but rather a set. Section 3 will elaborate these grammatical

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As may be seen by examples (1) and (2), Q’eqchi’ is a morphologically ergative language: grammatical subjects of intransitive verbs are marked the same as grammatical objects of transitive verbs (via an absolutive infix), and grammatical subjects of transitive verbs are marked differently (via an ergative infix).
points in more detail. Let me now turn to the semantics of the modal clitics in order to justify the glosses I have been providing.

2.2. Semantic properties of the modal clitics

When occurring with declarative illocutionary force, the clauses in examples (1) and (2) may function as assertions, and thereby express a proposition (p) which may be true or false depending on whether the state of affairs it denotes corresponds with the world or not. Or, to phrase this in terms of communication rather than logic, such an assertion indicates the speaker’s commitment to the truth, or at least unchallengeability, of p at the time of the utterance. Notice, then, that unmarked assertions—that is, utterances with declarative illocutionary force and no modal clitics—indicate that the world in which one is committed to the truth of a proposition is identical to the world in which one expresses that proposition. Or, to phrase this in terms of participant roles: unmarked assertions indicate that the one who is committed to the truth of a proposition is identical to the one who expresses that proposition.

In order to more carefully formulate this relatively simple observation, let me introduce three terms. Following Jakobson (1990), I will use the expression narrated event to refer to the proposition expressed by an utterance, and the expression speech event to refer to the context in which an assertion expressing a proposition is uttered. I will use the expression commitment event to refer to the world in which the speaker is committed to the truth of the proposition expressed by his or her assertion. In this idiom, the above observation may be stated as follows: in an unmarked assertion, the status of the commitment event is left unspecified, and is thereby usually indistinguishable from the speech event. In other words, an unmarked assertion indicates that the event in which one is committed to the truth of a narrated event is identical to the speech event. See Fig. 1.

My reason for using such an elaborate terminology to make such a simple observation is that the modal clitics, when operating on a clause that is uttered with declarative illocutionary force, specify the status of the commitment event, and thereby serve to distinguish it from the speech event. That is to say, in assertions with marked status—indicated by the presence of modal clitics—the locale of a commitment event is specified, and is thereby usually differentiated from the speech event. Let me phrase this in terms of Goffman’s well known decomposition of the speaker into animator, author, and principle (1981, p. 144): status disambiguates animators from principles (or speech event from commitment event), just as person disambiguates speakers from actors (or speech event from narrated event), and reported speech disambiguates animators from authors (or speech event from reported speech

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6 While these are referred to as commitment events (or commitment worlds), it should be emphasized that they are participant roles. Their eventive and/or worldly nature arises from the fact that they get calibrated (spatially, temporally, mentally) relative to speech events and narrated events (and their participants).
I have argued this point in detail elsewhere (Kockelman, 2002, 2003b, 2004). See Fig. 2.

In Q’eqchi’, there are four modal clitics that encode the status of the speaker’s commitment event. The factive clitic pe’ signals that the commitment event is in this world (i.e., the world of the speech event), and therefore markedly encodes what is usually assumed. This is expressed in the glosses of example (3) by either the presence of the verb do (addressee-directed function: insistive or contradictive) or the presence of the exclamation mark (speaker-directed function: suprisitive or dubitive). The afactive clitic tana signals that the commitment event is in a possible world. This is expressed in the gloss of example (4) by the presence of the modal adverb possibly. The optative clitic taxaq signals that the commitment event is in a wish world. This is expressed in the gloss of example (7) by the sentence-initial phrase if only. And the counterfactive clitic raj signals that the commitment world is in another world (i.e., a world other than the speech event). This is expressed in the gloss of example (6) by the modal auxiliary verb would. Notice, then, the shifter nature of factive and counterfactive clitics: the status of the commitment event is specified relative to the speech event. Lastly, notice that while the nonfactive clitic moko…ta belongs to this set by way of its grammatical distribution, notionally it marks constituent-scope negation and thereby specifies the logical valence of the narrated event rather than the status of the commitment event. This is expressed in the glosses of examples (5) and (7) by the word not. Such a distinction is mirrored by its form and distribution: not only is the nonfactive clitic the only circumfixed form, but as revealed by example (7), all the other modal clitics have scope over it. Lastly, these modal clitics should all be contrasted with unmarked status and unmarked valence (signaled by the absence of a

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7 Recall that, for Goffman (1981, p. 144), the speaker is “an active individual in the role of utterance production”, the author is “someone who has selected the sentiments that are being expressed and the words in which they are encoded”, and the principle is “someone whose position is being established by the words that are spoken, someone whose beliefs have been told, someone who is committed to what the words say”.

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modal clitic), which leaves the status of a commitment event and the valence of a narrated event unspecified. Table 1 summarizes this information.  

2.3. Pragmatic properties of the modal clitics

Besides encoding the semantic features discussed in the last section, modal clitics exhibit many other modes of meaning. In particular, they index objects or states of affairs; they serve discursive and social functions; and these semantic features, indexical objects, and pragmatic functions are subject to the interpretations of speakers themselves. In this section, I introduce some theoretical distinctions (deployed in

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8 One may wonder what notional domain underlies and unifies these operators. In particular, if we set aside the nonfactive clitic as marking valence instead of status, it is tempting to see the movement from factivity to afactivity to optativity to counterfactivity (or pe, tana, taxaq, raj) as unifiable and orderable relative to a notion of epistemic certainty: the relative overlap between speech event and commitment event. This would be in keeping with the notion of an ‘epistemic scale’ as theorized by Givón (1982, 1994) and Akatsuka (1985), and as presupposed by Role and Reference Grammar (Van Valin and LaPolla, 1997). However, as I have argued elsewhere (Kockelman, 2002, 2003c, 2004), the single dimension that scales this set of operators is actually the relative disjunction between commitment event and narrated event (i.e., the degree to which the narrated event and the commitment event are ontologically distinct from each other). This is an extremely complicated and non-intuitive point, and turns on the diachronic origins of status operators as they relate to the interclausal relations hierarchy.
Section 3) to characterize how each of these semiotic resources contributes to the meaning of the modal clitics.

Perhaps the most peculiar feature of the modal clitics is that they often say two things at once: in encoding the status of the speaker’s commitment to a narrated event, they implicate the status of another’s commitment to an inverted narrated event. That is to say, a speaker’s grammatically encoded commitment to some proposition $p$ is usually said in the indexically revealed context of another’s commitment to not $p$ (or another’s non-commitment to $p$). This ‘other’ may be the addressee, the speaker, or the actor (i.e., the one being spoken about). Their commitment to inverted narrated events may be temporalized, internalized, or dialogized. And this indexical expression of another’s commitment may be presupposed or created by the utterance itself.

That is to say, certain commitment events must exist for the use of modal clitics to be appropriate. In the case of indexically presupposed commitment events, the commitment in question is revealed by something other than the utterance containing the modal clitic; and, in the case of indexically created commitment events, the commitment in question is revealed only through the utterance containing the modal clitic (see Silverstein (1981) for the distinction between indexical presupposition and commitment).9 In a way, then, there are two distinct loci of commitments: one encoded by the modal clitics; and the other implicated by the occurrence of these modal clitics in context.

It is important, then, to understand the ontological status of these others’ commitments to inverted narrated events—where they reside, and what they give rise to, both as indexed in actual discourse and as characterized in speakers’ interpretations of such discourse. For example, the factive clitic $pe'$ may be used with a proposition $p$ in the indexically presupposed context of the addressee’s commitment to not $p$.10

Table 1

Semantic meaning of modal clitics when contrasted with unmarked status and valence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Grammatically signals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ø</td>
<td>Unmarked</td>
<td>in a non-specified world, speaker is committed to the truth of $p$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$pe'$</td>
<td>Factive</td>
<td>in this world, speaker is committed to the truth of $p$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$tana$</td>
<td>Afactive</td>
<td>in a possible world, speaker is committed to the truth of $p$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$taxaq$</td>
<td>Optative</td>
<td>in a wish world, speaker is committed to the truth of $p$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$raj$</td>
<td>Counterfactive</td>
<td>in another world, speaker is committed to the truth of $p$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$moko...ta$</td>
<td>Nonfactive</td>
<td>in a non-specified world, speaker is committed to the truth of not $p$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9 Silverstein calls this relative presupposition and relative creativity, and characterizes the former as “a relationship whereby a specific effective instance of a pragmatic signal is linked to and requires, for its effect, some independently verifiable contextual factor or factors” (1981, pp. 6–7), and the latter as “a particular pragmatic signal [that] essentially brings some contextual factor into existence, serving as the unique signal thereof” (1981, p. 7).

10 This usage is very similar to the use of a nonfactive clitic $moko...ta$ in the indexically presupposed context of the addressee’s commitment to $p$. And notice how in English do-support (I did do it; I did not do it) is obligatory with negative valence, but not with unmarked valence (I did it). In Q’eqchi’, in contrast, valence and factivity are completely uncoupled dimensions. And notice how the surprisitive use of do-support in English usually requires interrogatory illocutionary force, whereas in Q’eqchi’ this is not so.
That is to say, to emphasize that one’s commitment to a proposition \( p \) is in \textit{this} world, is appropriate in the indexically presupposed context of the addressee’s commitment to not \( p \). This commitment may have been revealed any number of ways: by the addressee’s previous assertion not \( p \), by her presupposing not \( p \) in a question, by her overtly stating ‘I believe not \( p \)’, etc. In such contexts, the meaning of the utterance containing the factive clitic \( pe \) is best captured by an addressee-focused gloss, as in example (3).

Similarly, the factive clitic \( pe \) may also be used with a proposition \( p \) in the indexically created context of speaker’s previous commitment to not \( p \). That is to say, to emphasize that one’s commitment to a proposition \( p \) is in \textit{this} world, is appropriate in the indexically created context of the speaker’s prior commitment to not \( p \). This commitment need not have been revealed prior to this utterance. (But it may be reinforced after the utterance: by the addressee’s response, by the speaker’s co-occurring comments, etc.) Rather, this commitment arises out of the marked usage of this utterance: to emphasize that one is committed to \( p \) in \textit{this} world, is to invite the implicature that one is not committed to \( p \) in \textit{another} world—often temporally construable as \textit{prior} to this world.\(^{11}\) In such contexts, the meaning of the utterance containing the factive clitic \( pe \) is best captured by a speaker-focused gloss, as in example (3).

Notice that in the addressee-focused function (indexical presupposition), the other’s commitment is \textit{dialogized} (belonging to the addressee); and in the speaker-focused function (indexical creation), the other’s commitment is \textit{internalized} (belonging to the speaker herself). This is a pervasive dichotomy underlying various functions of the modal clitics. The process of \textit{internalization}, whereby addressee-focused functions iconically relate to speaker-focused functions—and hence whereby the participant format of private interiority maps onto the participant format of public conversation—has been discussed in Kockelman (2002, 2003c). Loosely speaking, it may be phrased as follows: \textit{psychological depth is the internalization of dialogical breadth}. This claim may be understood in several ways: (1) that the features of the former should be understood in terms of the features of the latter (and hence psyche understood as social and semiotic); (2) that such a process occurs historically (explaining how certain functions originate diachronically from certain forms in a given language); and (3) that such a process occurs ontogenetically (explaining how certain functions originate developmentally as a speaker learns a language).\(^{12}\)

We owe its classic formulation to Mead and Vygotsky; but non-semiotic versions

\(^{11}\) Why modal clitics say two things at once should be relatively simple to understand. Insofar as modal clitics markedly specify the status of the speaker’s commitment event (in contrast to unmarked utterances, in which the speaker’s commitment event is indistinguishable from the speech event), they only occur in marked contexts: contexts in which another’s commitment event is indexically presupposed or created. One might consider these a species of generalized implicature relating to quantity (cf. Grice, 1989), especially given that the indexically created commitment events may be either reinforced or cancelled. However, it should be noted that the implicature is about commitment events, not narrated events.

\(^{12}\) In any case, I have few diachronic and developmental data that would attest to the second and third ways of understanding the claim. Hence, for the purposes of this essay, the claim should be understood in the first way.
of it may be found in Hegel, Nietzsche and Freud. A key claim of this essay, how-
ever, is that the idea is most fruitfully conceptualized in terms of participant roles. I
will return to this idea again and again in what follows.

Now given that modal clitics often simultaneously grammatically encode one com-
mitment event and indexically create (or presuppose) another inverted commit-
ment event, the disjunctures between such encoded and indexed commitment events may
(iconically) index putative psychological states. Thus, to use the factive clitic pe’
to grammatically signal that one is committed to p in this event, and thereby index-
ically create the context that one was committed to not p in another event, may index
‘surprise’ (if the other event is construed as prior to this one), or ‘doubt’ (if the other
event is construed as simultaneous with this one). In this way, the disjunctures be-
tween grammatically encoded and pragmatically implicated commitment events often
index intentional states more complicated than the simple beliefs underlying the com-
mitment events themselves. This is particularly true in speaker-focused utterances.

In addition to indexing commitment events and intentional states, modal clitics
index social roles and relations. Indeed, often it is precisely by means of indexing
intentional states that the modal clitics index social relations. For example, to use
the factive clitic pe’ to index one’s doubt regarding an interlocutor’s assertion, may
index either a relatively intimate or relatively impersonal relation. Thus, the factive
clitic pe’ can be used to mark doubt among either close friends or sparring antago-
nists. Or, to use the optative clitic taxaq to indicate that one wishes for an event, of-
ten indexes a shared perspective between speaker and addressee: that both have a
similar commitment to the narrated event in question by way of having shared social
roles or relations (a husband and wife discussing the price of corn; a man and his
work assistants discussing the possibility of rain).

In addition to indexing objects such as commitment events, intentional states,
and social relations, the modal clitics serve discursive and social functions. These
functions often piggy-back on the objects indexed by modal clitics—and the reason
to focus on pragmatic function instead of indexical object is merely to emphasize
the instrumental quality of language: that it can be a tool wielded by agents for
certain ends, subject to the agents’ understandings of its particular functions (where
this understanding may be embodied or articulated). For example, to use the fac-
tive-clitic pe’ in the presupposed context of the addressee’s commitment to not p,
may serve as a contradictory or insistive, depending on the strength of their
commitment.

Lastly, one must take into account speakers’ interpretations of their own and oth-
ers’ usage of the modal clitics. Of particular interest is how temporal or psychological
idioms are used to understand the meaning of the modal clitics. For example, the fac-
tive clitic pe’ is often interpreted by speakers as meaning ‘you just learned’. In this way,
they gloss the meaning of a modal clitic using a mental-state verb (to know) and a
temporal adverb (just). Similarly, the afaactive clitic tana is interpreted by some speak-
ers as meaning ‘you don’t want to say’. In this way, epistemic possibility is glossed not

in terms of logic or certainty, but in terms of not wanting to have to commit oneself to the narrated event in question. Here is where the second-order interpretations of speakers themselves intersect with their realtime practices of speaking, and hence a key process whereby explicit rationalizations regiment implicit meanings.

3. Morphosyntax of the modal clitics

In this section, I discuss the morphosyntax of the modal clitics. In Section 3.1, I show why the modal clitics constitute a form class on the basis of their grammatical distribution. In Section 3.2, I show how the modal clitics interact with each other, and demonstrate that they constitute a set rather than a paradigm. And in Section 3.3, I show the interaction of the modal clitics with obligatory grammatical categories, and relate these interactional patterns to the semantic features they encode.

3.1. Grammatical distribution and logical scope of the modal clitics

The modal clitics are predicate enclitics. With verbal predicates, whose obligatory grammatical categories are prefixed, and which include all transitive verbs and most intransitive verbs, they occur after the verbal root. And with stative predicates, whose obligatory grammatical categories are suffixed, and which include all adjectives and positionals, as well as the progressive verb *yook*, the verb of speaking *chank*, and the existential predicate *wank*, they occur immediately after the suffixes. As will be discussed in Section 3.3, in the case of both stative and verbal predicates, the grammatical categories in question are person–number and mood-aspect-tense-evidence. In addition to occurring after predicates and their suffixes, the modal clitics occur before non-modal enclitics, arguments (meaning noun-phrases co-referenced on the verb), and non-arguments (meaning adjuncts such as prepositions, relational nouns, and adverbs). Let me exemplify these distributional patterns.

14 These may be may be more or less decontextualized. As an example of a relatively decontextualized interpretation, one may take the answer to an ethnographic or linguistic question: 'What does this utterance mean?' And as an example of a relatively contextualized interpretation, one may take self-repair involving the addressee's misconstrual of their own commitment.

15 In this way, the physical placement of the modal clitics (as being further from the predicate than suffixes marking mood-aspect-tense-evidence and person–number) parallels their logical scope: they have scope over obligatory arguments and core operators. This is consonant with my claim in Section 2 that the modal clitics are clausal operators. See Van Valin and LaPolla (1997) for a discussion of cross-linguistic regularities underlying operator scope and its morphosyntactic expression.

16 Let me note that there are MATE-less constructions in which a verbal predicate appears in its non-finite form followed by the dative marked –*e*. Such constructions mark aspect. For example *xik w-e* (go Erg(1s)-Dat) may be glossed as 'I'm going' (when one is just leaving). In Spanish, it may be glossed as *ya me voy* (I'm just leaving). Such an aspectual marking only occurs with verbs of movement. In any case, with such aspectual constructions, modal clitics may occur after the non-finite predicate and before the dative construction. For example: *ok raj w-e chi wark* (begin CF Erg(1s)-Dat Comp sleep(Nom)), or 'I was just going to sleep'.
Example (8) shows the optative clitic *taxaq* occurring after the stative predicate *chunchu* (to be seated) and its affixes (tense/modality and person), and before a purposive complement. Example (9) shows the afactive clitic *tana* occurring after the intransitive verbal predicate *chalk* (to come), and before a proper name (which is cross-referenced as the argument of the predicate). As may be seen, obligatory grammatical categories occur as prefixes with verbal predicates, and as suffixes with stative predicates. Example (10) shows the factive clitic *pe* occurring after the stative predicate *wank* (to be/exist), and before a prepositional phrase, in a yes/no question (marked by the sentence-initial particle *ma*). Example (11) shows the optative clitic *taxaq* occurring after the adjectival predicate *yaal* (true), and before a full-clause complement. And example (12) shows the nonfactive clitic *moko*...*ta* circumfixed around the stative predicate *wank* (to be/exist), and before a locative deictic.

In utterances in which the preverbal focus-position is occupied (focusing, relativization, and Wh-movement), the modal clitics take the preposed constituent as their host. In this preposed position, they may encliticize with any constituent which may be focused (whether arguments or adjuncts). Thus, they may take as their hosts pronouns, proper names, deictics, manner adverbs, Wh-words, adjectives, and even predicative adpositions such as prepositions and relational nouns. Similarly, in cases of clausal, or ‘broad-scope negation’, marked by the nonfactive particle *ink’d*, they

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17 In Q’eqchi’, as in many languages (see Van Valin and LaPolla, 1997, p. 36), there are two pre-verbal positions or ‘slots’ where constituents may go. First, there is the *precore* slot, which is the location of focused NP’s (such as Wh-words). It is considered to be inside of the clause, but outside of the core. It involves no intonation break. Second, there is the *left-detached* position, which is the location of marked topics. It is considered to be outside of the clause, but within the sentence. It also involves an intonation break, and may be marked by the particle *ut* (and). And any argument there cannot be cross-referenced on the predicate. (See Berinstein (1985) for a thorough discussion of these positions in Q’eqchi’.) Most importantly for my purposes, is that modal clitics show up in ‘second-place position’. That is to say, modal clitics occur after the predicate (in cases without any elements in focus-position), and they occur after elements in focus-position, including the focus-particle *ha’*. 
are also preposed, occurring immediately after this particle. Lastly, the modal clitics have scope (more or less) within illocutionary force. In this way, they may occur with declaratory utterances (prosodic assertion), exclamatory utterances (prosodic exclamation), and interrogative utterances (with yes/no questions, signaled by the presence of the particle ma, and with Wh-questions, signaled by the presence of a Wh-word in focus-position). Let me exemplify these patterns.

