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Linguistic anthropology and critical theory

Paul Kockelman

24.1 Cages, claws, and keys

As used here, the term critical theory refers to work produced by a set of thinkers who might best be understood as shadows of the enlightenment – Bacon and Hobbes, Kant and Hegel, Marx and Freud, Darwin and Nietzsche, Saussure and Peirce, among many others. While these thinkers are, to be sure, radically heterogeneous in many respects, they all pondered the limits (and sometimes the seeming limitlessness) of knowledge and power. In some sense, they all understood human-specific forms of agency, and mediation more generally, to be simultaneously cage, claw, and key.

This chapter is meant to characterize the core theoretical claims of linguistic anthropology while, simultaneously, critiquing the cultural logic underlying its practices of claim-making. The title, then, is meant to do double-work: we will take a critical look at theory in the discipline of linguistic anthropology by foregrounding its dependence on certain moves in critical theory. As will be seen, such practices turn on the repeated deployment of a small set of interrelated moves, themselves closely linked to such limits: replace any mediated relatum with a mediating relation; reframe any entity or event as the precipitate of a process; and recast seemingly mono-dimensional figures as flattenings of multi-dimensional frameworks.

The first section simply summarizes a dozen or so relatively axiomatic commitments of linguistic anthropologists, showing how they are all structurally similar in their invocation of a particular metaphor – why live (or, rather, think and theorize) in Flatland when there is affordable housing (or, rather, readily available analytic tools) in Textureville? The next six sections treat mediation in detail. They detail two key modes of mediation (conditioning and representation), and the ways these modes (when subject to processes such as framing, embedding, disturbing, and reflecting) effortlessly generate almost all of the major claims made by critical theorists (as incorporated by linguistic anthropologists). In some
sense, then, my claim is that there is a very simple "grammar" that generates almost all of the major moves made in critical theory and, insofar as we have inherited many of the claims of this tradition, those of our own discipline. And the conclusion develops some of the stakes of this fact.

24.2 From Flatland to Textureville

Some of the core commitments in the last half-century of linguistic anthropology are summarized in Table 24.1. Perturbing the Saussurian dichotomies (1983[1916]; and see Greenberg 1990, inter alia), we foreground discourse practice (parole) as much as grammatical structure (langue), diachronic transformation as much as synchronic relations, motivation (icons and indices) as much as arbitrariness (symbols). Building on Malinowski (1936), Austin (2003[1955]), and Jakobson (1990a; and see Hymes 1962, as well as the essays in Bauman and Sherzer 1974), we foreground language as action as much as language as reflection or description. Building on Austin again, with roots in Mead (1934) and fruits in Goffman (1959), we foreground implicit signs (e.g., gestures, signs given off) as much as explicit signs (e.g., symbols, signs given), and their effectiveness on context (protention) as much as their appropriateness in

Table 24.1 Some core moves of linguistic anthropology (or What the discipline foregrounds)