Example (13) shows the optative clitic taxaq occurring after the Wh-word k’aru (what) in preverbal focus-position (cross-referenced on the predicate by the absolutive infix -Ø-). Example (14) shows the counterfactive clitic raj occurring after the Wh-word ani (who) in preverbal focus-position (cross-referenced on the predicate by the absolutive infix -Ø-). Example (15) shows the afactive clitic tana occurring after the NP a’an (he) in preverbal focus-position (cross-referenced on the predicate

18 Note that two Wh-words are composed of more than one morpheme: k’aru-ru (what-Erg(3s)-face = ‘what’), and chan-ru-ru (how-Erg(3s)-face = ‘how’). When modal clitics occur with these Wh-words, they sometimes occur after the Wh-word, and sometimes between the morphemes that compose the Wh-word: k’aru raj and k’aru-ru, chanru pe’ and chan pe’ ru. I cannot account for the difference in meaning (if there is one).
by the absolutive infix -Ø-). Example (16) shows the optative clitic taxaq occurring after the nonfactive particle inka’ā (not) in preverbal position. The pronoun a’an (he) in brackets shows that an NP can go in the preverbal focus-position with the nonfactive particle and a modal clitic. And examples (17) and (18) show a minimal pair. In example (17), the optative clitic taxaq occurs after the focus particle ha’ and before the NP in the preverbal focus-position. And example (18), based on a grammaticality judgment, shows this clitic occurring after the NP in the preverbal focus-position. Example (19) shows the optative clitic taxaq occurring after the Wh-word chanru (how) as part of a relativised clause. And example (20) shows the counterfactual clitic raj occurring after a non-finite predicate in the preverbal focus-position, which itself is the complement of the predicate ajok (to want). Notice, then, that modal clitics are always in second position: either post-predicate (focus-position not occupied) or post-preposed constituent (focus-position occupied). The foregoing points are summarized in Table 2.

Table 2
Grammatical distribution and operator scope of the modal clitics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distribution and scope</th>
<th>Modal clitics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Verbal or stative enclitic (unmarked)</td>
<td>+  +  +  +  +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preposed with focusing</td>
<td>+  +  +  +  +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preposed with relativation</td>
<td>+  +  +  +  +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preposed with Wh-movement</td>
<td>+  +  +  n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preposed with clausal negation</td>
<td>+  +  +  n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope over core operators (MATEs)</td>
<td>+  +  +  +  +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope over focus</td>
<td>+  +  +  +  +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope over clausal negation</td>
<td>+  +  +  n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope within illocutionary force</td>
<td>+/- +/- +/- +</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19 These distributional regularities directly parallel information structure. The modal clitics have scope over the focus of an utterance, regardless of the focus-structure of the utterance (cf. Van Valin and LaPolla, 1997; Lambrecht, 1994). Thus, in cases of predicate focus, when no constituent has been preposed, the modal clitics have scope over the predicate of the utterance. The topic, usually the grammatical subject in such cases, remains presupposed. In such cases, the modal clitics appear as verbal enclitics. See examples (8–12). In cases of sentence focus, such as presentationals marked with the stative predicate wank, which serve to introduce new participants, the entire utterance is being asserted and there is no topic. In such cases, the modal clitics have scope over the entire utterance, and they appear as stative enclitics. In cases of constituent focus, marked in Qeq’i by preposing the focused constituent to an immediately preverbal position, the modal clitics move to appear as enclitics on the preposed constituent. They have scope only over this preposed constituent. The rest of the utterance remains presupposed. See examples (13–19). In cases of sentential negation, marked by the nonfactive particle inka’ā, the modal clitics move to appear as enclitics of this particle. They have scope over sentential negation, which in turn typically has scope only over the predicate of an utterance. The topic remains presupposed. See example (16). Lastly, most of the modal clitics may also appear in utterances functioning as questions, exclamations, and assertions. They usually remain within the scope of such distinct forms of illocutionary force.
As may be seen from Table 2, the modal clitics constitute a cohesive form class insofar as they have distributional patterns and logical scopes in common. As may also be seen, the nonfactive clitic moko...ta is the only clitic whose distribution is slightly different. It cannot occur with either Wh-words or the nonfactive particle ink’a’ (which marks broad-scope, or clausal, negation). This accords with the discussion in Section 2, where this clitic was shown to mark features belonging to the grammatical category of valence (constituent-scope negation). And it accords with the marked morphological form of this clitic as circumfixed rather than encliticized.20 Lastly, this table also shows that the modal clitics pe’, tana, and taxiqa interact with illocutionary force in much more complicated ways than raj and moko...ta, insofar as only these last two clitics return utterances with unmarked illocutionary force. In the next section, wherein I show that this form class constitutes a set rather than a paradigm, I’ll show that this interaction with illocutionary force correlates with the fact that raj and moko...ta can be operated on by the other modal clitics, but not vice-versa.

3.2. Interactions of the modal clitics with each other

Modal clitics may occur with each other in a limited number of ways. (This section is adapted from Kockelman (2003b).) I have no tokens of utterances in which more than two modal clitics appear. And speakers’ grammaticality judgments for invented utterances of this type are always negative. In this way, there seems to be a maximum limit of two modal clitics per utterance—which greatly reduces the co-occurrence combinations that are possible. In utterances in which there are two modal clitics, the first modal clitic (that is, the clitic closest to the host, and thus the one with the most narrow scope) can only be either the nonfactive clitic moko...ta, or the counterfactive clitic raj.21 And in utterances in which the first modal clitic is the nonfactive clitic, any other modal clitic may occur. While in utterances in which the first modal clitic is the counterfactive clitic, any other modal clitic except the nonfactive

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20 There are at least four other verbal enclitics in Q’eqchi’-Maya. The verbal enclitic aj wi’ marks a narrated event as being done also. (Although the same form may also encliticize with numbers, in which case it mean only. And it may be used pre-topic in the form ka’ajwi’, in which case it means only.) It preposes to encliticize with any constituent in the focus position. And it preposes with the nonfactive particle ink’a’. Of all the other verbal enclitics, it is the most like the modal clitics. The verbal enclitic wi’ chik marks a narrated event as being done again. It only preposes in cases of sentential negation, enclitizing with the nonfactive particle ink’a’. The verbal enclitic wi’ co-occurs only with locative and instrumental foci. Although such constituents are necessarily proposed into focus-position, wi’ remains in its post-verbal position. When other constituents appear in focus-position it does not occur, nor does it occur with topicalizations of instruments or locations (a clause-initial position). It may optionally cliticize to the locative Wh-word bar, which occurs in focus position. (See Berinstein (1985).) It does prepose in cases of relativization. The nominal enclitic chik is semantically similar to the English words else and more, in that it may encliticize with all Wh-words (in focus-position) to give questions like where else, and it may encliticize with numbers and number-classes to give phrases like one more. It does not, however, ever form a verbal enclitic. Such non-modal verbal clitics therefore bare at most a tenuous resemblance to the modal clitics on the basis of their distribution and meaning.

21 Thus, the factive clitic pe’, the afactive clitic tana, and the optative clitic taxiqa, while able to occur with the nonfactive clitic moko...ta and the counterfactive clitic raj, cannot occur with each other.
clitic may occur. This gives seven possible combinations of the following scope and co-occurrence relations: *moko*. . . *ta* < *raj* < *taxaq*/*tanalpe*. Let me exemplify these combinations.

(21) **moko r-e tana li winq, r-e tana li ixq**

NF Erg(3s)-Dat AF Dm man Erg(3s)-Dat AF Dm woman

‘perhaps it’s not the man’s, perhaps it’s the woman’s’

(22) **naq wi raj tz’aqal in-na’, moko x-Ø-x-numsi ta raj li aatin a’an**

Comp if CF real Erg(1s)-mother NF Perf-Abs(3s)-Erg(3s)-pass NF CF Dm word that

‘if she were my real mother, she would not have passed on those words’

(23) **moko a’an ta pe’ na-Ø-raj**

NF that NF F Pres-Abs(3s)-Erg(3s)-want

‘that is not what he wants!’

(24) **moko laa’at taxaq t-at-xik**

NF Abs(2s) Opt Fut-Abs(2s)-go

‘if only you wouldn’t go’

(25) **ink’a’ raj tana-aq x-Ø-ee-baanu a’an**

Neg CF AF-NS Perf-Abs(3s)-Erg(3p)-do that

‘perhaps you shouldn’t have done that’

(26) **x-Ø-chal raj pe’**

Perf-Abs(3s)-come CF F

‘she was going to come!’

(27) **t-Ø-in-kul raj taxaq**

Fut-Abs(3s)-Erg(1s)-receive CF Opt

‘if only I were to receive it’ (grammaticality judgment)

Example (21) shows the nonfactive clitic *moko*. . . *ta* occurring with the afactive clitic *tana*. As may be seen, the combination *moko*. . . *ta* plus *tana* is morphophonemically reduced to *moko*. . . *tana*. Example (22) shows the nonfactive clitic *moko*. . . *ta* occurring with the counterfactive clitic *raj*. Example (23) show the nonfactive clitic *moko*. . . *ta* occurring with the factive clitic *pe’*. Example (24) shows the nonfactive clitic *moko*. . . *ta* occurring with the optative clitic *taxaq*. Again, morphophonemic reduction occurs, turning *moko*. . . *ta taxaq* into *moko*. . . *taxaq*. Example (25) shows the counterfactive clitic *raj* occurring with the afactive clitic *tana*. Example (26) shows the counterfactive clitic *raj* occurring with the factive clitic *pe’*. And example (27) shows the counterfactive clitic *raj* occurring with the optative clitic *taxaq*.

Table 3 enumerates these possibilities. From left to right, the modal clitics are ordered from ‘strongest certainty’ to ‘weakest certainty’: unmarked status (Ø); factive status (F); afactive status (AF); optative status (Opt); and counterfactive status (CF). The top two rows show combinations of modal clitics with positive (unmarked) valence. And the bottom two rows show combinations of modal clitics with negative valence. A question mark (?) by a combination means that I only have a grammaticality judgment. And a dash (—) means that the combination is non-applicable as
an option. Negative valence is marked by two means: first, by the nonfactive clitic moko\textsubscript{ta} (NF), as per examples (21–24); and second, by the nonfactive particle ink\textsubscript{a} (Neg), as will be further discussed in Section 4.1. As may be seen, constructions involving two modal clitics and negative status are only possible with the nonfactive particle ink\textsubscript{a}. Otherwise, both markers of negative valence combine equally well with the modal clitics.\footnote{It should be said that, in addition to the afactive clitic tana, there is also an afactive particle mare. While it indicates the speaker’s commitment to a proposition in a possible world, it is also used to provide hypothetical examples. In this function, it may occur with all the combinations in Table 3. Nonetheless, it may also occur with some of these combinations in its unmarked function as epistemic possibility. In particular, in the cases where it contrasts with the afactive clitic tana in having scope over the counterfactive clitic raj, the combination may be glossed as ‘perhaps it was (not) going to happen’. Whereas when such a combination is constructed using the afactive clitic tana, the combination may be glossed as ‘it should (not) have happened’.}

Notice that the nonfactive and counterfactive clitics may be operated on by the other modal clitics, but not vice-versa. Given that neither the nonfactive clitic nor the counterfactive clitic interact with illocutionary force (recall Table 2), in contrast to the other modal clitics, it makes sense that they may be operated on: they have scope within illocutionary force, whereas the other modal clitics have scope at the limits of illocutionary force. Thus, while the nonfactive and counterfactive clitics can operate on an assertion (i.e., a clause with unmarked illocutionary force) and return an assertion, when the optative, afactive and factive clitics operate on assertions they may return exclamation, wishes, and weak assertions.\footnote{Let me list some examples: mare a\’an pe\’ AF(F); mare a\’an tana AF(AF); mare a\’an raj AF(CF); mare a\’an taxaq: AF(Opt) (\?); mare ink\textsubscript{a}’ raj: AF(CF(NF)); and perhaps for tana, pe\’ and taxaq (\?); ink\textsubscript{a}’ raj tana: AF(CF(NF)); ink\textsubscript{a}’ raj pe\’: F(CF(NF)); ink\textsubscript{a}’ raj taxaq: Opt(CF(NF)); ink\textsubscript{a}’ raj pe\’ xuuboq.} Very simply, then, the scope of an operator constrains its co-occurrence possibilities—and raj and moko\textsubscript{ta} have narrower scope than pe\’, tana, and taxaq. Kockelman (2003b, 2004) takes up these issues in greater detail—detailing the relationship between semantics, scope, and grammaticalization.

### 3.3. Interaction of the modal clitics with obligatory verbal categories

As introduced in Section 2, and exemplified in the examples so far, there are two obligatory inflectional paradigms that occur with verbal predicates. One of these

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive valence</th>
<th>Strongest certainty</th>
<th>weakest certainty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ø</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Opt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F(CF)</td>
<td>AF(CF)</td>
<td>Opt(CF)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative valence</td>
<td>NF or Neg</td>
<td>CF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F(NF) or</td>
<td>Opt(NF) or</td>
<td>CF(NF) or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F(Neg)</td>
<td>Opt(Neg)</td>
<td>CF(Neg)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F(CF(Neg))</td>
<td>Opt(CF(Neg))</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3

Possible combinations of the modal clitics

\footnote{One might think that the factive clitic pe\’ should return strong assertions. However, while it does function as an emphatic, it usually functions as an exclamative.}
paradigms, whose members I will refer to as the ‘MATEs’, marks features pertaining to the verbal categories of mood, aspect, tense and evidence. They may be understood as core operators, in that they have scope over the predicate and its obligatory arguments. And the other one of these paradigms marks features pertaining to the verbal categories of person and number. These serve to cross-reference the obligatory arguments of the predicate. In what follows, I characterize each of these inflectional paradigms, and then discuss the co-occurrence constraints that arise in interactions between the members of these paradigms and the modal clitics.

Table 4 shows the inflectional forms and encoded features of the MATEs. These forms are prefixed to members of the verbal class, and they constitute a paradigm encoding a hierarchy of privative oppositions, sensitive to features pertaining to the grammatical categories of mood, aspect, tense, and evidentiality.\(^\text{25}\) As may be seen, the major division among members of this paradigm is that of mood. The feature [modal], for which the forms [chi-] and [mi-] are marked, is a general, non-indicative mood, which covers deontic (or ‘root’) modality, but not epistemic modality. Depending on context, its use ranges over jussive, obligative, precative, hortative, optative, and desiderative functions—all notional categories within Jespersen’s system which contain “an element of will” (Jespersen, 1965, p. 320). These forms contrast, in that [mi-] is marked for the feature [negative], while [chi-] is unmarked.\(^\text{26}\) Among

25 In his monograph Stewart (1980a), and in his essay “Tense/Aspect in Kekchi” Stewart (1980b), Stewart presents the “tense/aspect system” of Q’eqchi’ as having six prefixes. [ta-] he calls “future definite”, and says that it “indicates (1) a non-immediate future time as opposed to an action which will take place immediately, and/or (2) an aspect of definiteness or certainty that the action will take place, and/or (3) an attitude of intention or purpose on the part of the agent of the verb” (1980b, p. 75). [nak-] he calls the “present habitual”, and says that it “indicates (1) actions which are true at, but not limited to, the present time in that these actions have a quality of stability, and/or (2) actions which are habitual and customary” (p. 76). [x-] he calls the “recent past”, and says that it is “perfective” and “indicates (1) that the action took place no later than yesterday, and (2) that the action was completed” (Stewart, 1980b, p. 76). [ki-] he calls the “remote past”, and says that it indicates “(1) actions which took place in the more remote past, and (2) action that is completed” (Stewart, 1980b, p. 76). He calls [chi-] the “optative/imperative”, saying that “in terms of time this inflection indicates that the action is just about to occur or begins at the moment of speaking, thus dividing future time with the prefix [ta-]” (Stewart, 1980b, p. 76). He also thinks that it indicates “an immediate desire on the part of the speaker mixed with an element of doubt that the desire will be fulfilled, and in this sense may be said to be optative or exhortative” (Stewart, 1980b, p. 76). Finally, [mi-] he calls the “negative optative/imperative”, and thinks it has the same functions as [chi-], only negative (Stewart, 1980b, p. 76). 

26 There is also imperative illocutionary force, which is signaled by the absence of a MATE.
the inflectional forms unmarked for the feature [modal], the next largest division is between the forms marked for the aspectual feature [perfective] and those which are unmarked.\(^{27}\) The forms [x-] and [ki-], both marked for the feature [perfective], contrast in that [ki-] is also marked for the evidential feature [indirectly-known].\(^{28}\) It marks narrated events as being non-attested—either known through reported speech (typically myth or hearsay), or known via inference (rather than direct experience).\(^{29}\) Among the forms unmarked for the aspectual feature [perfective], the next largest division is that between the form [ta-], which is marked for the tensed feature [future], and the form [nak-], which is unmarked with respect to all features. This last form is the most contextually dependent, and its meaning can range from present, future, and habitual/customary, to generic, modal, and perfective. In neutral contexts it may be characterized as ‘present habitual’.

\(^{27}\) Progressive aspect is marked via the stative yook and the infinitive form of a verbal. In general, statives are marked for the aspectual feature [imperfective], and verbals are unmarked.

\(^{28}\) The particle len is an evidential that marks one’s evidence for one’s commitment world as arising from reported speech. It usually occurs after the verb, but may be preposed to encliticize with elements in the focus position. Unlike the quotative marker chank, which marks utterances as directly reported speech, len is used with indirectly reported speech. For example, a man sent his son to his brother’s house, to ask his other son to return home. Stopping at the door to the house, the boy inquired whether his brother was there, and said his father wanted him to return home. The girl at the door then reported this to the boy’s brother inside. When she returned, she said, ink’a nalaj xik chan, or ‘I don’t want to go’, he says’. When the boy returned home to report what transpired to his father, he said, ink’a len xraj chalk, or ‘it was said (len) he doesn’t want to come’. Notice, then, that while the original message was probably just ‘I don’t want to go’. In its second reporting, it became ‘I don’t want to go, he says’. And in its third reporting, it became ‘it was said he didn’t want to come’. The reported message is changed from first-person, present-tense, to third-person, past-tense. And the marked of reported speech is changed from chank (directly reported speech), to len (indirectly reported speech). And lastly, notice that the switch from chank to len happens when the speaker did not himself hear the original utterance. Unfortunately, this is the only token of len I have in which I heard the initial report and the subsequent report. All other tokens involve only the report (using len), or an initial radio broadcast—usually a news message—which tend to be reported with len. In this way, chank is used when the speaker heard the original message, and len is used when the speaker heard a copy of the original message—whether as directly reported speech or already as indirectly reported speech (or not reported speech at all, such as a news commentary about flooding in a distant village). In addition, while the quotative particle chank requires that one knows the original speaker, the reportative clitic len doesn’t. Speakers emphasize that the use of len does not affect the truth value of an utterance—that they are just as likely to believe an utterance which involves len as any other. (And this makes sense, for although the speaker is unknown, the message usually comes from the radio.) However, they do emphasize that the use of len indicates that one doesn’t know an event well (ink’a nakaanaw chi us, moko chaabil ta naj nakaanaw). In addition, speakers characterize the use of this particle as involving incidents which one didn’t see or hear (len porke moko xwil ta, ut moko xwabi ta). This presumes that the events denoted by utterances unmarked by len are known to their speakers by direct sensory expression.

\(^{29}\) This is, however, complicated by the fact that women and old people are much more conservative in their use (using this MATE to mark inference), whereas men tend to use it only for either myth or remote events. In this way, for most speakers, it is beginning to look more like a remote past tense feature. Typically, women use this in the inferential sense; and men use this in hearsay sense. For example, a woman standing by the window says to her friend, kik’ulun li saq’e, or ‘the sun has arrived’. Here the arrival of the sun is not known by actually seeing the sun, but inferred by the change of lighting through the clouds. Notice, then, that this has nothing to do with ‘remote past’. (But this makes sense: perfective aspect plus unexperienced evidence easily functions as past-tense.)
Table 5 shows the inflectional forms and encoded features of the verbal paradigms marking the grammatical categories of person and number. Q’eqchi’ is a head-marking and morphologically-ergative language. There are, then, two sets of person–number infixes: set A, for ergative case; and set B, for absolutive case.30 On transitive verbs, set A is used to cross-reference grammatical subjects, and set B is used to cross-reference grammatical objects. Inflectionally speaking, the verbal complex is ordered as follows: MATE-set B-set A-verb. On intransitive verbs, set B is used to cross-reference grammatical subjects. Inflectionally speaking, the verbal complex is ordered as follows: MATE-set B-verb. Set A is also used with nouns (including relational nouns and prepositions) to cross-reference the possessor. Set B is also used to cross-reference grammatical subjects on statives (which are always intransitive); however, the forms are suffixed, rather than infixed. Pronouns, usually cross-referencing the arguments of predicates, are derived from set B forms. They do not usually occur in utterances unless contrastive or emphatic.31

Table 5
Inflectional forms and encoded features of person–number paradigms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Person and number</th>
<th>Ergative case (set A)</th>
<th>Absolutive case (set B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consonant initial</td>
<td>Vowel initial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First-singular</td>
<td>-in-</td>
<td>-w-, -inw-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second-singular</td>
<td>-aa-</td>
<td>-aaw-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third-singular</td>
<td>-x-</td>
<td>-r-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First-plural</td>
<td>-qa-</td>
<td>-q-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second-plural</td>
<td>-ee-</td>
<td>-eer-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third-plural</td>
<td>-e’x-</td>
<td>-e’r-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 shows the inflectional forms and encoded features of the verbal paradigms marking the grammatical categories of person and number. Q’eqchi’ is a head-marking and morphologically-ergative language. There are, then, two sets of person–number infixes: set A, for ergative case; and set B, for absolutive case.30 On transitive verbs, set A is used to cross-reference grammatical subjects, and set B is used to cross-reference grammatical objects. Inflectionally speaking, the verbal complex is ordered as follows: MATE-set B-set A-verb. On intransitive verbs, set B is used to cross-reference grammatical subjects. Inflectionally speaking, the verbal complex is ordered as follows: MATE-set B-verb. Set A is also used with nouns (including relational nouns and prepositions) to cross-reference the possessor. Set B is also used to cross-reference grammatical subjects on statives (which are always intransitive); however, the forms are suffixed, rather than infixed. Pronouns, usually cross-referencing the arguments of predicates, are derived from set B forms. They do not usually occur in utterances unless contrastive or emphatic.31

Table 6 shows the co-occurrence constraints between the modal clitics and members of the verbal paradigms just discussed: prefixes marking mood, aspect, tense and evidence (MATEs), and infixes marking person and number. Person, which could extend along a dimension orthogonal to the page, has been projected onto the page. It includes both those forms which mark grammatical subjects of transitive predicates (ergative case) and those forms which mark grammatical subjects of intransitive predicates (absolutive case). Number has been restricted to singular. A plus-mark (+) in a box means that the particular combination is grammatical. A minus-mark (−) means that the particular combination is ungrammatical. An a plus/minus-mark (+/−) means that the particular combination is grammatical, but relatively inappropriate.

Notice the following patterns. First, no modal clitics may occur with the MATE [mi-], which is marked for the features [modal, negative]. And, with the exception of the optative clitic tayaq, and the afactive clitic tana (in first-person predcations), the modal clitics cannot occur with MATEs marked for the feature [modal].32 In other

30 Berinstein (1985, pp. 41–46) has been argued that number, in the case of third-person (or rather ‘non-person’), is marked independently of person, such that there is no distinction between ergative and absolutive case in such situations.
31 And sentences in which two appear are generally judged ungrammatical by speakers (cf. Berinstein, 1985, 22–23).
32 This is akin to the epistemic possibility particle mare being able to co-occur with the afactive clitic tana.
words, status as a clausal operator may not act on assertions inflectionally marked for deontic modality, or mood, as a core operator, except in the case of optative status. This makes sense in that deontically modal utterances are already epistemically modal: utterances with ‘an element of will’ already have their epistemic value in question. Constructions involving the optative clitic *taxaq* are already deontically modal (turning on a *wish* world)—so there is resonance with the MATE [chi-] rather than contradiction. And, as will be discussed in Section 4.2, constructions involving the MATE [chi-], the afactive clitic *tana*, and first-person predications are only used to respond to suggestions and polite commands. Thus, from a functional perspective, such utterances are deontically modal. Lastly, notice that there are no constraints on the MATE [ki-], marked for the evidential feature [indirectly-known]. In such constructions, the speaker’s commitment to the truth of the narrated event is not in question, only the speaker’s relation to the source of information.

Second, third-person is grammatical for any combination of modal clitics and (non-modally-marked) MATEs. Given that the modal clitics specify the status of the speaker’s commitment event to a narrated event, and often index the status of the addressee’s commitment to a narrated event, and given the relative non-markedness of third-person-singular (as non-subject, non-person, non-plural), such relative freedom makes sense. Only when the action of a participant in the speech event is being described, do indexed grounds (commitment events) and denoted figures (as participants in the narrated events), come into tension.

Third, future-tense predications have more grammatical freedom than present-tense, perfective-aspect, or indirectly-known-evidentiality predications. Given that the narrated events characterized by such future-tense constructions are not yet actual (though the propositions expressed by such constructions are still ‘true’), they may occur with first- and second-person predications without being inappropriate. Thus, it is more appropriate to use the factive, afactive, and optative clitic with future actions (whether one’s own or one’s addressee’s) than it is their past, habitual, or perfective actions.

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33 And notice how this corroborates my analysis of the MATE [ta-] as marking future tense.

34 Interestingly, while speakers say the combination of [chi-] and *tana* is okay in first-person (but not second- and third-person), they also don’t outright condemn the combination of [mi-] and *tana* with first-person (but not second- and third-), merely saying that its doesn’t come out good (*ink’d* *us nā’el*), in that ‘it’s as if one is praying to oneself’ (chanchan *li nakaatij aawib aajunes*).
And fourth, the factive, afactive, and optative clitics are judged relatively inappropriate in first- and second-person (non-future and non-modal) constructions. This makes good ethnopsychological sense. In the case of the factive clitic, because one knows what one has done simultaneously with doing it (and without being told), one cannot have recently learned what one has done from some external source. And similarly, because one knows what one has done better than anyone else, one is not likely to have to stress one’s own actions to another. Exceptions arise in cases of forgetting, inebriation, argument, etc. Second-person predication involving the factive clitic are judged inappropriate unless confined to ‘guessing games’ (as in ‘guess where I bought my pants?’). In such a genre, upon learning the answer (that one’s addressee has kept from one regarding their own actions), one may repeat the guess, now as an assertion rather than a question, in conjunction with the factive clitic pe (as in ‘you bought them there!’).

In the case of the afactive clitic, one knows what one oneself has done. One cannot therefore be non-committed to the truth of a narrated event that involves one’s own perfective or habitual action (although one can be non-committed to the truth of one’s future action). Again, exceptions arise in cases of forgetting, inebriation, etc. Similarly, it is relatively inappropriate to inform one’s addressee of what they may or may not have done. Again, exceptions arise in the case of ‘guessing games’, in which one is trying to guess what one’s addressee has done in the context of a relatively marked genre.

And, in the case of the optative clitic, one cannot wish for one’s own perfective or habitual actions anymore than one can wish for one’s addressee’s perfective or habitual actions, insofar as these are either already known (to be true or false), or readily knowable (by asking one’s addressee). In sum, the semantic features encoded by the modal clitics easily motivate the co-occurrence constraints between the modal clitics and obligatory verbal categories.

4. Indexical objects, pragmatic functions, and speaker interpretations

In this section, I discuss each of the modal clitics at length, paying particular attention to their non-semantic modes of meaning. In Section 4.1, I discuss the non-factive clitic moko...ta, and compare it with the nonfactive particle ink’a’. In Section 4.2, I discuss the afactive clitic tana. In Section 4.3, I discuss the optative clitic taxaq. In Section 4.4, I discuss the factive clitic pe’. In Section 4.4, I discuss the counterfactive clitic raj. And lastly, in Sections 4.5 and 4.6, I discuss two modal clitics which have not yet been mentioned insofar as they only occur with interrogatory illocutionary force. Section 4.5 deals with the contradictive clitic tabi’, which signals that a question is being asked rhetorically in order to contradict the addressee’s commitment to the contrary. And Section 4.6 deals with the positive clitic tawi’, which signals that a question is being posed rather than asked.

4.1. Negative valence: moko...ta

The nonfactive clitic moko...ta, which signals the speaker’s commitment to not p (in an unspecified world), is the least marked modal clitic. As mentioned in Section 2,
it encodes features relating to the grammatical category of valence rather than status. Thus, while it characterizes the narrated event to which the speaker is committed, it does not characterize the commitment event itself. *Moko...ta* should be contrasted with the nonfactive particle *ink’a*, in that it has narrow focus (usually negating core constituents, such as the predicate or one of its arguments), whereas *ink’a* has broad focus (usually negating predicate phrases or entire clauses). As was seen in Section 3.2, *ink’a* has less constraints on its interaction with modal clitics than *moko...ta*, and can be part of a clause that is operated on by two modal clitics. In addition, *ink’a* can serve as the negative answer to a yes/no question. And, in accordance with its unmarked focus-structure, *ink’a* occurs much more frequently than *moko...ta* in conversation. 

Insofar as *moko...ta* serves as constituent-scope negation, and does not characterize the commitment event, I will not be focused on it in what follows, except insofar as it interacts with the other modal clitics.

4.2. Afactive status: *tana*

The afactive clitic *tana* signals the speaker’s commitment to *p* in a possible world. In addition, it may indexically create that the speaker is committed to

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35 It is usually used to assert not *p* in the context of the addressee’s commitment to *p*. (This commitment may be weak, and possibly created by the nonfactive utterance itself.) In marked circumstances, however, it may also be used to assert not *p*. Very simply, then, nonfactive assertions are unmarkedly used to deny information, and markedly used to assert negative information. This is, of course, one reason the negation of logical languages is different from the negation of natural languages.

36 The afactive *tana* should be contrasted with the afactive particle *mare*. Like *tana*, *mare* marks epistemic modality, signaling that there is a possible world in which the speaker is committed to some proposition. *Mare* differs from *tana* in that it has unmarked (or broad) focus, rather than narrow focus. One might compare *mare* and *tana* to ‘maybe’ (as an adverb, having scope over a sentence) and ‘may’ (as a modal auxiliary verb, used in its epistemic sense, having scope over a clause). As will be discussed in Section 4.5, *mare* is often used to signal hypothetical worlds. In this role, it has sentence-scope: *mare pe’ treinta*, or ‘perhaps it is thirty (insistive)’. It is often used with first-person, future-tense utterances. And it often occurs in positive-negative disjunctive utterances: *mare tinruq, mare ink’a*, or ‘maybe I’ll go, maybe I won’t’. Lastly, it can stand alone as an utterance. Otherwise, its use is difficult to distinguish from *tana*. For example, a woman, returning home, asks her daughter where her husband is. Her daughter says she doesn’t know. And the woman says, *mare wan rik’in inna*, or ‘perhaps he is with my mother-in-law’. Or, while leaving to work in the fields one morning, a man is asked by his wife when he will be returning home. He says, *mare sa’ kiib hoor*, or ‘perhaps by two o’clock’. Or, when I ask how many pounds of corn come in a sack, a woman answers, *mare jun kintal*, or ‘perhaps one-hundred pounds’. Speakers’ accounts of the meaning of this particle usually turn on an either/or meaning. For example, one speaker suggested that the utterance *malaj tinruaq wulaj*, or ‘perhaps I will be able (to do it) tomorrow’, means that ‘it is not completely true whether I will be able to or not’ (*moko tz’aqal yaal ta ma tinruaq ta o ma ink’a* ta). He then used the construction itself to gloss the phrase: ‘perhaps I will be able (to do it), and perhaps I will not be able (to do it)’ (*mare tinruaq, mare ink’a*). He finished by saying that such an utterance has two meanings (*yal wib li ru naraj naxye*). Another speaker suggested that *mare* means that ‘you don’t want to say’ (*ink’a* *nakauaj xyebal*). In particular, if one is asked about one’s future actions, one can answer with *mare*—often with two clauses, each headed by *mare*, and one being the negation of the other: ‘perhaps I will go now, perhaps not’ (*mare ninxik hoon, mare ink’a*). Notice, then, that this person’s gloss focused on the desire of the speaker (not to make a promise), rather than on the truth of the utterance. And notice that all of these glosses are similar to those given by speakers for *tana*. 

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not p in a possible world, or indexically presuppose that the addressee is committed to not p in a possible world. In this way, tana marks simple epistemic possibility in the context of the speaker and/or addressee’s possible commitment to the contrary. It may usually be glossed as ‘perhaps’. For example, arriving at the home of her sister, a woman notices the door is locked. She asks:

(29a) **S1:** bar wan-Ø-Ø
where be/exist-Pres-Abs(3s)
‘where is she?’
And her husband answers:

(29b) **S2:** xko’-Ø-tana sa’ k’ayil, maa ani
go(Perf)-Abs(3s) AF inside market Neg who
‘perhaps she’s gone to the market, she’s not around’

Example (29) shows a very frequent use of *tana*: providing uncertain information in the context of an addressee’s question. While providing uncertain information outside of the context of an addressee’s previous question is relatively rare, it does occur in the context of attributing negative motivations to others. For example, in recounting to her friend how her first child’s godfather refused to be the godfather of her second child (after he had heard that the child’s parents were unsure about asking him again), a woman described his refusal:

(30a) **S1:** ut yal x-Ø-x-ye chaq w-e naq sik’ li w-eeqaj
and only Perf-Abs(3s)-Erg(3s)-say hither Erg(1s)-Dat Comp seek(Imp) Dm Erg(1s)-substitute
‘and he said to me ‘find my substitute’’

(30b) **x-baan tana li-x josq’il**
Erg(3s)-because AF Dm-Erg(3s) anger
‘because of his anger perhaps’

(30c) **sa’ junpaat tana x-Ø-chal li-x josq’il**
inside quickly AF Perf-Abs(3s)-come Dm-Erg(3s) anger
‘quickly perhaps came his anger’

(30d) **naq ki-Ø-r-abi li aatin a’an**
Comp Inf-Abs(3s)-Erg(3s)-hear Dm word that
‘when he heard that word’ (that is, when he heard the parents were unsure about asking him again)

(30e) **naq sik’ jun-aq w-eeqaj chan-k-Ø**
Comp seek(Imp) one-NS Erg(1s)-substitute say-Pres-Abs(3s)
‘that he said ‘seek a substitute for me’’

(30f) **S2:** aah
‘aah’

(30g) **S1:** aban laa’in x-Ø-in-sik’
but Abs(1s) Perf-Abs(3s)-Erg(1s)-seek
‘so I sought one’
(30h) pero ut anaqwan na-Ø-raho’ chi sa’ x-ch’ool
    but and now Pres-Abs(3s)-be.bitter Comp inside Erg(3s)-heart
    ‘but now his heart is bitter’
(30i) S2: aah
    ‘aah’
(30j) S1: ra x-in-r-eek’a
    bad Perf-Abs(1s)-Erg(3s)-feel
    ‘he senses me badly’ (or ‘he holds rancor against me’)
(30k) S2: aah
    ‘aah’
(30l) S1: pero x-maak li-x josq’il, x-Ø-x-ye w-e sa’ junpaat naq
    but Erg(3s)-because Dm-Erg(3s) anger Perf-Abs(3s)-Erg(3s)-say Erg(3s)-Dat
    inside quickly Comp
    ‘but because of his anger, he said to me quickly that’
(30m) sik’ li w-eeqaj, ink’a’ na-Ø-w-aj chan-k-Ø
    seek(Imp) Dm Erg(1s)-substitute Neg Pres-Abs(3s)-Erg(1s)-want say-Pres-
    Abs(3s)
    ‘‘search for my substitute, I don’t want (to do it)’ he said’
(30n) S2: aah, n-Ø-in-taw r-u
    aah Pres-Abs(3s)-Erg(1s)-understand Erg(3s)-face
    ‘aah, I get it’
(30o) S1: entons, laa’in x-Ø-in-sik’, anaqwan ra chi sa’ x-ch’ool
    thus Abs(1s) Perf-Abs(3s)-Erg(1s)-seek now bad Comp inside Erg(3s)-heart
    ‘thus I sought (his substitute), (and) now he is angry’

The afactive clitic tana is used in lines (30b) and (30c). In both instances, the speaker is discussing the anger (josq’il) of her son’s godfather. In line (30b), what is being modalized as possible is not the existence of the man’s anger, but its causal relation to what the man said. And in line (30c), what is being modalized is the suddenness of the man’s anger upon hearing that the woman was unsure about asking him again. In both cases, however, the existence of the man’s anger is presupposed. Indeed, in lines (30a–b), the anger is taken to be the cause of an utterance. And in lines (30c–d), the anger is taken to be caused by another utterance. In this way, what is being modalized is not the existence of a negative emotion (nor its attribution to an actor), but the causal relation between a negative emotion and an utterance: in the first instance, emotion causing utterance; and in the second instance, utterance causing emotion. In lines (30h), (30j), (30l), and (30o), more negative emotions are attributed to this man, none of which are modalized with tana. And, indeed, in line (30l), the man’s anger is again predicated as causal of his actions, but this time without an afactive clitic. In this way, while tana is used to modalize the causal relationship between utterance and emotion, it is only used the first time these causal relationships are discussed. Insofar as the addressee has added no information to the speaker’s knowledge in the utterances between lines (30c) and (30l), the speaker’s subsequent certainty seems more a function of her ongoing relationship with an addressee, than actual ‘uncertainty’ about the
narrated event in question. Indeed, as will be discussed in Section 4.5, this woman’s friend is not a close friend, such that tana may simply be indexing a lack of trust (regarding whether or not her utterances will be reported to others).