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<th></th>
<th>Discourse as much as grammar, diachrony as much as synchrony, motivation as much as arbitrariness</th>
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<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>Language as action as much as language as reflection</td>
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<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>Implicit signs as much as explicit signs, and their effectiveness on context as much as appropriateness in context</td>
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<td>d</td>
<td>Meta-language as much as language, and reflexive language as much as reflective language</td>
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<tr>
<td>e</td>
<td>Poetic regimentation (showing equivalence) as much as meta-linguistic regimentation (stating it)</td>
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<td>f</td>
<td>Semiotic collectivities (on multiple social, temporal, and ideational scales) as much as speech communities</td>
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<td>g</td>
<td>Multiplicity and concreteness of human creativity as much as abstract (or syntactic) generativity</td>
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<td>h</td>
<td>Tropic usage (etiolation, parasites, refoulings, decenterings, etc.) as much as conventional usage</td>
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<td>i</td>
<td>Interactional orders (and their re-orderings) as much as speech events</td>
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<td>j</td>
<td>Processes precipitating &quot;text&quot; and &quot;context&quot; as much as text in relation to context</td>
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<td>k</td>
<td>Parole (qua practice), and langue and parole about langue and parole (qua ideology), as much as langue (qua structure)</td>
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<td>l</td>
<td>Competence (langue, potenti, etc.) as precipitate of process as much as condition for performance</td>
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<tr>
<td>m</td>
<td>Anthropology and linguistics before the 1960s as much as anthropology and linguistics since the 1960s</td>
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<td>n</td>
<td>Methodology as theory as much as methods in relation to theory</td>
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context (rentention). Building on Austin yet again, as well as another key essay of Jakobson (1990b; and see the essays in Lucy 1993), in addition to a host of work in analytic philosophy, we foreground meta-language as much as language, and reflexive language (such as shifters, proper names, and so forth) as much as reflective language. Developing a particular insight in that first essay of Jakobson (1990a), we foreground poetic regimentation (showing equivalence) as much as metalinguistic regimentation (stating it). Building on Gumperz (1965), and with many subsequent additions, we focus on semiotic collectivities (on multiple social, temporal, and ideational scales) as much as speech communities. Gathering often diverse claims from a range of scholars (Goffman 1981; Friedrich 1986; and see Enfield and Levinson 2006), we focus on the multiplicity and concreteness of human creativity as much as abstract (or syntactic) generativity. As developed most clearly by Goffman (1981), we focus on tropic usage (etiolation, parasites, ritualization, refootings, decenterings, etc.) as much as conventional usage. And, again with particular reference to Goffman (1964, 1983; and see Blom and Gumperz 1972), we focus on interactional orders (and their re-orderings via shifts in footing, and so forth) as much as speech events. In a tradition that runs back to Haliday and Hasan (1976; and see the particularly important essays in Silverstein and Urban 1996), we foreground processes that precipitate “text” and “context” as much as text in relation to context. Building on insights of Bourdieu (1977[1972]; and see the essays in Schieffelin et al. 1998; and, in particular, work by Silverstein 1979, 1981), we focus on parole (qua practice), and langue and parole about langue and parole (qua ideology), as much as langue (qua structure). Building on Hymes (1966; and see the essays in Schieffelin and Ochs 1986), we foreground communicative competence (langue, potentia, etc.) as precipitate of process as much as condition for performance. More generally, unlike many of our colleagues in related disciplines, we make use of anthropology and linguistics “before the 60s” (Ortner 1984) as much as anthropology and linguistics since the 1960s. And finally, via a pragmatic tradition that goes back to Peirce (1998[1907]), we foreground methodology as theory as much as methods in relation to theory.

As may be seen, all the moves are closely interrelated, and so might constitute a “theory” if they didn’t already have a kind of axiomatic status (somewhere between best-practices and paradigmatic assumptions). As should be noted, many of the core moves aren’t from linguistic anthropology proper, but have been adopted by linguistic anthropologists from other fields, making our discipline seem like an incredibly stream-lined device for sieving wheat from chaff (and then resowing its seeds in particularly fertile fields, qua culture-specific and ethnographically framed ways).

Before moving onto mediation as a central analytic trope, it is worthwhile saying a few words about the overarching logic of the list itself. As should be apparent from the meter (and, in particular, by the repeated use of the relational term as much as), one key strategy turns on a three-stroke
process. First, foreground previously backgrounded dimensions (which may have been overlooked, elided, or misunderstood). For example, attend to all the functions of language beside the referential. Second, continue to carefully attend to the previously foregrounded dimension (and thus the issue is not inversion, but rather subsumption). For example, the point is not to foreground discourse instead of structure, but rather to foreground both discourse and structure (as well as each in relation to the other). And third, account for the relation between foreground and background; and thus try to understand how one relates to the other (say, as condition to consequence), or why certain dimensions more easily come to the fore. For example, as per point (j), instead of focusing on text per se, focus on textuality as a process which gives rise to such a precipitate (and focus as well as on the factors that frequently lead to the elision of the former in local and expert understanding).

Crucially, such a summary of key moves in the discipline of linguistic anthropology also serves as a quick-and-dirty summary of its key failings. In particular, while many linguistic anthropologists work at the level of subsumption much of the time, a substantial amount of scholarship only ever manages to invert. For example, we get a lot on ideology but, relatively speaking, not much (or at least no longer much) on structure and practice; a lot on textualization, but not much on text; and so forth. We will return to some of the conditions for these inversions in the conclusion.