Another frequent use of tana is speaker-initiated repair. In particular, after having presupposed information the speaker later realizes the addressee may not know, the speaker may ask the addressee whether they do indeed know the information, followed by ink’a tana, or ‘perhaps not’. For example, in telling her sister-in-law about two children who had suffered the same illness, a woman said the following:

(31a) S1: kama’an x-Ø-xok r-e lix Laur r-e laj Manu
  like.this Perf-Abs(3s)-Erg(3s)-gather Erg(3s)-Dat SD Laura Erg(3s)-Dat SD Manuel
  ‘in this manner was lost a child belonging to Laura, and another belonging to Manuel’

(31b) S1: ma aaw-ilom jun-aq x-k’ula’al laj Manuel, ink’a’ tana
  Question Erg(3s)-seen one-NS Erg(3s)-child SD Manuel Neg AF
  ‘did you see Manuel’s child? perhaps not’

(31c) S2: ink’a’
  Neg
  ‘no’

(31d) S1: jun x-k’ula’al naq wan-Ø-Ø ki-Ø-kam
  one Erg(3s)-child Comp exist-Pres-Abs(3s) Inf-Abs(3s)-die
  ‘one child of his that there was died’

In line (31a), the speaker presupposes information (the existence of a child belonging to Manuel). In line (31b), the speaker checks to see whether it was okay to presuppose this information, followed by the phrase ink’a tana, or ‘perhaps not’. When the addressee responds in line (31c) that she did not know about the child, the speaker then asserts in line (31d) what she previously presupposed in line (31a). In this way, ink’a tana indexes the markedness of a question asking what was just presupposed—giving, in effect, a reason for such a question. In other words, one may tentatively answer one’s own question negatively (that is, with the afactive clitic tana), in the presupposed context of one’s just having implicitly answered it affirmatively.

As was seen in example (29), the low certainty that is indexed by tana may be due to the inferential nature of the speaker’s knowledge. In example (32), a man uses tana in the context of a second-person, future-tense predication, along with an explanation for his modalization:

(32a) S1: ma t-at-chalq
  Question Fut-Abs(2s)-come
  ‘will you come (tomorrow)?’

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37 This is to say, one may be committed to a narrated event in a possible world in the context of an addressee’s possible commitment to the inverted narrated event. Or, one may be committed to a narrated event in a possible world in the context of not wanting to assume responsibility for one’s commitment.
(32b) **S2:** aah, saber, ink’a’ n-Ø-in-naw ma t-in-chalq tawi‘
  aah who.knows Neg Pres-Abs(3s)-Erg(1s)-know Question Fut-Abs(1s)-come
  Positive
  ‘aah, saber, I don’t know whether I’ll come’

(32c) **S1:** t-at-chalq tana, porke ralal kutanq nak-at-k’ulun
  Fut-Abs(2s)-come AF because every day Pres-Abs(2s)-come
  ‘you’ll probably come, because everyday you come’

As may be seen, I gloss *tana* in line (32c) as ‘probably’ because *tana* seems to be
marking uncertainty in the context of describing the future actions of one’s addressee: indeed, the speaker in line (32c) is weakly contradicting the speaker in line (32b).
Here, then, the second clause of line (32c) gives the rationale for the speaker’s commitment to p in a possible world. In this way, *tana* functions as a weak contradiction in the context of inference through attention to habit. And, in this way, the relative strength of certainty is contextually variable.

There are many utterances in which the afactive clitic *tana* occurs with the afactive particle *mare* (maybe). All of my tokens of such utterances are answers to questions which are posed (using the positive clitic *tawi*) rather than asked. In this way, just as being asked a question to which one doesn’t know the answer can license a single afactive clitic—see example (29)—being in the context of a posed question to which one doesn’t know the answer can license an afactive particle and an afactive clitic.
For example, in discussing the direction in which a new house had been built, a man said to his friend:

(33a) **S1:** bar tawi li-x jayalil, ma arin o ma arin
  where Positive Dm-Erg(3s) direction Question here or Question here
  ‘where could it be facing? here or here?’ (along with two gestures)
  And his friend answers:

(33b) **S2:** aah, mare arin tana
  aah, maybe here AF
  ‘aah, maybe here perhaps’ (along with one gesture)

Notice, then, when a speaker indexes, through the positive clitic *tawi*’, that their addressee does not know the answer to their question either (33a), the addressee may doubly modalize their answer (33b). And notice how the speaker’s assumption about their addressee’s relative lack of knowledge maps onto the addressee’s doubly modalized answer to the speaker’s question: there is a possible world in which there is a possible world in which the speaker is committed to the narrated event.

With Wh-words, *tana* marks indefinite assertions. For example, in discussing his plans to travel to the United States to find work, a man said:

(34a) **joq’e tana t-in-xik aran**
  when AF Fut-Abs(1s)-go there
  ‘someday I will go there’
(34b) aban toj maak’a’ in-tumin, toj maak’a’ in-hu
    but still not.exist Erg(1s)-money still not-exist Erg(1s)-paper
    ‘but I still don’t have money, I still don’t have papers’

In line (34a), the Wh-word jog’e (when) occurs in conjunction with the afactive clitic tana, and I gloss the construction as ‘someday’.\(^{38}\) That such an utterance acts as an indefinite assertion is corroborated by the speaker’s second utterance (34b), in which he qualifies his previous utterance—giving, in effect, the condition in which the possible commitment event would correspond with the speech event, in which a possible world would correspond with this world. Indeed, such indefinite assertions can be remodalized using the afactive particle mare, showing they are truly not questions. For example, in telling her husband that the door to their house was unlocked when she returned home from church, a woman said:

(35) mare ani tana x-Ø-ok sa’ li q-ochoch
    maybe who AF Perf-Abs(3s)-enter inside Dm Erg(1p)-house
    ‘perhaps someone entered our house’

In example (35), the sentence-initial particle mare signals epistemic possibility, and the Wh-word ani (who), in conjunction with the afactive clitic tana, may be glossed as ‘someone’.\(^{39}\) Notice that the presence of the afactive particle mare shows that the utterance does not have interrogatory illocutionary force (and that mare has scope over tana). And notice that indefinite NPs, signaled by the presence of a Wh-word in conjunction with the afactive clitic tana, are always in focus-position (insofar as Wh-words are always in focus position). In this way, indefinite NPs are necessarily focused NPs.

In glossing the meaning of such indefinite assertions, speakers often use the exact same construction with the positive clitic tawi in place of the afactive clitic tana. As will be discussed in Section 4.7, the positive clitic serves to pose questions without actually asking them. Thus, in line (34a), if tana were replaced with tawi, the utterance would be glossed as ‘when could I go there?’ One reason such constructions are said to be equivalent, is that the utterances with tawi have as their presupposition the utterances with tana: to ask ‘who could have done something’ is to presuppose that ‘someone did something’. A second reason is that utterances with tawi also lose their interrogative illocutionary force: they function not as questions, but as assertions. And lastly, speakers’ interpretations of both constructions often turned on a milpa that has been broken (or trampled) or a house that has been entered (or robbed). In other words, uncertainty (indexed by tana) and wonder (indexed by

\(^{38}\) In discussing the grammatical category of status in the context of Hopi, Whorf (1956) mentions indefinite status, which ranges from Wh-words in questions to Wh-words in indefinite assertions. In effect, he notes that ‘who did it’ is grammatically equivalent to ‘someone did it’. In Q’eqchi’, such indefinite assertions are created using a Wh-word in conjunction with the afactive clitic tana. Whorf notes: “the meaning of the word is an indefinite suggestion that implies also a more or less inquisitive attitude ‘something—I wonder what?’” (p. 118).

\(^{39}\) And, indeed, the emphasis here is on the personhood, or who-ness, of who did it. For the speaker added moko xul ta, or ‘it (was) not an animal’.
tawi) map onto prototypical fears of villagers (gendered as they are): assault by unknowns, or nonspecifics, on one’s most vulnerable inalienable possessions (field and home, livelihood and hearth). In this way, equivalence of glosses is motivated not only by similar semantic features, but also by similar prototypical uses—with such prototypes indexing local anxieties. In this way, there is a relationship between uncertainty—indexed by tana or tawi—and anxiety regarding the vulnerability of one’s most easily threatened inalienable possessions.

As will be discussed in Section 4.5, the counterfactive clitic raj, in conjunction with the nonfactive particle ink’a, often serves a function similar to ‘should not’. That is to say, one’s commitment to a narrated event may be a deontic world—one of either practical or moral necessity. In such constructions, the afactive clitic may occur, softening the necessity. In this way, tana serves to make deontic necessity weaker or more polite. For example, when examining the work done on his house by two assistants, a man notices they have already put up planks in the place where a window should go. He says to them:

(36a) ink’a raj tana-aq x-Ø-ee-baanu a’an
    Neg CF AF-NS Perf-Abs(3s)-Erg(3p)-do that
    ‘perhaps you shouldn’t have done that’
(36b) ink’a ajel li r-u chi-x-baanunkil li k’anjel a’an
    Neg important Dm Erg(3s)-face Comp-Erg(3s)-do(Nom) Dm work that
    ‘it was not important to do that job’

Notice that line (36b) is essentially a paraphrase of line (36a). And such a contextualized interpretation of the construction in line (36a) accords with more decontextualized interpretations that speakers offer in interviews. For example, speakers gloss the construction in line (36a) as (it is) not good (to do) (moko us ta xbaanunil). In this way, a linkage of counterfacticity, nonfactivity, and afactivity mark polite or weak necessity, which is easily interpreted as the violation of goodness or importance. In this example, the afactive clitic merely serves to make the injunction more deferential—indexing the relationship of reciprocation underlying the labor-pooling necessary for house-building. (That is to say, one cannot be directly castigated by someone for botching some task in the midst of doing that someone a favor.)

40 As may be seen in line (36a), this clitic is fused with nonspecific morpheme –aq, which often occurs after numbers (oxibaq or ‘about three’), or with Wh-words (anihaq or ‘whoever’) giving, tanaaq. I can’t account for any differences in this distribution.

41 Given that the counterfactive clitic raj often indexes desire or intention, one might have glossed the utterance in example (36a) as ‘perhaps you weren’t going to do that’ (i.e., ‘perhaps you were thinking about doing something else). That is to say, one would expect that constructions with the counterfactive clitic followed by the afactive clitic would serve to modalize, as possible, states of affairs that the speaker would be committed to in another world. However, I don’t have utterances that have this sense. Rather, in signaling their own uncertainty about others’ motivations, speakers use the afactive particle mare (perhaps) followed by an utterance with the counterfactive clitic raj. In this way, the utterance, mare x-Ø-chal raj (perhaps Perf-Abs(3s)-come CF) may be glossed as ‘perhaps he was going to come’. Whereas the utterance x-Ø-chal raj tana (Perf-Abs(3s)-come CF AF) may be glossed as ‘perhaps he should have come’.
The afactive clitic *tana* may occur with first-person, optative-mood predications in relatively formulaic constructions.\(^{42}\) For example:

(37a)  **S1:** *ch-at-k’ulunq-aq w-ik’in*  
 Mod-Abs(2s)-come-NS Erg(1s)-with  
 ‘you would come with me’

(37b)  **S2:** *ch-in-k’ulunq-aq tana*  
 Mod-Abs(1s)-come-NS AF  
 ‘I would perhaps come’

(37c)  **S1:** *ch-at-k’ulunq-aq bi’*  
 Mod-Abs(2s)-come-NS then  
 ‘you would come then’

In line (37a), a man asks his father-in-law to come to his house for a feast before planting. In line (37b), the father-in-law accepts, using the afactive clitic *tana*. And in line (38c), the man repeats his original utterance with the particle *bi’* (then). In this way, the afactive clitic may occur in utterances which are the response to what is somewhere between a question and a suggestion. In a similar fashion, speakers may use *tana* in their response to a command or suggestion. For example:

(38a)  **S1:** *tento-hat t-at-xik*  
 must-Abs(2s) Fut-Abs(2s)-go  
 ‘you must go’

(38b)  **S2:** *aah us, jo’kan tana*  
 aah good like.this AF  
 ‘aah, okay, perhaps then’

In line (38a), a man tells his younger brother to go to a village meeting, using the deontic mood predicate *tento* (must). The younger brother answers in line (38b), by saying *jo’kan tana*, or ‘perhaps like that’. While I don’t really understand examples (37) and (38), it is as if the possible world indexed by the speaker with *tana* is resonating with the necessary world, or wish world, indexed by the addressee’s previous utterance. It may also be the case that *tana* is serving a function closer to probability—see example (32)—and thus the speaker is saying that because of such a command or suggestion he or she should go. In such a case, epistemic probability would be serving as deontic necessity.

Speakers gloss *tana* as ‘you don’t know, you only think’ (*ink’a’ nakaanaw, yal nak-aak’a’uxla*). Similarly, they say that it marks ‘just a thought’ (*yal ta jun lix k’a’uxlankil*). In addition, speakers may add to these constructions the prepositional phrases *sa’ aach’ool* (inside your heart) or *sa’ aak’a’uxl* (inside your thoughts), glossing *tana*, for example, as ‘you only think inside your heart, you don’t know’.*\(^{43}\)

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\(^{42}\) Other combinations of optative-mood and person are judged ungrammatical by speakers, and I have no tokens of such utterances.

\(^{43}\) Thus, when asked to gloss *nachal tana*, or ‘perhaps he comes’, one speaker offered the interpretation that *yal xaak’a’uxla sa’ laa ch’ool, moko xaanaaw ta*, or ‘you only think inside your heart, you don’t know’. 
Such decontextualized interpretations resonate with more contextualized interpretations. In particular, *tana* may occur in relative clauses headed by the predicate *k’auxlank* (to think): *yookin chixk’auxlankil nag tchalq tana, pero maaji ninnaq joq’e*, or ‘I am thinking that he will possibly come, but I still don’t know when’. And *tana* may also occur in relative clauses headed by the prepositional phrase *sa’ ch’ool ej* (inside one’s heart): *sin ch’ool laa’in tchalq tana*, or ‘inside my heart he will perhaps come’. Notice, then, that there are two contrasts being made in these interpretations: thinking versus knowing; and inside one’s heart versus (implicitly) outside in public. In this way, the commitment world grammatically encoded by *tana* (in contrast to the commitment world of an unmarked utterance) is interpreted as intentionalized (thought), localized (inside the heart or thoughts), and personalized (the heart or thoughts are inalienable possessions of the speaker). And this commitment world is implicitly contrasted with knowing, externalization, and common possession (or equal-access).

Constructions involving *tana* and future-tense predications offer a rich ground for speakers’ interpretations. For example, with third-person, future-tense predications, the speaker is said not to know the third-person’s actions with certainty, insofar as the speaker has not heard the third-person say what he or she was going to do. In other words, only after having asked a third-person can a speaker say with certainty what that third-person is going to do (*ink’a’ xaapatz’ re bar xchal ut, ut ani, ani xna’, xyuwa’*). Such an interpretation, then, presupposes that another’s voiced intention, or self-description of future actions, is enough to warrant a modally unmarked assertion.

Future-tense, first-person predications are often glossed with two disjunctive clauses. For example, one speaker said that to say *tinchalq tana*, or ‘perhaps I will come’, is to say *mare tinchalq, mare ink’a’ tinchalq*, or ‘perhaps I will come, perhaps I will not come’. In this way, speakers may lexically emphasize (with the afactive particle *mare*) what is indexically created (with the afactive clitic *tana*). (And, with future-tense predications, the disjuncture between encoded and implicated commitment worlds is most manifest.) Indeed, some speakers gloss the use of *tana* in such constructions as *ink’a’ raj taawaj xyebal*, or ‘you wouldn’t want to say (but you have to)’. Thus, they interpret such utterances as indicating the speaker’s lack of desire to commit herself to the actions denoted by the utterance, and thereby presuppose the necessity of having to speak. Resonating with this presupposition, they note that *tana* often occurs in answers to questions (*lix sumenkil*). In this way, occurring in utterances which are the second-part of a pair-part structure (question/answer), *tana* indexes socio-pragmatic compulsion: the obligation to respond when addressed.

Another informant told me that such a construction means ‘you don’t know, and too many words like that are not good’ (*naraj naxye ink’a’ nakaanaw, entons moko us ta mas li aatin d’an*). In this way, there are articulatable conventions (that accord with frequency of distribution) that one should not offer information for which one is not certain (unless it is the answer to a question). Thus, *tana*, the marker of epistemic possibility, is only used against the background of a deontic
judgment—an addressee’s demand to answer their question, even without full certainty.44

Lastly, unlike all the other modal clitics, tana serves as an easily articulated marker of village identity. In particular, speakers agree that while tana is used in their village (and in all of the villages surrounding the municipio of San Juan Chamalco), the afactive clitic na is used to mark epistemic uncertainty in the villages surrounding the municipios of San Pedro Carchá and Coban. (And this accords with my experience.) Thus, one villager said: laa'o naqaye jo’kan tana chanko, or ‘we all say jo’kan tana,’ whereas eb li Coban neke’xye jo’kan na, or ‘those from Coban say jo’kan na’.45 In this way, a grammatical form marking epistemic possibility provides the most easily thematized linguistic locale for speakers’ accounts of village-based identity.

4.3. Optative status: taxaq

The optative clitic taxaq signals the speaker’s commitment to p in a wish world. I say that the commitment world is a wish world for two reasons. First, a wish is different from a desire in that the speaker has no control over the state of affairs in question, has no means to effect such an end. In this way, a wish cannot usually serve as the cause of its own fulfillment. (Unless of course the addressee is in a position to bring about the state of affairs in question—which can be the case when taxaq is used to make polite suggestions or say prayers.) And second, a wish indexes epistemic uncertainty: a wished for event is unlikely to happen (though not impossible).46 In this way, by signaling that a speaker is committed to p in a wish world, taxaq indexically creates contexts in which the speaker is committed to not p in a possible world. In accordance with these features of wishes, most of my tokens of taxaq occur with narrated events involving the weather, national politics, and eco-tourism—all desirable events outside of the speaker’s control. Most of the remaining tokens occur with narrated events involving the actions of one’s addressee in the context of polite

44 Such an understanding of tana also arises in cases where people try to explain why tana is awkward with first-person, non-future predications. For example, in asking an informant whether one could say ninchal tana, or ‘I may come’ (a construction which involves a first-person, present-tense predication), she said ink’a’ tana, or ‘maybe not’, chanchan ink’a’ nakaamaw bar tawi nakatchal, or ‘it’s like you don’t know where you could be coming from’. Notice, then, that this explanation presupposes that everyone should have certain knowledge of their own habitual actions. The speaker then suggested that such a construction could be used in a situation in which one was using a compass to find the cardinal direction (north-south-east-west) from which one came.

45 As well, in the context of ethnographic interviews (I don’t have enough tokens outside of that for such a fine distinction), women use tana much more than men in answering questions. In this way, the use of tana versus na marks village identity, and the relative frequency of tana marks female gender—perhaps by way of women having less status to be certain; but also because they have less direct experience of events that occur outside of the village and homestead.

46 It should be emphasized that taxaq marks optative status, not optative illocutionary force (cf. Van Valin and LaPolla, 1997, pp. 41–42). In particular, taxaq is within the scope of illocutionary force, and can occur with declarative illocutionary force (grammatically and prosodically unmarked), interrogatory illocutionary force (grammatically marked), imperative illocutionary force (grammatically marked), and exclamatory illocutionary force (prosodically marked).
suggestions or prayers. In most cases, the addressee shares the speaker’s commitment to the narrated event in question. That is to say, *tana* is only said in the context of those addressees (and ratified participants) whose commitment worlds are similar to those of the speaker. In this way, *taxaq* indexically presupposes shared commitment worlds. (Though, as always, these worlds may be indexically created as well.) That is to say, while only the speaker is in the role of animator of the utterance, all the participants in the speech event are in the role of principle: several hearts are spoken for with a single mouth. In this way, merely being in the presence of another’s wish is enough to be interpellated as similarly wishful. Let me offer some examples.

(39) **ink’a’ taxaq yoo-Ø-Ø li hab**  
    Neg Opt do-Pres-Abs(3s) Dm rain  
    ‘if only it doesn’t rain’

Example (39) shows an utterance that was preceded and followed by silence. The speaker had just looked out the window of his house: the sky was dark and cloudy. He said, ‘if only it doesn’t rain’, and then turned back to his breakfast. The men who would be helping him clear his field that day glanced out the window, but remained silent. Notice, then, that such an utterance—like an interjection—can punctuate silence: disturbing it before returning to it.47 Notice that here the event in question is out of the control of both the speaker and his addressees. Indeed, the proposition expressed in his utterance will prove to be counter to the facts: it will end up raining, as intimated by the clouds. Notice that such an event affects each of these people equally as members of a group that is about to be engaged in a coordinated activity in a shared environs. In this way, the man’s utterance publicizes a shared sentiment as a shared sentiment, thereby indexing the coordination of commitment worlds. In sum, the wishes signaled by the optative *taxaq* are shared and relevant wishes—perhaps even the wishes of a single social person. Indeed, if one does responds to another’s wish, one often just repeats the wish itself (suitable truncated): you share my commitment world; I share your commitment world; we share a commitment world. For example:

(40a) **S1: yamyoo-Ø-Ø li kutan**  
    clear/empty-Pres-Abs(3s) Dm day  
    ‘the day is clear’

(40b) **S2: jo’kan-aq taxaq li kutan hulaj, x-baan naq toj wan-Ø-Ø in-trabaj**  
    like.this-NS Opt Dm day tomorrow Erg(3s)-because Comp still exist-Pres-Abs(3s) Erg(1s)-work  
    ‘if only it’s like this tomorrow, for I have still have much work’

(40c) **S1: jo’kan taxaq**  
    like.this Opt  
    ‘if only it is like this’

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47 And, for this reason, some of my tokens are from non-recorded events: contexts that are situational rather than conversational.
In example (40), a woman has just returned from feeding her chickens. She tells her husband the day is clear (40a). He replies by indicating his wish that it will be similar the next day (40b). And she responds by seconding his wish (40c), showing that one can lexically emphasize what is indexically presupposed (that is, the sharedness of the commitment world itself). Notice that the man’s upcoming work, while not directly affecting his wife, does affect her in that they share in the return of the domestic mode of production. Indeed, his well-being is her well-being, insofar as they maximally share inalienable possessions—children, home, field. In other words, their shared commitment world is a function of their shared personhood. Lastly, notice that the certainty of the narrated event in question is greater in this example than it was in example (39). People can wish for relatively possible and impossible events: there is no counterfacticity necessarily entailed. In this way, the strength of the indexically created commitment world—that is, the magnitude of the speaker’s commitment to not p in a possible world—may be weak or strong as a function of context. Let me offer an example of an exchange that occurs between a husband and wife regarding eco-tourists:

(41a) S1: t-e’-chalq len li qa-turista
   Fut-Abs(2s)-come they.say Dm Erg(1p)-tourist
   ‘they say our tourists are coming’
(41b) S2: ma yaal tawi
   Question true Positive
   ‘could it be true?’
(41c) S1: mare yaal nek-O-e’x-ye, mare maak’a’-eb
   maybe true Pres-Abs(3s)-Erg(3p)-say maybe not.exist-Abs(3p)
   ‘maybe its true what they say, (but) maybe there aren’t any (tourists)’
(41d) S2: yaal taxaq
   true Opt
   ‘if only it’s true!’

In this example, a man has just heard from his neighbor that the eco-tourism project has radioed to say that there will be eco-tourists arriving the next day. When the man tells this to his wife (41a), he uses the reportative particle len, saying ‘they say our tourists are coming’. His wife replies using the positive clitic tawi (41b), saying ‘could it be true?’ And the man answers without commitment (41c), saying ‘perhaps it is true, or perhaps there aren’t any (tourists)’. Lastly, his wife responds using the optative clitic taxaq (41d), saying ‘if only it’s true’. Notice that the woman says yaal taxaq, or ‘if only it’s true’, in the indexically presupposed context—line (41c)—that, perhaps it’s not true (i.e., there are no tourists). Here the arrival of the tourists is uncertain, not so much because news of their arrival comes from a disreputable source (nor the neighbor, nor the project), but because the arrival of tourists is known to involve much contingency (they can get lost, arrive late, decide not to come at the last minute, etc.).

48 Notice that in line (41d) the truth of the event is being expressed as a wish, not the event itself. In this way, there is a double distancing from narrated world: yaal (true) denotes a commitment world just as taxaq indexes one.
wish is a mutual wish for this couple: each will take part in the care of tourists when they arrive (the husband guiding and the wife hosting), and each will earn (more or less equally) from the money the tourists spend.

Let me offer an example in which the optative clitic occurs with a first-person, optative-mood predication:

(42) *ink’a* taxaq chi-Ø-n-k’ul li rahlal
    Neg Opt Mod-Abs(3s)-Erg(1s)-receive Dm suffering
    ‘let me not receive the suffering!’

A woman uttered line (42) one morning after having just told her husband about a dream she had in which she fell ill. In the afternoon, she told her mother the same story, ending with the same utterance. And that night she told the story to her older sister, again ending with the same utterance. (None of these were recorded—so I cannot account for any changes in the story itself.) Notice, then, that this utterance is serving as the telos, or resolution, of the narrative itself. Notice that first-person utterances involving *taxaq* are appropriate when the speaker has no control over the event in question (in this utterance, the woman is in the semantic role of receiver). Notice as well that while such a narrated world is truly relevant to only one person (the speaker herself), she uses the utterance in the context of interlocutors who are her closest relatives: husband, mother, and older sister (or ‘mother equivalent’). In such cases, inalienable possessors who are also inalienable possessions are the closest and most similar people to the speaker, and thus my point about shared perspectives still holds: what is at stake for oneself is at stake for one’s closest kin. In this way, *taxaq* indexes social relations with those from whom one expects empathy and compassion.49

Lastly, let me point out that this woman’s utterance is highly stylized, in that wishes not to receive suffering are included in most prayers. In such contexts, they are often followed by the phrase *laa’at gawa’,* or ‘you are our father’. In other words, in prayers, the optative clitic *taxaq* occurs in constructions that are addressed to an interlocutor who *does* have control over the events in question. In this way, wishes become requests in the context of a powerful enough interlocutor—and affecting this shift (from wish to request) is one of the functions of prayer. (Though, to be sure, the speaker’s indexically created commitment to not p in a possible world still holds.) Thus, while this woman is not ostensibly addressing god in her utterance, her utterance indexically invokes such a context. In this way, *taxaq* not only indexes shared commitment worlds, but shared religious commitments.50

Second-person, future-tense or optative-mood predications often occur with *taxaq*, but usually in the context of making polite suggestions or giving thanks—that is,

49 And, in the context of strangers, one expects that tokens of *taxaq* will turn on narrated events that involve the price of corn, the breakdown of buses, earthquakes in a nearby city, etc. (Either events that affect all people, or events that affect us here and now.)

50 Note that while it would be tempting to read all wishes as unaddressed prayers, speakers’ interpretations of *taxaq* never corroborated this.
wishing that one’s interlocutor be reciprocated for some favor that he or she has just done. For example, in directing her father-in-law to a table, a woman says *chun-chuugat taxaq re naq ink’a* tatlibq (see example (8)), or ‘if only you would be seated in order that you don’t grow tired’. Here a suggestion to sit is framed as a wish, and here the speaker wishes for a narrated event in which her addressee’s comfort is at issue. Similarly, after receiving a small loan in the market from a friend, a woman blesses her friend, and is then thanked for this blessing:

(43a) **S1:** t-Ø-aa-k’ul taxaq li r-eeqaj l-aa usilal x-baan li qaawa’
   Fut-Abs(3s)-Erg(2s)-receive Opt Dm Erg(3s)-substitute Dm-Erg(2s) favor Erg(3s)-because Dm god
   ‘if only you will receive a substitute for your favor from god’

(43b) **S2:** baantiox
   ‘thank you’ (from x-baan tiox (Erg(3s)-because god), or ‘because of god’)

Notice that in both of these examples a shared commitment world is being indexed. Indeed, in the first example, what one might call ‘politeness’ or ‘deference’ is due in part to the speaker indexing that her wishes are her interlocutor’s wishes, and in part to the fact that a wish world entails weak possibility: one’s suggestion, as a suggestion, is left entirely in the interlocutor’s hands. And, in the second example, god is explicitly marked as the potential agent of the favor (the relational noun –baan (because) is usually used to mark the so called demoted agent in passive constructions). In sum, sharedness of commitment world, weakness of certainty, lack of control, and petitioning of a shared god for another’s care, are all features indexed by *taxaq* that can be enlisted for marking deferential social relations. (Though perhaps the direction of enlistment is actually reversed.)

*Taxaq* can occur with interrogatory illocutionary force but, as mentioned in Section 3.1, it interacts with it in non-trivial ways. Thus, in the case of Wh-questions, the Wh-word is usually interpretable as ‘someone’ (or ‘sometime’, ‘somewhere’, etc.), such that the utterance serves as an indefinite wish, rather than a question. As seen in the previous section, this is similar to the use of the afactive clitic *tana* with Wh-words to mark indefinite assertions. Let me offer an example in which a woman used such a construction after a church meeting in which villagers had discussed where to find money to fix the roof of their church:

(44) **ani taxaq ta-Ø-to’onink r-e li tumin**
   who Opt Fut-Abs(3s)-lend Erg(3s)-Dat Dm money
   ‘if only someone would lend (us) the money!’

In example (44), the Wh-word *ani* (who) occurs in conjunction with *taxaq*, and I gloss the entire construction as an indefinite wish. This utterance was said by the woman to her mother as they were walking out of the church. Essentially, it is an echo

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51 One may say ‘thank you’ (*baantiox*) after a negative imperative that has the addressee’s health at issue (such as ‘don’t fall’).
of a claim made by participants in the preceeding church service to the effect that money was necessary to repair the roof of the church (which was developing a leak). That is to say, the sharedness of the commitment world is maximally presupposed, being explicitly characterized in a previous, shared context. In this way, what is initially phrased as a village-wide need, and what is initially addressed to a congregation of villagers, is subsequently converted into the wish of a single villager, and said in the context of an immediate family.

Some speakers’ interpretations of the afective clitic *taxaq* turn on the verb of desire (*ajok*), in conjunction with the counterfactive clitic *raj*. Thus, these speakers suggested that *a’an taxaq* (that Opt), or ‘if only that’, may be glossed as *t-O-inw-aj raj a’an* (Fut-Abs(3s)-Erg(1s)-want CF that), or ‘I would like that’. In this way, a desire predicate, inflected for future-tense and first-person, and followed by a counterfactive clitic, serves as a paraphrase for *taxaq*. Notice, then, how the sharedness of the speaker’s commitment world is elided in these speakers’ interpretations of *taxaq*. In contrast, a greater number of speakers paraphrased the use of *taxaq* using *taxaq*, *as us taxaq wi yaal naq Full-Clause* (good Opt if true Comp Full-Clause), or ‘it would be good if it were true that...’. Here the optative clitic follows the adjective *us* (good), and is itself followed by a full-clause complement (denoting the narrated event in question) introduced by the expression *wi yaal*, or ‘if it’s true’. In this way, the closest most speakers ever come to glossing *taxaq* is by an utterance evaluating not a narrated event per se, but rather the truth of the proposition denoting the narrated event. That is to say, the commitment world indexed by *taxaq* has in it a world in which another’s assertion is true. In such a seemingly circular glossing (i.e., in speakers’ use of *taxaq* to gloss *taxaq*), speakers lexicalize both an evaluative and an epistemic judgment (goodness and truth). Wishing is itself not lexicalized in Q’eqchi’ (compare ‘surprise’ in the case of the factive clitic *pe*), and thus speakers didn’t have an obvious lexical resource to turn to—that is, something that would denote what the modal clitic indexes. Nonetheless, the contributions of *us* (good) and *yaal* (truth) in these interpretations serve this purpose by framing wishes in terms of shared values instead of private mental states. Thus, in moving between ‘I would like it’ and ‘it would be good if only it were true’, speakers’ interpretations of *taxaq* move between private desires and public values.

However, many speakers offered examples of contexts in which *taxaq* would be used, rather than attempt to gloss its meaning at all. In such examples, speakers often turned to political arrangements. One man offered the following example of usage: “Let’s say perhaps that you are talking about a job. A really big job. Let’s say a job like one done by a politician, someone who is going to be president. They will build roads. They will construct water tanks. They will construct electricity lines. They will construct everything. But they are only talking about the beginning of such tasks. And, after that, it is usually said (to them), ‘it would be good if you would do your job’ (*us taxaq naq taabaanu aak’anjel*).” I don’t think such an utterance would actually be said to a politician (and I have no such tokens), for clearly it is

52 In such utterances, the optative clitic does not have scope over the adjective *us*, but rather over the entire clause.
ironic: ‘while I am in agreement with what you want to do, I am dubious that you will do it’. Notice, then, that in such contexts, *taxaq* indexes doubt as much as it indexes desire. And, in tokens of reported speech, it marks the speaker’s and addressee’s shared pessimism (or ‘wishfullness’) in the context of the reported-speech addressee’s promise. Notice, then, the mood indexed by this modal clitic (and compare anxiety and *tana*): pessimism towards politicians’ promises of progress. In this way, the most easily thematized, or prototypic, function of *taxaq* is indexing ironic pessimism rather than hope. In this way, *taxaq* can index memory as much as desire—common experiences overtaking common hopes, and thereby contributing to the split in subjectivities presupposed in the genre of irony.

4.4. Factive status: *pe’*

The factive clitic *pe’* signals the speaker’s commitment to p in *this* world. Insofar as unmarked utterances do not specify the status of the commitment world (such that it is usually indistinguishable from the speech world), *pe’* markedly specifies what is usually assumed.53 With unmarked illocutionary force, it has three general functions. First, it may be used to assert p in the context of either the addressee’s non-commitment to p or the addressee’s commitment to not p, thereby serving as either an *insistive* or a *contradictive*. Second, it may be used to exclaim p in the context of the speaker’s recent learning of p, creating the context of the speaker’s prior or current non-commitment to p, thereby serving as a *surprisitive* or *dubitive*. And third, it may be used exclaim p in the context of the speaker’s recent learning of p, in the context of the speaker’s learning of p being in question, thereby serving as a *satiative*. I will exemplify these functions in turn.

The use of *pe’* as an insistive or contradictive is relatively infrequent. Nonetheless, linguists often gloss it in this manner (see Berinstein, 1985). In such a function, *pe’* often follows an explicit assertion contradicting what the addressee has just said.54 It may also occur with first- and second-person, future-tense predications, in which the speaker informs their addressee what will happen to them, or what the speaker is committed to undertaking. In such contexts, *pe’* can have a function similar to deontic necessity. (Compare *tana* as epistemic possibility functioning as deontic possibility.) With third-person predications, it often marks narrative emphasis. For example:

(45) **moko li winq ta, ha’ pe’ li ixq x-Ø-baanun r-e**

NF the man NF Focus F Dm woman Perf-Abs(3s)-do Erg(3s)-Dat

‘it was the woman who did it, not the man’

53 What is probably the case is that *pe’* is more specific than unmarked status, such that the difference between unmarked status (Ø), factive status (*pe’*), and counterfactive status (*raj*) is similar to the difference between *the*, *this*, and *that*.

54 Most of my tokens of such contradictive and insistive functions occur with the focus particle *ha’* in sentence-initial position.
Example (45) shows the factive clitic pe’ in the context of contradicting what the addressee has just said: in the first clause, their assertion is denied; and in the second clause, the narrated event to which the speaker is committed is asserted against this ground using pe’ with the focus particle ha’. Example (46) shows a relatively rare second-person, future-tense predication. It was taken from a story in which one character informs the other about their impending, and quite ugly, fate. Example (47) shows pe’ in the context of answering a speaker’s posed question, marked by the positive clitic tawi’ (47a). Line (47b) also shows the speaker’s lexicalization of the addressee’s emotional state (worry), presumably indexed by the positive clitic tawi’ in line (47a). (Such a function might best be characterized as an addressee-focused satiative.) And example (48) shows pe’ in the midst of a narrative in which it gives emphasis to a narrated event in a hypothetical world. Notice that the afactive particle mare shows up in conjunction with pe’ in the first clause of line (48c), but only as marking the possible world in which such an expensive price was given (emphatically). The speaker then follows this up, in the second clause of line (48c), with a speaker-directed usage of pe’ (in reported speech), showing the nice symmetry between the addressee-directed and the speaker-directed functions of pe’. In this way, the addressee’s current commitment world maps onto the reported-speech speaker’s prior commitment world, and thus ‘insistence’ maps onto ‘surprise’, and the dialogical and internalized functions of pe’ are illustrated with a single utterance. I will return to this symmetry below.

Let me offer some examples of speaker-directed uses, serving as satatives, surprisitives and dubitives. It is early in the morning, a woman is fixing breakfast and her husband is warming himself by the hearth fire. She asks:
(49a) **S1: jarub hoor tawi**
    how many hour Positive
    ‘what time could it be?’
    He answers:

(49b) **S2: saber, toj maaji’ a las syete**
    who knows still not at the seven
    ‘who knows, it’s not yet seven’
    They listen to radio for a while, until the announcer says it is seven-fifteen.
    The man then says:

(49c) **S1: ak x-Ø-nume’ pe’ a las syete**
    already Perf-Abs(3s)-pass F at the seven
    ‘it’s already past seven!’

In line (49c), the factive clitic pe’ signals that the speaker is now committed to this proposition, against the ground of his previous enunciated weak commitment to ‘not yet seven’ (49b). It should be emphasized that the woman was listening to the radio as well, and thus heard the announcement when her husband did. In this way, this sentence is uttered against the ground of the man’s prior enunciated commitment to it being earlier than seven. That is to say, the man is neither informing his wife of the time, nor correcting her belief about the time. He is rather correcting his own previous assessment (however weak it was, as indexed by saber, or ‘who knows’), in addition to indexing something akin to ‘surprise’.

As seen in this last example, the factive clitic pe’ often follows constructions involving the positive clitic tawi. Usually, there is an intervening period in which the speaker and/or addressee engage in some activity designed to discover the answer to their original question (for example, listening to the radio, or asking someone else). Interestingly, against the ground of ‘wonder’ or ‘worry’ indexed by the positive clitic tawi, as in lines (47b) and (49a), the factive clitic pe’ can be used outside the context of the speaker’s prior commitment to the contrary. In such satiative contexts, the factive clitic pe’ is used against the ground of the speaker just learning—and often through difficulty—what they were previously wondering about. For example, in learning how to use an A-frame with a plumb line to terrace his field, a man placed the instrument in a number of positions, trying to figure out how it worked. When he realized the plumb line was supposed to fall down the middle of the A-frame whenever its feet rested on a contour line, he said, *jo’ka’in pe’* (like this F), or ‘like this (it’s supposed to work!)’