### 24.3 Mediation

A core commitment of linguistic anthropology is the importance of *mediation*, which may be loosely (and provisionally) understood as a kind of relation between two relata ($R_1 \Rightarrow R_2$). The relata in question may be figured in a variety of ways (e.g., as entities, events, qualities, processes, actors, domains, other relations, and so forth). What usually matters is that, aside from the mediating relation per se, the relata seem otherwise relatively different or disconnected. For example, a word in relation to a referent, a mode of consciousness in relation to a form of communication, a practice in relation to a structure, a collectivity in relation to a value, a grammatical category in relation to a semantic feature, one identity in relation to another identity, and so forth.

Like many other disciplines, linguistic anthropology has traditionally been interested in two particular *modes of mediation*. First, one relatum may relate to the other as sign to object ($S \Rightarrow O$); or, more generally, as representation to representatum (e.g., a gesture that points and an object that is pointed to). And second, one relatum may relate to the other as cause to effect ($C \Rightarrow E$); or, more generally, as condition to consequence (e.g., the action of flipping a switch and the event of a light turning on). See Table 24.2a.
Table 24.2  Some key modes of mediation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expression</th>
<th>Paraphrase</th>
<th>Examples</th>
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| **a) Basic Modes**<br> S $\Rightarrow$ O | Sign stands for object, or representation has some representatum | Grammatical category $\Rightarrow$
| | | semantic feature, mental state $\Rightarrow$
| | | state of affairs |
| C $\Rightarrow$ E | Cause gives rise to effect, or condition has some consequence | Discursive practice $\Rightarrow$
| | | grammatical structure, mode of communication $\Rightarrow$
| | | mode of consciousness |
| **b) Reframings**<br> $(S)_{C} \Rightarrow (O)_{E}$ | Sign relates to object as cause to effect | Performatives (token level), projection (type level) |
| | | Constatives (token level), iconicity (type level) |
| $(O)_{C} \Rightarrow (S)_{E}$ | Object relates to sign as cause to effect | Clues, symptoms, natural meaning; Hobbes, Darwin, Veblen, Labov |
| $(O)_{S} \Rightarrow (E)_{O}$ | Cause relates to effect as sign to object | |
| $(E)_{S} \Rightarrow (C)_{O}$ | Effect relates to cause as sign to object | Clues, symptoms, natural meaning; Hobbes, Darwin, Veblen, Labov |
| **c) Embeddings**<br> S $\Rightarrow (S \Rightarrow O)_{O}$ | Object of sign is sign–object relation | Meta-language, paraphrase, reported speech, etc. |
| C $\Rightarrow (C \Rightarrow E)_{E}$ | Effect of cause is cause–effect relation | Meta-control, conducting conduct, keys, switches, etc. |
| S $\Rightarrow (C \Rightarrow E)_{E}$ | Object of sign is cause–effect relation | Physics equation: $E=mc^2$; warning sign: Slippery when wet |
| C $\Rightarrow (S \Rightarrow O)_{E}$ | Effect of cause is sign–object relation | Grammaticalization, regimentation, entextualization, enregisterment, etc. |
| $(S \Rightarrow O)_{S} \Rightarrow O$ | Sign–object relation is sign of object | Language you speak sign of your identity |
| $(S \Rightarrow O)_{C} \Rightarrow E$ | Sign–object relation is cause of effect | Any interpretant of sign–object relation |
| $(C \Rightarrow E)_{S} \Rightarrow O$ | Cause–effect relation is sign of object | One’s reaction to a situation itself a sign of one’s mood or emotion |
| **d) Disturbances**<br> $(C \Rightarrow E)_{C} \Rightarrow E$ | Cause–effect relation is cause of effect | Phylogenetic interpreters |
| S $\Rightarrow$ O | Blocked or unknown representation | Not conscious of some object; cannot articulate some object |
| S $\Rightarrow$ O | Distorted or false representation | Representation of object incorrect; representation of object distorted |
| C $\Rightarrow$ E | Effect stopped, path blocked | Thwarting of action; channel capped |
| C $\Rightarrow$ E | Effect redirected, path rerouted | Co-opting of action; channel transformed |
If, in the first case, the relation may often be described as something like *standing for* (i.e., a sign stands for an object), in the second case, the relation may often be described as something like *giving rise to* (i.e., a condition gives rise to a consequence). To return to the concerns of critical theory, as raised in the introduction, these two modes of mediation may often map onto knowledge and power, respectively.