I have one token of pe’ occurring with the ostensive evidential deictic wili, or ‘look there’. This token occurred in a man’s reporting of his own speech, in the context of giving an example of the meaning of the factive clitic pe’. Here he had been discussing how, after he found that someone had smashed his corn field (*li xyok’ok li wawimj*), he lay in wait for them (*sa’ muqmu*) to return again. When they did return, and he finally saw who they were, he said (to himself), *aah, wili pe’ li nabaanun re li wawimj*, or ‘aah look (factive) at who is doing this to my field!’ Here, then, the difference between the speaker-directed and addressee-directed functions of pe’ is blurred. Indeed, the ostensive evidential wili is essentially functioning as an imperative to look, such that the man reports himself telling himself to look at evidence for a narrated event.
he is committed to in the this world of the reported speech event. And here, once again, local anxieties regarding the violation of home and field come to the fore in speakers’ interpretations of various commitment worlds indexed by the modal clitics.

Such a use in reporting one’s own speech, and thereby describing one’s own reaction, is quite common. Pe’ also frequently occurs in the reported speech of others, even as their internal speech. For example, in a legend that recounts the marriage between the sun and the moon, after discovering that his daughter (the moon) is not in bed, the moon’s father realizes that the hummingbird she had brought to bed with her the night before was not a real hummingbird (but actually the sun):

(50a) ma ink’a’ x-0-w-eek’a moko tz’aqal tz’unun ta
    ‘did I not sense it (was) not a real hummingbird?’

(50b) a’an pe’ ki-0-elq’an r-e in-rab’in
    ‘he is the one who stole my daughter!’

(50c) chan-0-0 r-aatinankil r-ib li-x junes
    ‘he says, speaking to himself alone’

Notice that contradictives and insistives are addressee-directed, whereas exlamatives and dubitives are speaker-directed. In the first case, the addressee’s commitment is relatively presupposed; in the second case, the speaker’s commitment is relatively created. In other words, in shifting from addressee-focus to speaker-focus (person), we shift from present to past (time), assertion to exclamation (illocutionary force), and presupposition to creation (indexicality). In this way, the commitment world being this world, can be contrasted internally (with the speaker’s previous commitment world) or dialogically (with the addressee’s current commitment world). That is to say, there are deep symmetries linking speaker-focused and addressee-focus usages—such that each may be understood as a mirror image of the other: surprise is the mirror image of insistence, and doubt the mirror image of contradiction. (Though, one might imagine that, from a developmental perspective, speaker-directed functions could be shown to be the internalization of addressee-directed functions.)

As mentioned in Section 3.3, the factive clitic pe’ is judged to be marginally appropriate with first-person predications. Given that the factive clitic signals that the speaker is committed to the truth of the narrated event in this world, this makes intuitive sense: people should have knowledge of their own actions. And, indeed, the relatively few tokens I have of such constructions occur with future-tense predications. In line (47b), for example, a speaker makes a promise. And in example (51), a man was describing his attempt to use a phone in the city of Coban. Never having used one before, and not understanding Spanish, he had tried several times without success. Finally, he got discouraged and sat down to watch someone else use it. A Ladino woman came over, put her money in, and then dialed her number making a call. In describing himself watching this, this man reported his own internal speech:
One informant told me there were certain situations in which the factive clitic could be used with present-tense predications. And he offered the example of using a compass to figure out where one has just come from. In setting up this example, he says that one is ‘wondering’ where one came from, saying literally ‘thinking inside one’s head where it could be’. And as soon as one finds out where one is (using the compass), one may say aah, ninchal pe arin, or ‘aah, I came from here!’ In such cases, then, it is not so much ‘surprise’ that one is indexing, but release from puzzle-ment or wonder.55 Thus, such a first-person predication, in conjunction with pe’, is appropriate when serving as a satiative.

As also mentioned in Section 3.3, the factive clitic pe’ is judged to be marginally appropriate with second-person predications. Again, such constructions usually involve future-tense predications. In line (46), for example, there exists the rather rude—and one imagines rare—case of a speaker informing an addressee about his impending death. Given the semantics of this clitic, the general inappropriateness of such constructions makes intuitive sense: people should not be asserting information about others to those others insofar these others should already have knowledge of their own actions. Accordingly, my only tokens of this clitic with future-tense predications are speaker-directed (rather than addressee directed). For example, a man’s brother comes to dinner and is talking to the man’s wife about his work on a distant plantation in lowland Guatemala. The man says:

(52a) S1: laa’in x-in-nume chaq Corozal
Abs(1s) Perf-Abs(1s)-pass hither Corozal
‘I passed by Corozal’
And the woman says:
(52b) S2: aah, x-at-nume chaq le’, n-Ø-in-naw li k’alebaal a’an
aah Perf-Abs(2s)-pass hither over.there Pres-Abs(3s)-Erg(1s)-know Dm village that
‘aah, you passed by there, I know that village’
And then she says:
(52c) aah x-at-chal pe le’
aah Perf-Abs(2s)-come F over.there
‘aah, so you came from over there!’

Notice that the use of pe’ in line (52c) does not immediately follow the speaker’s learning of the information in question. Rather, she has already indexed her commit-

55 Similarly, with future-tense, third-person predications, speakers offered examples that turned on almanac information that has just been looked up, such as learning when the new moon will be: tchalq pe’ li ak’ po sabado, or ‘the new moon will come on Saturday!’
ment to the truth of the speaker’s assertion in the first clause of line (52b); and she has already lexicalized the relevance of his assertion to her—a hitherto unknown degree of connection—in the second clause of line (52b). In this way, pe’ need not immediately follow the presentation of new information. It may follow the speaker’s lexicalization of the indexical ground. Here, then, line (52c), while speaker-directed, is indexically presupposed in line (52b).

When asked to offer interpretations of the meaning of pe’, speakers say that it means ‘you just discovered now’ (toje’ xaataw anaqwam), or that ‘you just now know’ (toja’ naq xaanaw laa’at). In this way, speaker’s interpret pe’ in terms of immediately perfective aspect (toje’, or ‘just’, along with the MATE x-) and either the predicate na’ok (to know) or the predicate ta’ok (to discover). More contextualized interpretations of pe’ occur mid-utterance, and often turn on what was ‘inside one’s heart’ versus what one has just learned. For example, in discussing his day at the market, a man described himself asking a vender where he could buy apples (presupposing that the vendor didn’t have any to sell). When the vender replied that she had apples left, the man reported his own speech as wan pe’ manzaan, sin ch’ool laa’in maak’a’ chik, or ‘there are still apples!’ (said to vendor in reported speech event) ‘inside my heart there were no more left’ (said to actual addressees in current speech event). Here the man explicitly described to his current interlocutors (‘inside my heart . . .’) what he indexically created with his previous utterance to his reported speech interlocutor (‘there are still apples!’). In this way, to speakers of Q’eqchi’, the factive clitic pe’ most transparently indexes new and correct knowledge against the ground of old and erroneous belief. And this disjuncture between erroneous and actual worlds is easily interpreted in terms of the localization of facts: explicitly inside one’s heart (erroneous) versus implicitly outside in the world (actual). Recall how in Section 3.2 the speaker’s possible commitment world, indexed by tana, was localized in the speaker’s heart, and said to be mere ‘thought’ versus ‘knowledge’. In this way, both error and uncertainty are located in the heart, one’s deepest, and most hidden inalienable possession: with pe’, what was in the heart as ‘belief’; and with tana, what is in the heart as ‘thought’.

Lastly, notice that the factive clitic pe’ is never glossed as ‘surprise’. Indeed, there is no lexeme for surprise in the Q’eqchi’ language (though several for ‘fright’). Needless to say, this is not because ‘surprise’ (or satiation) is a rare phenomenon, but rather it is salient enough to have been grammaticalized in a clitic. A similar state of affairs exists for the positive clitic tawī’, which often indexes ‘wonder’, the optative clitic taxaq, which often indexes ‘wishing’, and the counterfactive clitic raj, which often indexes ‘intent’. In each of these cases, then, a highly salient, but nonetheless non-lexicalized, intentional state is most transparently indexed by a grammatical operator. (Of course, given that these are grammatical operators rather than lexemes, they serve many other functions as well—so I am artificially separating out their speaker-directed function for analysis.) Given both the grammatical encoding of status, and the indexical creativity of inverted commitment worlds that underlie the understanding of these clitics as indexing intentional states, one might say these clitics serve as iconic-indices of intentional states, not just symbols. (Compare intonation and interjections as having a similar relation to the intentional states, usually ‘emotions’, that they index.) That is to say, the disjunctures between two commitment worlds signaled by modal clitics embody
certain highly salient intentional states: intention (raj), surprise (pe’), uncertainty (tana), and wonder (tawi). Notice that this means that disjunctures of ‘beliefs’ (i.e., commitment worlds) serve to index emotive and evaluative (deontic/deserative) intentional states—such that ‘cognition’ is in the service of ‘will’ and ‘emotion’. And, insofar as inverted commitment worlds may map onto the speaker or the addressee, this means that addressee-directed functions always act as mirror images of speaker-directed functions—such that the dialogic is always iconic to the internalized.

The factive clitic pe’ may be used with interrogatory illocutionary force in three general contexts. First, it may be used to question p in the context of the addressee’s presupposing the speaker’s commitment to p, creating the context of the speaker’s non-commitment to p, thereby serving as a repairative. Second, it may be used to question p in the context of the speaker’s commitment to p, and in the context of the addressee’s commitment to p being in question, thereby serving as a quizzative or bluffative. And third, it may be used to question p in the context of the speaker’s commitment to p being in question, in the context of the addressee’s commitment to p, thereby serving as a confirmative. If interrogative illocutionary force usually presupposes that the speaker doesn’t know the answer and the addressee does, the various functions of pe’ turn on violations of this presuppositional ground. Let me offer some examples.

The most frequent use of pe’ with interrogatory illocutionary force is in the context of asking an addressee a question whose answer should be known. For example, if a person has just learned the name of another person, but then forgotten it, he or she may ask the person’s name again, but this time with pe’. For example, ani pe’ aa-k’aba (who F Erg(2s)-name), or ‘what’s your name again?’ Similarly, if one comes into a story late, and cannot figure out who or what the current topic is (for example, the antecedents of anaphoric expressions such as pronouns), one may use pe’ to learn what is being presupposed. For example, in recounting a story about some vandals who had stolen a statue from the church in a nearby town, a man was interrupted by his father, who had just joined the conversation:

(53a) \[ S1: \text{xko'oo'-eb tana, aban bar tawi', ink'a' n-Ø-in-naw} \]
\[ \text{go(Perf)-Abs(3p) AF but where Positive Neg Pres-Abs(3s)-Erg(1s)-know} \]
\[ \text{‘they probably took off, but where (they could have gone) I do not know’} \]

(53b) \[ S2: \text{ani pe' xko'oo'-Ø} \]
\[ \text{who F go(Perf)-Abs(3s)} \]
\[ \text{‘who took off?’} \]

(53c) \[ S1: \text{eb li kristyan li x-e'-muxuk r-e li iglesya} \]
\[ \text{Abs(3p) Dm people Dm Perf-Abs(3p)-profane Erg(3s)-Dat Dm church} \]
\[ \text{‘the people who profaned the church’} \]

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56 Related to this use is put, which seems to mark sarcasm.

57 Of interest is that most of my tokens for these interrogatory illocutionary force functions of pe’ come from ethnographic interview contexts rather than intra-village discourse. My sense is that these functions occur most frequently in doctrinal and/or educational (i.e., church and school) settings. In this way, the use of pe’ with questions indexes a particular register of interaction.
In line (53a), the speaker presupposes that his addressee can identity the topic (those people who ‘took off’ after they stole the statue). In line (53b), the speaker questions that presupposition—against the ground of his recently entering the conversation, not against the ground of the previous speaker’s erroneous presumption. And in line (53c), the first speaker fills in the presupposed information. (Notice that the fact of the church being profaned is now assumed to be common knowledge.)

For the ethnographer, the most frequently used repairative occurs with the Wh-word *chanru* (how), and occurs in the context of being asked a question, while creating the context that the speaker did not understand the question. Here the expression *chan pe’ ru* functions as ‘how’s that’.58 Let me offer an example in which I mispronounce a word upon introducing it as a topic:

(54a) **S1: ma us t-o-aatinaq chi-r-ix li eeqa**
*Question good Fut-Abs(1p)-speak Comp-Erg(3s)-behind Dm substitution*
‘is it okay that we speak about substitution (mispronounced)’

(54b) **S2: cham-pe’-r-u**
*how F Erg(3s)-face*
‘how’s that?!’

(54c) **S1: li eeqa**
*Dm substitution*
‘substitution (mispronounced)’

(54d) **S2: eeqaj**
‘substitution (stressed)’

(54e) **S1: eeqaj**
‘substitution’

(54f) **S2: hehe’**
‘yes’

*Chan pe’ ru* is also used in the context of message distortion: a woman in her house calling to a child outside; a man in his field talking to a distant passerby. Indeed, my room was between the main house (where a mother worked) and the yard (where her children played), so I heard such exchanges yelled back and forth all day. For these reasons, speakers tend to gloss repairative constructions as ‘I didn’t hear very well what you said’ (*ink’a’ xwabi chi us li k’aru xaaye*). And they will often interpret such constructions as a command to ‘say it to me again’ (*ye we wi’chik*).

In confirmative utterances, *pe* serves to ask whether one’s preceding utterance is correct against the indexically presupposed ground of the speaker’s knowledge of p being in question, and against the indexically presupposed ground of the addressee’s knowledge of p.59 In such contexts, it occurs with the word ‘truth’ (*yaal*), and serves

58 And this use of the Wh-word *chanru* or ‘how’ makes sense: given no proposition p, this functions to get addressee to repeat their question in a reformulated fashion.

59 And *ma pe’ yaal* (Question F true), where the interrogatory illocutionary force is more obvious. The yes/no question particle *ma* does not occur, yet rising intonation does. And one would expect *pe* to follow the adjective *yaal* (true). In any case, this now functions as a tag question.
as a tag question to an otherwise unmarked assertion: ‘p pe’ yaal?’ For example, after offering a Spanish gloss for a Q’eqchi’ word to his wife, a man turned to me and said, pe’ yaal, or ‘it’s true isn’t it?’ And I answered yaal, kama’an, or ‘it’s true, that is how it is’. Such expressions thereby also index assumptions about hierarchies of expertise. Such an expression is often used to gain one addressee’s assent for how something is, before using that assertion to explain something else. Thus, the confirmation can come from the same addressee to whom one is asserting something. As a confirmative, it can also be used to express one’s surprise, and thereby serve as a positive minimal response. Thus, after the speaker has been informed of some assertion p, he or she can say pe’ yaal, ‘in truth!’ And the addressee can respond, yaal, or ‘in truth’, and keep talking. For example, in explaining the meaning of the word ajom (desire), a speaker said the following:

(55a) l-aa wajom w-ik’in a’an jun tzolok, pe’ yaal
Dm-Erg(2s) desire Erg(1s)-with that one study, F truth
‘your desire with me is a study (i.e., dissertation), isn’t it?’

(55b) pues si, a’an na-Ø-r-aj na-Ø-x-ye li aatin, li r-ajom
well yes that Pres-Abs(3s)-Erg(3s)-want Pres-Abs(3s)-Erg(3s)-say Dm word
Dm Erg(3s)-desire
‘indeed, that what the word ‘its desire’ means’

(55c) a’an li ajel li r-u r-e, r-e li mas t-at-aatinaq, pe’ yaal
that Dm importance Dm Erg(3s)-face Erg(3s)-Dat Erg(3s)-Dat Dm most Fut-
Abs(2s)-talk F true
‘that’s the most important for, for us to talk the most about, isn’t it?’

In example (55), the speaker seemed to be trying to get away from talking about his role in the church by turning my questions back to grammar. To do this, he was trying to show that his reluctance to talk about his role was due to his sense that my real desire, or rather purpose, had to do with grammar rather than religion. His use of the tag question pe’ yaal, then, serves to get my confirmation to his own claims about what my real desire was, such that he could shift the discussion back to less personal matters. And notice the implicit avoidance of directly asserting what one’s addressee’s desire is. Here, then, the confirmative function of pe’ is in the service of politeness, which is in the service of thematic evasion, if not down right condescension. (Though notice that his sense of what I wanted to know was not wholly inaccurate: how people use grammar to avoid questions about religion and make covert ascriptions about others’ intentions.)

The factive clitic pe’ is also used either to quiz people about what they should know or, in more marked cases, to call someone’s bluff about what they purport to know. The first case is by far the most frequent, and occurs in catechism (questions designed to elicit the recital of doctrinal knowledge) or, much less frequently, a parent asking a child about some fact they learned in school. Such a question can

60 It should be emphasized that in my corpus pe’ yaal, as a confirmative, and champe’ru, as a repairative, dominate other uses in frequency.
also be used to ask someone whether they did something they were supposed to do. For example, after having left a task for his son to do while he was away, a man said to the son upon his return  
\[ k\text{'}a \text{ pe\text{'}} \text{ ru } \text{xaaabaanu} \] (what \( F \text{ Perf-Abs(3s)-Erg(2s)-do} \), or ‘what did you do’ (i.e., ‘you did it then’). Notice, then, that quizzative uses are often indistinguishable from confirmative uses.

\( \text{Pe\text{'}} \) is used as a bluffative in contexts where an addressee has presumed to know \( p \), and the speaker is trying to expose their conceit. 61 For example, returning to my host’s house, I asked his son if he knew where his father had put my sleeping bag. I said this in front of the host himself, partly in jest: for he would always reassure me that his children didn’t know where he put my stuff while I was away (so they couldn’t mess around with it). When the child said yes, the man mocked chagrin to me, and then asked his son:  
\[ \text{bar pe\text{'}} \text{-Ø-} \text{in-k\text{'}} \] (where \( F \text{ Perf-Abs(3s)-Erg(1s)-give} \), or ‘where did I put it then’!

The child paused, shook his head, and said  
\[ \text{ink\text{'}} \text{a} \text{nninaw} , \] or ‘I don’t know’. And the man smiled and said to me  
\[ \text{abi} , \text{or ‘listen!’} \] (as in ‘didn’t I tell you so!’?).

4.5. Counterfactive status: raj

The counterfactive clitic raj signals the speaker’s commitment to \( p \) in another world. By signaling this commitment, it often creates the context of the speaker’s commitment to not \( p \) in this world. Its morphology links it to the verb ajok (to want) which, in its nominalized and possessed form, is rajbal (its desiring). Loosely speaking, it has three interrelated functions. In dependent clauses, it may mark hypothetical or intentional worlds. With future-tense predications, it may mark deference or contingency. And with perfective-aspect predicates, it may mark attempting without success, intending without action, or ‘almost’ without consequence.

The most frequently used means to signal a hypothetical world is the predicate yehok (to say), in the first-person-plural, imperative-mood: qayehaq or ‘let’s say’. 62 That is to say, hypotheticalness is signaled by explicitly localizing the speaker’s commitment world in a shared and implored speech world—an exhortation. In Q’eqchi’, the noun na’leb, which is an instrumentalization of the verb na’ok (to know), is used to refer to ‘examples’ (as well as to ‘habit’, ‘reason’, ‘customs’, and ‘advice’). In offering such hypothetical examples, speakers of Q’eqchi’ will often qualify what they are saying using this word, as ‘it’s only an example’ (ka’ajwi jun na’leb). In this way, hypothetical worlds—or ‘instruments for knowing’—are easily lexicalized as ‘only an example’ (versus a representation of actual states of affairs). Once a hypothetical frame has been signaled in such a way (often in conjunction with the afactive particle mare), the first utterance characterizing a narrated event within it may be marked by the counterfactive clitic raj. In other

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61 In such contexts, the speaker may or may not know \( p \).
62 Such a hortative construction is very frequent in ethnographic interviews and chuutam, the community groups that get together in the church every several months to talk about terms like ‘community’ (komonej) and ‘the good’ (usilal).
words, another world (in which the speaker is committed to some narrated event) is explicitly localized in a hortative world. Subsequent utterances, characterizing other narrated events in the hypothetical frame, need not be marked by raj. In this way, once a general commitment world has been explicitly marked as hypothetical, actual events in it need not be explicitly marked as counterfactual.\textsuperscript{63} Let me offer two examples of embedded counterfactuals:

(56) qayehaq mare t-Ø-in-ket raj tzekeem
    let's say perhaps Fut-Abs(3s)-Erg(1s)-eat CF food
    'let's say perhaps I was going to eat some food'

(57a) qayehaq, eeh, mare wan-Ø-Ø jun-aq aa, eeh, k'aru jun-aq li w-amigo
    let's say eeh perhaps exist-Pres-Abs(3s) one-NS Erg(2s) eeh what one-NS Dm
    Erg(1s)-friend
    'let's say, um, perhaps you have a, um, I have a friend'

(57b) li w-amigo ak x-Ø-in-boq chaq
    Dm Erg(1s)-friend already Perf-Abs(3s)-Erg(1s)-call hither
    'the friend I just called over'

(57c) eeh, ak x-Ø-in-boq chaq, mare ewer-aq
    um already Perf-Abs(3s)-Erg(1s)-call hither perhaps yesterday-NS
    'um, I just called over, perhaps yesterdayish'

(57d) entsnes, eeh, t-Ø-ku-lunq chik jun-aq li
    then um Fut-Abs(3s)-come again one-NS Dm
    'then, um, someone else will come'

(57e) qayehaq mare in-yuwa' raj ki-Ø-ku-lun w-ik'in
    let's say perhaps Erg(1s)-father CF Inf-Abs(3s)-come Erg(1s)-with
    'let's say perhaps my father came'

(57f) entsnes t-Ø-in-ye raj r-e t-Ø-chalq raj li winq a'an
    then Fut-Abs(3s)-Erg(1s)-say CF Erg(3s)-Dat Fut-Abs(3s)-come CF Dm man
    that
    'then I would say to him, 'that man was going to come''

Example (56) shows a hypothetical event marked by qayehaq (let's say) and mare (perhaps). As may be seen, the narrated event in question is described using the counterfactive clitic raj. Example (57) shows a much more extended hypothetical event. In line (57a), qayehaq and mare are used to introduce a topic, but the existence of this topic is not itself marked by raj. In line (57e), the speaker again uses qayehaq and mare to introduce a second, related event. Here, however, the topic itself (the speaker's father) is presupposed, and it is only the action of the father that is at issue: counterfactually modalized by raj. And line (57f) brings both events together: the speaker tells his father that another man was going to come (but hasn't). Notice that there is a double-embed-

\textsuperscript{63} Instead, raj tends to occur in hypothetical situations that involve other known people—such that it functions to mark explicitly the counterfacticity of the event in question. Or, raj is used to mark events that are not only counterfactive, but also impossible: qayehaq laa raj wan in-rabin, or 'let's say I have (CF) a daughter'. 
The counterfactive clitic is obligatory in the consequents of counterfactive conditionals (and it often occurs in the antecedents as well). Let me offer an example in which a woman is describing to her friend how her step-mother told the godfather of her first child that she was having second-thoughts about having him be the godfather of her second child (causing him to become angry with her—the repercussions of which were discussed in example (30)):

(58a) S1: a’an li r-ixaqil l-in yuwa’
    her Dm Erg(3s)-wife Dm-Erg(1s) father
    ‘she is the wife of my father’
(58b) S2: us
    ‘okay’
(58c) S1: li li qana’ Rosario, ma nak-Ø-aa-naw bi’ r-u
    Dm Dm SD Rosario Question Pres-Abs(3s)-Erg(2s)-know then Erg(3s)-face
    ‘Doña Rosario, do you know her then?’
(58d) S2: hehe
    ‘yes’
(58e) S1: a’an, x-baan naq a’an x-kab in-na’
    her Erg(3s)-because Comp her Erg(3s)-second Erg(1s)-mother
    ‘her, because she’s my step-mother’
(58f) S1: moko tz’aqal in-na’ ta chik
    NF real Erg(1s)-mother NF again
    ‘she’s not my real mother’
(58g) S2: hehe
    ‘okay’
(58h) S1: . . . mas yik’ti’ x-Ø-x-numsi r-e li r-iitz’in
    much lie Perf-Abs(3s)-Erg(3s)-pass Erg(3s)-Dat Dm Erg(3s)-younger.brother
    ‘she passes on lots of lies to her younger brother’
(58i) S1: r-iitz’in a’an li-x wa’, x-wa’chin laj Humberto
    Erg(3s)-younger.brother him Dm-Erg(3s)-? Erg(3s)-godfather SD Humberto
    ‘her younger brother is the god-father of Humberto’
(58j) S2: aah
    ‘aah’
(58k) S1: x-baan yik’ti’ a’an na-Ø-x-numsi r-e
    Erg(3s)-because lie him Pres-Abs(3s)-Erg(3s)-pass Erg(3s)-Dat
    ‘because of the lies she passes on to him’
(58l) S2: aah
    ‘aah’
(58m) S1: naq wi raj tz’aqal in-na’, moko x-Ø-x-numsi ta raj li aatin a’an
    Comp if CF real Erg(1s)-mother NF Perf-Abs(3s)-Erg(3s) NF CF Dm
    ‘if she were my real mother, she would not have passed on those words’
(59) wi ta ink’a’ x-0-qa-xok li t’ikr, x-Ø-taq’aak raj
    if ? Neg Perf-Abs(3s)-Erg(1p)-gather Dm clothing Perf-Abs(3s)-become.wet
    ‘if we hadn’t gathered up the clothing it all would have become wet’

In example (58), a counterfactive conditional does not appear until line (58m). There, both the antecedent (or ‘if-clause’) and the consequent (or ‘then-clause’) are marked by the counterfactive clitic raj. Notice that the propositions expressed by each of these clauses were contradicted in previous lines: for the antecedent, line (58f); and for the consequent, lines (58h) and (58k). Examples (59) shows a counterfactive conditional in which only the consequent is marked by the counterfactive clitic raj. The antecedent, which is known to be false only by its own uttering (that is, while the clause presupposes that the speaker did indeed gather up all the clothing, this was the first time this action was mentioned in the speech event). In both examples, one may take the antecedent to be the explicit marker of a hypothetical frame—or another world—in which the speaker is committed to the narrated event expressed in the consequent. That is to say, the antecedents of counterfactual conditionals lexically characterize the conditions that would have to hold for the speaker to be committed to the consequent: they denote the necessary features of another world.

Lastly, the counterfactive clitic raj occurs in the dependent clauses of certain verbs of thinking. Let me offer two examples, one with the verb k’a’uxlank (think/intend), and one with the verb yo’onink (expect):

(60a) x-Ø-in-k’a’uxla wib sut, malaj oxib sut, naq n-in-xik raj
    Perf-Abs(3s)-Erg(1s)-think two time or three time Comp Pres-Abs(1s)-
go CF
    ‘I thought two times or three times that I was going to go’

(60b) pero ink’a’ wi’chik n-in-xik
    but Neg again Pres-Abs(1s)-go
    ‘but again I didn’t go’

(61a) n-Ø-in-yo’oni raj naq ta-Ø-k’ulunq raj w-ik’in
    Pres-Abs(3s)-Erg(1s)-expect CF Comp Fut-Abs(3s)-come CF Erg(1s)-with
    ‘I expect that he is going to come to me’

(61b) pero ink’a’ na-Ø-k’ulun
    but Neg Pres-Abs(3s)-come
    ‘but he doesn’t come’

Line (60a) shows the predicate k’a’uxlank (to think) followed by a full-clause complement, marked by the counterfactive clitic raj. This occurrence of raj does not locate the narrated event denoted by the dependent clause in a world of thinking. Rather, it signals that in the world of thinking there was another world which was the thinker’s (versus the speaker’s) commitment world. And (60b) shows that the indexically created context may be lexically reinforced. This raj is not obligatory. That is to say, it does not necessarily occur in the full-
clause complements headed by the predicate k’a’uxlank. Line (61a) shows an utterance with two counterfactive clitics: the first, following the main predicate itself; and the second, following the dependent predicate. The first raj interacts with the predicate yo’onink (to expect): it does not signal that in another world the speaker would have expected something; rather, it says that the expectation (in this world) went unsatiated. Notice that the presence of the second raj would seem to be redundant, or even contradictory, except that the dependent predicate is inflected for future tense. Like line (60a), it indicates that in the (counterfactive) expectation world, the speaker was committed in another world to the person coming. Line (61b) shows that one can lexically reinforce the indexically created context of line (61a). In both line (60a) and (61a), then, there is a double embedding of commitment worlds—the first denoted by the predicates k’a’uxlank and yo’onink, and the second signaled by the counterfactive clitics in the dependent clauses of these predicates. Lastly, notice the interesting symmetry between expectation and intention, such that intention may be understood as internalized expectation (or expectation may be understood as externalized intention).

The second major function of the counterfactive clitic raj is to mark deferential relations. Constructions marking such deferential relations usually involve future-tense predication, and mark addressee-contingent plans, often serving as polite requests. In other words, deference is signaled by leaving the outcome of two possible worlds in the control of one’s addressee. For example, when leaving a work group one day, a man says goodbye to his father-in-law, and then says:

(62a) **S1: ma wan-q-at sa’ aaw-ochoch hulaj**

*Question be-Fut/Mod-Abs(2s) inside Erg(2s)-house tomorrow*

‘will you be home tomorrow?’

The father-in-law replies:

(62b) **S2: hehe’**

‘yes’

And the man says:

(62c) **S1: aah pues t-in-chalq raj aaw-ik’in hulaj**

*aah well Fut-Abs(1s)-come CF Erg(2s)-with tomorrow*

‘aah, well I was going to come to your house tomorrow’

And the father-in-law replies:

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64 This seems to be facultive. For example, in glossing the utterance tatchalq raj (Fut-Abs(2s)-come CF), or ‘you were going to come’, speakers just as easily used taak’a’uxla tatchalq raj, or ‘you think you are going to come’ and taak’a’uxla naq tatchalq, or ‘you think that you will come’. In other words, the mental verb k’a’uxlank (to think) can be used with a complement marked by the counterfactive clitic raj or not, to gloss the same expression. And, indeed, in actual complements of this verb, the clitic raj usually doesn’t appear, but can. Its presence seems to signal a greater commitment to the counterfacticity of one’s complement. Speakers can use future-tense or perfect-aspect in dependent clause for the same meaning, and thus its presence isn’t conditioned by the MATE’s: x-Ø-in-k’a’uxla naq x-in-chal raj aaw-ik’in ewer versus x-Ø-in-k’a’uxla naq t-in-chalq raj aaw-ik’in ever.
In line (62a), a man asks his father-in-law whether he will be home the next day. When his father-in-law says yes, the man states his plan using a future-tense predication and the counterfactive clitic raj. That is, rather than saying he will come the next day, he says there is another world in which he will come, and indexically creates the context that in this world he may not come. Here, then, the counterfactive clitic raj serves to mark one’s contingent intentions—contingent because they depend on the actions or desires of one’s addressee. In effect, the utterance in line (62c) is giving a reason for the question in line (62a): ‘if you were going to be home, I was going to come (but if not, than no)’. Such an utterance, then, allows one’s addressee to decide whether this world or another world will be the actual world the following day. In this way, deference is arrived at by signaling that one’s own actions are contingent on one’s addressee’s actions.65 Notice, then, that with future-tense predications, insofar as the narrated event has not yet come to pass, the difference between the speech event and the commitment world is interpretable as a choice between two options rather than as an intention versus an action, or a hypothetical world versus an actual world. Presented with this fact, speakers explicitly thematize such future-tense counterfactive constructions as sa’ wib li ru naxye or ‘it says two things (at once), qayehaq mare wan aahonal, ut mare ink’a’, ‘perhaps you have time, and perhaps you don’t’.

Similarly, with second-person, future-tense predications, the counterfactive clitic raj may be used to make suggestions. For example, in setting up an ethnographic interview, a man said tatinaatiina raj chaq kabej, or ‘you would come to speak to me in two days’. Here, his utterance says, in effect, ‘in another world we will speak in two days’, and leaves the indexically created context (in this world we will not speak in two days) to be implicitly reinforced or defeased by the addressee’s decision to go, or not to go. It should be said that this use of future-tense and counterfacticity for politeness is only used with first- and second-person utterances. With third-person predications, such utterances are interpretable as simply ‘he was going to come’. In this way, they are understood as the speaker having been led to believe the third-person was going to come (but whether or not that person will actually come is still an open question). Such utterances are often interpreted as uncertainty: mare tachalq mare ink’a’, or ‘perhaps he comes, perhaps he doesn’t’. In this way, counterfacticity, future-tense, and third-person is a combination often used to mark uncertainty through the unresolvedness of an assertion (another world) and the defeasement or reinforcement of its indexically created

65 In discussing such utterances, speakers will usually interpret a predicate plus counterfactive as the predicate k’a’uxlank (to think/intend) plus a complement. For example, tinchalq raj, or ‘I was going to come’ is glossed as taak’a’uxla tanchalq raj, or ‘you think/intend that you are going to come’.
context (this world).\textsuperscript{66} In sum, if future-tense and third-person predications interact with \textit{raj} to indicate an epistemic relation of uncertainty, future-tense and second-person predications interact with \textit{raj} to indicate a social relation of contingency: conceding control of outcome.

Such future-tense, counterfactive constructions often occur with the adjective \textit{us} (good) to indicate polite suggestions (second-person predications) or uncertain desires (first-person predications).\textsuperscript{67} Let me offer some examples.

\begin{flushleft}
\textbf{(63a)} \textit{us raj t-o-xik toj eq’ela, malaj sa’ kaa’ib hoor}
good CF Fut-Abs(1p)-go still early or inside four hour
‘it would be good if we left early, (perhaps) at four o’clock’
\end{flushleft}

\begin{flushleft}
\textbf{(63b)} \textit{x-baan naq t-Ø-qa-seeb q-ib sa’ qa-trabaj}
Erg(3s)-because Comp Fut-Abs(3s)-Erg(1p)-hurry Erg(1p)-Rflx inside Erg(1p)-job
‘because we can speed up our task’
\end{flushleft}

\begin{flushleft}
\textbf{(64)} \textit{us raj t-Ø-aa-seeb aaw-ib chi-x-tzolbal l-aa k’anjel}
good CF Fut-Abs(3s)-Erg(2s)-hurry Erg(2s)-Rflx Comp-Erg(3s)-study Dm-Erg(2s) job
‘it would be good if you hurry learning your job’
\end{flushleft}

\begin{flushleft}
\textbf{(65)} \textit{us raj t-in-xik, aban toj maji’ n-Ø-in-naw}
good CF Fut-Abs(1s)-go but still not yet Pres-Abs(3s)-Erg(1s)-know
‘it would be good if I go, but I still don’t know (whether I’ll go)’
\end{flushleft}

In example (63), a group of men have just finished clearing a section of the speaker’s land. In line (63a), the speaker uses the construction \textit{us raj} to suggest that they begin work again early the next day; and, in line (63b), he then gives a reason for this suggestion. In example (64), a man tells his younger brother to hurry up learning his job. And in example (65), a man is discussing the possibility that he will go to a plantation in the lowlands, where he hears there is a relatively high-paying job.

In glossing constructions like those shown in examples (63–65), speakers’ interpretations turn on trying to convince another person to do something which they do not want to do: literally, ‘they do not have thoughts/heart to do it’ (\textit{maak’a’}

\textsuperscript{66} With purposive clauses (consisting of non-finite verbs marked by the complementizer \textit{chi}), the counterfactive clitic \textit{raj} usually has scope over the complement (insofar as this is the focus of such assertions). Thus, in the utterance \textit{xinchal raj chaawaatinanulk}, or ‘I have come CF to speak with you’, the event of coming is true in this world, where the event of speaking is signaled as being true in another world. While this being true in another world implicates that the event of speaking is not true in this world, such an implicature may be defeased or reinforced. Such ambiguity of implication is often used by speakers to leave a decision (whether or not the event of speaking will occur) to the addressee. In effect, one says ‘if you are willing I came to speak to you’. In such an utterance, the ‘other world’ in question is often intentionalized as a desire of the speaker. If the addressee’s desire is similar, then the counterfactive implicature is defeased. If the addressee’s desire is different, then this implicature is reinforced. In this way, the counterfactive clitic \textit{raj} functions to make a request more polite.

\textsuperscript{67} Compare \textit{taxaq}, which cannot usually be used to make suggestions whose outcome would benefit the speaker.
lix k’a’uxl chi xik). In this way, such suggestions arise in the context of trying to change another’s desire—such that they will act on their own accord in a way that is aligned with the speaker’s desire. For example:

(66a) qayehaq mare mas wan-Ø-Ø jun ajbal li ru qa-trabaj
    lets.say perhaps much exist-Pres-Abs(3s) one importance Dm Erg(3s)-face
    Erg(1p)-task
    ‘let’s say perhaps we have an important task’
(66b) pero laa’at maak’a’ mas aa-k’a’uxl chi xik
    but Abs(2s) not.exist much Erg(3s)-thought Comp go
    ‘but you don’t have much desire/thought to go’
(66c) eeh chi-x-baanunkil li qa-trabaj a’an
    eeh Comp-Erg(3s)-do(Nom) Dm Erg(1p)-task that
    ‘eek, to do this task of ours’
(66d) entoneses t-Ø-in-ye raj aaw-e, us raj t-o-xik hulaj
    so Fut-Abs(3s)-Erg(1s)-say CF Erg(2s)-Dat good CF Fut-Abs(1p)-go
    tomorrow
    ‘so I would say to you, ‘it would be good if we go tomorrow’’
(66e) . . . mas naabal chik qa-trabaj kabej
    (because) more much again Erg(1p)-task two.days.from.now
    “because we will have more work in two days’’

Deferential relations are also signaled by the use of the counterfactive clitic raj in conjunction with the nonfactive particle ink’a’, and a yes/no question. For example:

(67) ma ink’a’ raj t-Ø-aa-baunu usilal, eeh, t-in-aaw-aatina raj
    Question Neg CF Fut-Abs(3s)-Erg(2s)-do goodness eeh Fut-Abs(1s)-Erg(2s)-
speak CF
    ‘would you not do me a favor, eeh, you would speak to me’

The first clause in example (67) has five separate factors contributing to its status as highly deferential. First, there is the predicate itself, which characterizes the addressee’s action as the doing of a favor, or ‘goodness’ (usilal). Second, this predicate is inflected for future-tense, so the narrated event is still open, and thereby contingent on the addressee’s actions. Third, as signaled by the nonfactive particle ink’a’, the valence of the narrated event is negative. Fourth, with the counterfactive clitic raj, the speaker marks his commitment to the narrated event (itself nonfactive and future-tensed) as upholding in another world, indexically creating the context that he is committed to the addressee doing a favor in this world. (Notice, that for this reason this utterance is not as polite as it would be with unmarked valence, in which the indexically created context is that the addressee will not do the favor.) And fifth, with the question particle ma, the speaker signals that the truth of the proposition is known by the speaker—and thus, that it is within the speaker’s control (consisting of a second-person predication). In this way, the second clause denotes an event that the speaker will be committed to in another world—one in which the addressee’s
answer to the first clause is yes. In sum, open-question, negative valence, and counterfactive status (plus a future-tense predication and the lexicalization of the action as a favor) is a highly deferential—and also highly wheedling and obsequious—form of suggestion.