Observing, describing, and theorizing such mediating relations is hard-enough work by itself (e.g., writing a grammar of a language or an ethnography of a speech community; or analyzing the correlation between discourse patterns and grammatical structures or between semantic categories and cognitive frames), and one might think that linguistic anthropologists would content themselves with undertaking the scholarship necessary to resolve such issues. However, the nature of the mediation involved seems to be complicated in particular ways, such that many linguistic anthropologists have felt the need to become critical theorists as much as scholars and scientists. (Note, for example, the split among our contributors.)

In the next four sections we will discuss such complications in detail: framing, embedding, disturbances, and meta-mediation. As already emphasized, the issue is not so much, what are the arguments and claims per se (i.e., our representations as to what mediates what and how so, and the genealogy of such representations in our discipline). Rather, the issue is the epistemic logic (or culture, if you will) that conditions (✓) such representations (✓) to be more or less endlessly and effortlessly deployed. In some sense, then, the point is to understand and critique linguistic anthropology’s approach to understanding and critique.

### 24.4 Framing

It should first be emphasized that the two modes of mediation (representation and conditioning) are best understood as poles of a continuum, rather than positions in an opposition (and even that phrasing is optimistic). In part, this is because most modes of mediation are hybrid entities, exhibiting features of both types. And so the point is not to specify where something should belong as an ideal type (Weber 1949[1904]), but rather to characterize what features it partakes of as an actual token (as compared to and contrasted with an array of such ideal types). In part, this is because each mode of mediation may often only do its work in the context of the other. For example, an infrastructure of cause–effect relations enables any sign–object relation (and usually vice versa). In part, this is because many actual modes of mediation are quite complex, turning on long chains of the two simpler kinds. Indeed, in some sense this section is precisely an account of such complex chains of mediation. In part, it is because whether some instance of mediation is understood as one mode or the
other often depends on other modes of mediation. For example, our attempts to represent where causal influencing ends and semiotic representation begins is itself causally influenced by our semiotic representations. In part, it is because there are other ways to characterize the two modes of mediation. For example, in certain situations, the distinction between representation (S$\Rightarrow$O) and conditioning (C$\Rightarrow$E) maps not only onto distinctions like knowledge and power, but also distinctions like code and channel (Kockelman 2010), mind (or language) and world (Putnam 1975), reflection and action (Malinowski 1936), semantics and pragmatics (Levinson 1983), symbol and index (Peirce 1955a), theoretical agency and practical agency (Kockelman 2007), representing and intervening (Hacking 1983), mediator and intermediary (Latour 2007, and see Chapter 29, this volume), third and second (Peirce 1992[1868]), and even distinctions like self-consciousness and self-control. And finally, as will now be discussed in detail, and as closely related to all of the foregoing points, it is because each mode of mediation may be reframed in terms of the other under certain circumstances. See Table 24.2b.

Firstly, sign–object relations may often be understood in terms of cause-effect relations (either $(S)_C \Rightarrow (O)_E$ or $(O)_C \Rightarrow (S)_E$). For example, when sign-tokens are foregrounded, a performative utterance (qua sign) relates to the state of affairs it represents (qua object) as condition to consequence (recall Table 24.1c). Conversely, a constative utterance relates to the state of affairs it represents as consequence to condition. Similar claims can be made for private representations (qua mental states) as opposed to public representations (qua speech acts). For example, perceptions are, in part, caused by the states of affairs they represent; and intentions are, in part, causal of the states of affairs they represent. Such moves were crucial not only to analytic philosophers studying intentionality (Anscombe 1957, Searle 1983, Grice 1989a, Austin 2003[1955], and see Brandom, this volume, Chapter 14), but also to critical philosophers like Marx (1978[1845]) and Hegel (1977[1807]). For example, in one relatively widespread reading (however schematic and simplistic), a key question is whether mind or consciousness (qua ensemble of relatively representational processes) is relatively conditioning of the world (qua ensemble of relatively causal processes), or whether the world is relatively conditioning of mind (see, for example, Sahlin 1978, for a classic statement).

Similarly, when sign-types are foregrounded, motivation describes a process whereby signs take on, or are conditioned by, the features of their objects. Conversely, projection describes a process whereby objects take on, or are conditioned by, the features of their signs. And just as iconic-indexicality (versus symbolism), and motivated meaning (versus arbitrary meaning) more generally, was crucial to both Peircean semiotics (1955) and Saussurian semiology (1983[1916]), projection was fundamental to critical philosophy (Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, and so forth) as much as to Boasian anthropology (Sapir 1985[1927], Whorf 1956a). It is impossible to
understand notions like reification and fetishization, as the systematic misrecognition of the origins of value, without it. Indeed, even relatively hoary philosophical stances (nominalism, realism, conceptualism) may be understood as particular commitments to various modes and directions of mediation (see Putnam 1975; Haugeland 1998; and Brandom, this volume, Chapter 14). For example, is the intentionality exhibited by private representations (qua mental states) derivative of the intentionality exhibited by public representations (qua speech acts), or vice versa; and how do mind and language relate to reality more generally, qua condition or consequence?

Secondly, cause-effect relations may often be understood in terms of sign-object relations ((C)S => (E)O or (E)S => (C)O). In the simplest of cases, this describes processes of natural meaning (Grice 1989b): such as smoke means fire or fire means smoke. More generally, insofar as I know (or assume) one thing causally leads to, or follows from, another, I can treat the former as a sign of the latter. It thereby has "meaning" for me even though it was not "meant" to by its maker. In certain domains, such as symptoms and clues, such relations may be typified – the ability to read them is disciplined into an entire collectivity (of doctors and detectives) as part of its episteme. In other cases, such clues and symptoms may be used only by particular agents in particular events (during, say, the simple sort of detective and doctor work each of us does every day). What is crucial in all cases is really the set of ontological assumptions that underlie such interpretations (as to various kinds of causality and the way they connect various kinds of qualities and events, understood as the roots or fruits of other qualities and events), such that an interpreting agent may semiotically move from one kind of quality or event (qua cause) to another (qua effect). Note, for example, that linguistic anthropology, as a theory, is in part precisely a set of claims about such cause-effect relations: we don’t use symptoms as indices of illnesses or clues as indices of culprits so much as linguistic tokens and types as indices of social relations and sociality-information.

Theories turning on precisely these kinds of dynamics, on various sorts of scales (evolutionary, historical, developmental, etc.) are legion: Vygotsky’s (1978) account of pointing; Veblen’s (1971[1899]) understanding of pecuniary emulation; Labov’s (2001) description of hypercorrection; Darwin’s (1981[1871], 1965[1872]) theory of sexual selection and emotional expression; Hobbes’s (1994[1651]) understanding of power (and its symbols and symptoms); Bourdieu’s (1984) notion of distinction; Mead’s (1934) theory of the gesture; Goffman’s (1959) description of signs “given off”; and so forth. Finally, much of this might be understood as the essence of poetic meter (Jakobson 1990a), and patterning more generally: past experiences (with relatively connected qualities, whatever the why and how of the connection) condition future expectations (qua interpretations), be these “expectations” embodied, enminded, or engenomed.
24.5 Embedding

Just as such relations may be reframed (sign-object to cause-effect, or cause-effect to sign-object), so too may they be embedded. In such cases, the key issue is that each relatum in such a relation may itself be a relation with relata (and so on, indefinitely). See Table 24.2c. In particular, there is the possibility of both left-handed embedding and right-handed embedding. For example, just as there are embedded relations of the type $S \Rightarrow (S \Rightarrow O)_0$, or a sign relates to an object which is itself a sign-object relation (at some degree of remove), so too are there embedded relations of the type $(S \Rightarrow O)_S \Rightarrow O$, or the relation between a sign and an object is itself the sign of an object. Moreover, the embedded relation may itself be of the same type as the relation in which it is embedded, as per these two examples, or it may be of a different type. For example, just as there are embedded relations of the type $S \Rightarrow (C \Rightarrow E)_0$, or a sign relates to an object which is itself a cause-effect relation, so too are there embedded relations of the type $(S \Rightarrow O)_C \Rightarrow E$, or the relation between a sign and an object is itself the cause of an effect. Finally, these may be recursively re-embedded in each other again and again to any degrees of remove (see the discussion of context-free grammars in Chapter 29, this volume). For example, as will be discussed at length below, many articles by linguistic anthropologists are precisely complicated signs (qua texts) that represent conditions for (and consequences of) particular sign-object relations, where such conditions and consequences, qua causes and effects, are themselves other sign-object relations (and may themselves have other conditions and consequences). For example, $(\text{Text})_S \Rightarrow ((S \Rightarrow O)_C \Rightarrow (S \Rightarrow O)_E)_0$. In the rest of this section, we will offer examples of the eight relatively simple kinds of embeddings, discuss various ways they may be disturbed, and then discuss a few multiple embeddings of particular importance and complexity.