Negative valence and counterfactive status often occur with the predicate *ajok* (to want), to mark polite refusals or grudging acceptances. For example, a mother tells her son to get out of bed and feed the chickens:

(68a) **S1**: *ayu, ayu, k’e r-e li kaxlan*  
go(Imp) go(Imp) give(Imp) Erg(3s)-Dat Dm chicken  
‘go! go! give (this) to the chickens!’  
The son, quite sleepily, replies:

(68b) **S2**: *ink’a’ raj na-Ø-w-aj*  
Neg CF Pres-Abs(3s)-Erg(1s)-want  
‘I wouldn’t want to’  
And his mother replies:

(68c) **S1**: *ma ink’a’ tabi’ x-Ø-aaw-abi, ayu ayu*  
Question Neg Contradictive Perf-Abs(3s)-Erg(2s)-hear go(Imp) go(Imp)  
‘did you not hear?! go! go!’

(69) *ink’a’ raj na-Ø-w-aj, mas x-in-wa’ak*  
Neg CF Pres-Abs(3s)-Erg(1s)-want much Perf-Abs(1s)-eat  
‘I wouldn’t want to, I have eaten much’

Examples (68) and (69) both involve the same utterance: ‘I wouldn’t want to’ (*ink’a’ raj nawaj*). In line (68b), this utterance is functioning somewhere between grudging acceptance and defiant refusal. And line (69), said by a man when he was offered food at his brother’s house, functions as a polite refusal. In these utterances, the counterfactive clitic *raj* locates the lack-of-desire in another world, and indexically creates the context of presence-of-desire in this world. In both of these utterances, another world is mapped onto the speaker as an individual, and this world is mapped onto the current world of both speaker and addressee. In other words, while the speaker does not want to feed the chickens (or to eat the food), they index that they will engage in such activities in the context of their addressee’s desires (indexed by a prior imperative or offer).

Let me offer an example of a speaker’s gloss of a construction similar to line (68b):

(70a) *qaybeaq mare t-Ø-in-taqla laj Efrain sa’ Eswela*  
let’s say perhaps Fut-Abs(3s)-Erg(1s)-order SD Efrain inside school  
‘let’s say perhaps I send Efrain to school’

(70b) *ink’a’ raj na-Ø-w-aj xik chan-Ø-Ø*  
Neg CF Pres-Abs(3s)-Erg(1s)-want go(Nom) say-Pres-Abs(3s)  
‘I don’t want to go’, he says

(70c) *t-Ø-in-taqla s-in fuerz*  
Fut-Abs(3s)-Erg(1s)-send inside-Erg(1s) force  
‘I will order him with force’
Notice a few features of the interaction shown in example (70). First, the child’s response is highly marked: rather than undertake a given command, a child expresses his feelings about the command. Second, there is a question of two wills: the adult’s desire, indexed by his ordering the child to go to school; and the child’s lack of desire, characterized as ‘non-agreement’ (going to school did not enter the boy’s heart). Third, the child’s utterance has four components: the nonfactive particle *ink’a’*; the counterfactive clitic *raj* (preposed to encliticize with the nonfactive particle); the predicate *ajok* (to want); and the non-finite predicate *xik* (to go). Here, then, the child locates his not wanting to go in another world, and indexically creates the context that he wants to go in this world. Now, without too much interpretation, one can see how these worlds are localized in the son and father, respectively. In other words, with this utterance, the child is localizing two distinct wills, and saying which one will be acted on in this world. In sum, with commands, *raj* serves to mark grudging acceptance. And with offers, *raj* serves to mark polite refusals. In both cases, the *this* world and another world aspect of the clitic serves to mark a disjuncture, or conflict, between a social and or familial expectation, and a personal desire.

The last function of the counterfactive clitic *raj* is the least marked and perhaps the most frequent: it may be used with perfective-aspect predications (usually functioning as past-tense) to mark the speaker’s commitment to *p* in another world, creating the context of the speaker’s commitment to not *p* in this world. Notice that, like future-tense predications, there are two possible worlds being signaled; however, unlike future-tense (where which world is the actual world is yet to be determined), one world is actual and the other is counterfactual. In such constructions, another world may be intentionalized, ethicalized, or almost-ized. And, when intentionalized, the intentional world in question may belong to the speaker or narrated actor, depending on the animacy of the narrated actor, their relation of control to the event in question, and whether the narrated actor is a participant in the speech event or not. Let me offer some examples.

(71) **x-in-k’ulun raj ewer, pero ink’a’ x-in-e’x-toj**
Perf-Abs(1s)-come CF yesterday but Neg Perf-Abs(1s)-Erg(3p)-pay
‘I would have arrived yesterday, but they didn’t pay me’

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68 I am assuming that the counterfactive clitic has scope over the negation, and the negation has scope over the predicate (and its non-finite complement). (That is, the negation and counterfacticity are acting on the entire utterance, as predicate focus.) Another possible interpretation is that it’s the ‘going’ that is within the scope of negation and counterfacticity. In such an interpretation, the child is saying he doesn’t want to go (in another world), but that he will go (in this world).
(72) \textit{ink’a }raj x-Ø-x-loq’ li lamina
\hspace{1em}Neg CF Perf-Abs(3s)-Erg(3s)-buy Dm lamina
‘he shouldn’t have bought the roofing’

(73) x-Ø-in-sik’ raj abanan \textit{ink’a }x-Ø-in-taw
\hspace{1em}Perf-Abs(3s)-Erg(1s)-search CF but Neg Perf-Abs(3s)-Erg(1s)-find
‘I searched for it but I did not find it’

(74) \textit{ak x-Ø-jore’ raj li joom}
\hspace{1em}already Perf-Abs(3s)-break CF Dm cup
‘the cup almost broke’

(75) \textit{na-Ø-chal raj in-xa’ow, chalk raj na-Ø-r-aj in-yajel}
\hspace{1em}Pres-Abs(3s)-come CF Erg(1s)-vomit(Nom) come CFPres-Abs(3s)-Erg(3s)-want Erg(1s)-illness
‘my vomit was going to come, my sickness wanted to come’

Example (71) shows a canonical use of \textit{raj}: to mark one’s intention, desire, or plan against the ground of one’s actual actions (first clause)—and to provide an excuse for the frustrated action in question (second clause). Such an intentionalization of \textit{another} world is often lexicalized with the prepositional phrase \textit{sa’ inch’ool}, or ‘in my heart’. Thus, one may say \textit{xko’o raj sin ch’ool}, or ‘in my heart he was going to go’. Again, however, one may use the expression ‘inside my heart’ without a modal clitic. My sense is that such an overt indication of the locale of another world usually emphasizes the implicature (that he didn’t go), and characterizes more specifically the another world in question. (So there is no ambiguity in deciding whether it was what he said he’d do, or what he thought he’d do, or what he tried to do.)

Example (72) shows \textit{raj} being used to mark an ethical ground: an action undertaken when it shouldn’t have been. Here \textit{another} world is not a private intentional world, but a public moral world. Example (73) shows the use of \textit{raj} to mark not the counterfacticity of an event, but the counterfacticity of the telos, or goal, of the event. That is to say, the speaker did indeed search for the object (a source of water), but did not actually find it. Such counterfactual ends of action usually occur with activity predicates and/or progressive aspect (compare example (60)). Example (74) shows the use of \textit{raj} with a third-person predicate describing the trajectory of a cup that fell off the table. I have glossed the construction using \textit{almost}. Such a gloss is appropriate in the context of non-animate subjects and/or uncontrolled actions. (And such constructions can be subsequently intentionalized in terms of the speaker’s expectations against the ground of the outcome: ‘I thought it would break.’) And example (75) shows a construction involving a man’s vomit. Here, in the second clause, the sickness is intentionalized: in \textit{another} world, my sickness wanted to come; but in \textit{this} world, it didn’t.

\footnote{Compare \textit{yoo-k-in raj chi aatinak} (do-Pres-Abs(1s) CF Comp speak), or ‘we were still speaking (when we were interrupted)’.}
4.6. Contradictive question: tabi

The contradictive clitic tabi only occurs with interrogatory illocutionary force.\(^{70}\) It is used to call p into question in the presupposed context of the addressee’s commitment to p, and in the created context of the speaker’s commitment to not p. In the case of both yes/no questions and Wh-questions, the speaker is committed to the opposite of the proposition to which the addressee is committed. (While this proposition is usually only recoverable through context, in the case of yes/no-questions it is merely the negative answer to the question.) Such disjunctures between the speaker’s and addressee’s commitment worlds often index the speaker’s ‘exasperation’ (titz’k), ‘anger’ (josq’ok), or ‘doubt’ (ink’a paabank). And such utterances often index accusations of false accusations, or ‘calumny’ (q’abank).\(^{71}\) Let me offer some examples.

While shopping in the market, I inadvertently asked the same woman about the price of her tomatoes as I had previous asked. She told me the same price as she had the first time, and then asked, ma ink’a tabi t-Ø-aa-k’am (Question Neg Contradictive Fut-Abs(3s)-Erg(2s)-take),\(^{72}\) or ‘are you not going to take them?’ Here, my commitment not to buy the tomatoes was indexically presupposed by my previous actions, whereas her commitment to my buying them is indexically created by her utterance. In other words, her utterance functions as a command or a wish: ‘would you just take them already!’ This was my first experience with this clitic. When I later asked my host what it meant, she glossed the woman’s utterance by attributing to her reported speech: ‘mas xintitz’ chan, k’am bi, or ‘I am exasperated, she says, take them already!’ In this way, the utterance was said to index the woman’s exasperation at my twice having asking the price of the tomatoes without purchasing them, and was functioning as an imperative to take them.

Acting with the Wh-word chanru (how) the contradictive clitic tabi can be used when the speaker is not necessarily being impolite, but only indicating that a request cannot be fulfilled. For example, when a woman’s sister-in-law came by asking for a loan, the woman said that her husband—the visitor’s older brother—was away in the fields working, and that he had their money. In other words, the woman said she could not make a decision—that it was up to her husband. When the visitor asked again, the woman said, chan tabi r-u t-Ø-in-k’e aaw-e (how Contradictive Erg(3s)-face Fut-Abs(3s)-Erg(1s)-give Erg(2s)-Dat),\(^{73}\) or ‘how can I give it to you?’ Here, the addressee’s commitment to there being ‘a way’ (in answer to how) to receive money is indexed by her having asked the question twice, whereas the speaker’s commitment to there not being a way is indexically created by this utterance. While

\(^{70}\) While tabi only occurs with interrogatory illocutionary force, it is similar to other modal clitics in its morphology, grammatical distribution, and semantic meaning.

\(^{71}\) It should be said that because of the rudeness of this clitic, my tokens didn’t occur in the conversations I was recording between members of families, nor in interviews, but tended to be relatively isolated utterances I took down ‘on the fly’.

\(^{72}\) Notice how the contradictive clitic occurs after the predicate in a fashion similar to the other modal clitics.

\(^{73}\) Notice that the clitic tabi is encliticized with the preposed element in focus-position.
nothing was said about the speaker’s anger or exasperation, this would be a plausible interpretation.

Lastly, after a woman had shooed out the chickens that were congregating by her hearth, she said to her son, *ma ink’a’ tabi nak-Ø-aaw-il* (Question Neg Contradictive Pres-Abs(3s)-Erg(2s)-see), or ‘did you not see them?’ The child said a truncated ‘no’ (*nk’a*). And the woman went back to her cooking, saying *mas xintitz’k*, or ‘I am so fed up (with your behavior)’. In this example, the woman uses the contradictory clitic *tabi* with her question, and it occurs encliticized after the nonfactive particle *ink’a*. Here, the utterance indexically presupposes the child’s commitment to not having seen the chickens (revealed first by his lack of action, and later by his utterance), and indexically creates his mother’s commitment to his having seen them. Notice, then, such a rhetorical question is actually accusing the child of having seen the chickens and not having shooed them away. And one may suppose that the woman’s exasperation is due in part to the child’s foregoing his domestic chore (keeping the chickens away from the hearth), and in part to the child’s lie (regarding whether or not he saw them).

Speakers’ accounts of *tabi* often turn on disputes between men: situations in which one man has lied about some activity, and another man doesn’t believe him. One speaker, for example, offered the following account: “Let’s say that in occurs in the midst of an argument (*xchi’ilankil qib*) out of anger (*sa’ josq’iil*). Let’s say that perhaps you did a job poorly. But you say that I did it. Um, you say that I did it. But I didn’t. You did it. So perhaps we begin to argue over this deed (*na’leb*). So I say to you, *ani tabi xbaamun re, ma laa’in tabi, ma ink’a’ tabi laa’at,* or ‘who did this? did I do it? was it not you who did it?’ Because of this confrontation (*sa’ xk’aba lix ch’ilankil*), I say this to you”. Notice how the reported speech speaker’s three questions gradually narrow down who did it: from a general question of ‘who did it’ (you know who did it), to ‘was it I’ (no), to ‘was it not you’ (yes). Notice how the speaker (in the interview world) explicitly thematizes the relevant commitment worlds (what was actually done versus what participants say was done). And notice how such an utterance is thematized in the context of angry men arguing over work responsibilities.

4.7. Positive question: *tawi*

The positive clitic *tawi* usually only occurs with interrogatory illocutionary force, but it may also occur with relativized clauses which are headed by predicates expressing the speaker’s lack-of-knowledge. It is used to pose questions without asking them—and thus it usually indexically presupposes that neither the speaker, nor the addressee, know the answer to the question being posed. It is a very frequently used construction, and I have already mentioned it in examples (32, 33, 41, 47, 49, and 53). Let me offer some more examples.

Several men are taking a break from agricultural clearing. They lean against a fence. One points his lips towards the edge of forest, and asks *ani tawi laj echare’ li tz’i’ wan-Ø-Ø wili* (who Positive SD owner Dm dog be-Pres-Abs(3s) there) or ‘who could the owner be of that dog over there?’ The other men look in the direction...
the speaker has pointed to with his lips. *Saber*, says one man, ‘who knows’. The other men are silent, watching as the dog slinks away along the fence line. In asking a question while indexing that the addressee does not know the answer, this clitic may be said to index ‘puzzlement’ or ‘wonder’ regarding the appearance of the dog so far from the village. Such an utterance serves to coordinate perspectives: pointing out something, and putting into question that something as puzzling. And such an utterance invites, but does not require, possible answers regarding the solution to the puzzle (often modalized with *mare* and/or *tana*).

Often times *tawi* serves to alert an addressee that the speaker is searching for something, and occurs as ‘self-talk’ (cf. Goffman, 1978)—and thereby serves to explain the speaker’s odd actions. For example, my host entered the part of the house where I was sleeping and, while rummaging about, said several times *bar tawi* *x-Ø-in-k’e in-kemon* (where Positive Perf-Abs(3s)-Erg(1s)-give Erg(1s)-weaving), or ‘where could I have put my weaving?’ In this case, although ostensibly talking to herself, this woman’s utterance served to explain to me (whom she knew could hear her, I presume), what she was doing. Similarly, in the midst of lighting the hearth fire, a man noticed that his wife was staring out the window, and said *k’a reek’, or ‘what’s up?’ She answered *ani tawi* *x-Ø-ok sa’ li kabl* (who Positive Perf-Abs(3s)-enter inside Dm house), or ‘who could have entered the (neighbor’s) house?’ ‘Who knows’ (*saber*), said the man, as he continued trying to light the fire. In this way, the woman’s utterance served to explain her odd action by indicating her puzzlement at an event whose traces could still be seen by looking out the window. Similarly, recall from Section 4.2 that *tawi* may also serve to elicit guesses from an addressee. In such cases, these guesses usually occur with markers of epistemic modality. For example, upon arriving home from church and seeing that her chickens were tied to a post (to protect them from wandering away from the house, where they could be snatched up by a chicken-hawk), a woman said, *ani tawi* *x-Ø-bak’ok r-e in-kaxlan* (who Positive Perf-Abs(3s)-tie Erg(3s)-Dat Erg(1s)-chicken), or ‘who could have tied up my chickens’. Her husband then answered, *mare x-Ø-nume’ tana aa-ná’* (perhaps Perf-Abs(3s)-pass AF Erg(2s)-mother), or ‘perhaps your mother may have passed by’. Like line (33b), this man’s response has both the afactive particle *mare*, and the afactive clitic *tana*.

While *tawi* usually occurs when the addressee does not know the answer to a question or, indeed, when there is no addressee, it can also be used when the addressee does know the answer. For example, a man meets me on the trail after having been introduced to me several weeks before. He asks, *ani tawi* *aa-k’a’aba’* (who Positive Erg(2s)-name), or ‘what could your name be?’ I tell him, *laa’in laj Pablo*, or ‘I’m Paul’. And he says, *ma laa’at pe’, or ‘so that’s who you are’. Notice that here the man’s response is phrased with the question particle *ma*, the second-person pronoun, and the factive clitic *pe’. And notice that he used *tawi*, the positive clitic, with a question he knew I knew the answer to. Thus, the clitic *tawi* can be used to ask questions one should know the answer to—serving a very similar function to the repairative

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74 And it is for this reason that I characterize *tawi* as marking that the speaker does not know the answer, rather than marking that the addressee does not know the answer.
use of pe'. But whereas pe' seems to be used with information that is immediately dis-
cursively presupposed (for example, the antecedent for some anaphoric expression),
this use of tawi' arises from information that is discursively presupposed from a dis-
tant speech event. My sense is that the use of tawi' also indicates that one is strug-
gling to find the answer oneself—that it is on the tip of one’s tongue. Where the
use of pe' in the same context indicates that one has forgotten the answer completely
(or never knew it).

There are a number of complement-taking predicates that license the use of the
positive clitic tawi' in their complements. The most frequent predicate is ‘not know-
ing...’ (ink’a ninnaw ani tawi’ or moko ninnaw ta ani tawi’ or ‘I don’t know who it
could be’). Other forms are ‘who knows’ (saber, the Spanish non-finite form of ‘to
know’), ‘not seeing’ (moko xawil ta ani tawi’ lix k’aba’ or ‘you didn’t see who it
was’), ‘no longer knowing’ (maaj’i nakaanow ani tawi’ raj or ‘you no longer know
who could have done it’), and questions regarding ‘truth’ (ma yaal naq jo’kan tawi’,
or ‘is it true that it could be like this?’). Notice, then, that (lack of) knowledge, (lack
of) perception, and (uncertain) truth constitute a covert class of predicates whose
reactance is their conditioning of the occurrence of the positive clitic tawi’ in a rela-
tive clause.75

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Chicago.

75 Insofar as tawi’ may appear in a relativized clauses in which the speaker expresses her ignorance of
some fact, one might think that tawi’ is being redundant—that the speaker is asserting what the modal
clitic already indicates. However, it should be emphasized that relativised questions headed by ‘I don’t
know’ (ink’a ninnaw) do not obligatorily take the modal clitic tawi’. They may also occur without any
marking. My sense is that the difference in meaning between these two assertions is that the second one
often is a response to a question, ‘do you know who did it’, and the speaker has no idea who did it. While
in the first case the speaker also wants to know who did it, and perhaps has some inkling (or at least knows
the answer is knowable). Thus there are minimal pairs such as: ink’a ninnaw ani xko’o’, ink’a ninnaw ani
tawi’ xko’o’, ink’a ninnaw ani ta xko’o’.