Right-handed embeddings are the most familiar kind. Signs may stand for objects that are themselves sign-object relations. Metalanguage, and meta-semiosis more generally (Jakobson 1990a, 1990b; Lucy 1993; Silverstein 1995[1976]), was mentioned in the last section, and so needs no introduction. For present purposes, just note how over-represented it is in more popular literature (perhaps because it is just the most obvious peak of the meta-mediation mountain). Signs may stand for objects that are themselves cause-effect relations. For example, just as many physics equations are signs that represent causal processes ($F=Gm_1m_2/r^2$), so are many warning signs (slippery when wet). Causes may give rise to effects which are themselves cause-effect relations. A canonical example of this is unlocking a door, or any form of meta-agency more generally: by turning on (or off) a machine, one ensures that other effects will (or will not) be caused by it; by disciplining a child one tries to ensure that other actions (including speech actions) will and will not be instigated by it. More
generally, any attempt to conduct conduct (often through representations), as per Foucault’s (1991a[1978], 1991b[1978]) account of governmentality, or Weber’s (1978) account of domination, is of this variety. Or, closer to home, language prescriptivism and even quotidian modes of “correction.” Finally, causes may give rise to effects which are themselves sign–object relations. For example, any process that gives rise to a sign–object relation, or a field of such relations, may be described in these terms: grammaticalization, conventionalization, ritualization (Goffman 1981), enregisterment (Agha 2007), typification (Peirce 1955; Berger and Luckman 1967), sexual selection for certain emblematic characteristics (Darwin 1871[1851]), etc. Here, then, might go any condition of possibility for any particular semiotic process.

Left-handed embeddings may, at first, seem less familiar; but they too are ubiquitous. The sign of an object can itself be a (relatively causal) sign–object relation. In some sense, much of linguistic anthropology (Goffman 1959; Silverstein 1995 [1976]) works through this lens; my use of a sign–object relation from some particular code may itself be a sign (itself merely “given off,” and thus “not meant to mean”), to an interpreting agent with a particular ontology, of my particular sociocultural identity (class, gender, political stance, ability, etc.). The sign of an object can itself be a cause–effect relation. For example, the melting of a substance (effect) when heated to a certain temperature (cause), provides evidence (sign) that the substance is gold (object). When semiotic processes are properly understood as sign–object relations that give rise to interpretant–object relations, and hence as relations between relations (Kockelman 2005), this may be framed as follows: insofar as you interpret (qua effect) a sign in some way (qua cause), that is itself a sign of a certain object. For example, because you raise your hand (interpretant) when I ask a question (sign), I infer that you think you know the answer (object). Similarly, the cause of a cause–effect relation can itself be a sign–object relation. Again, linguistic anthropologists are constantly foregrounding this, as should be obvious when phrased in slightly different terms: not, what are some of the historical (or interactional) conditions for a particular grammatical structure (qua code, qua sign–object relation), but what are some of the consequences (Whorf 1956a; Lucy 1992a, 1992b; Silverstein 1979, 1981)? And again, when semiotic processes are properly understood as relations between relations, all sign–object relations are causes of interpretant–object relations (qua effects) essentially be definition). Finally, a cause–effect relation may itself be the cause of an effect. In certain cases, this is essentially a trivial observation: because dams relatively reliably slow the flow of rivers, beavers are disposed to build them. More generally, most of the given traits of a particular species may be understood as phylogenetic interpreters (qua effects) of particular cause–effect relations in their environment. This should emphasize that the issue is not, is such a meta-relation true or important, but rather, how do assumptions about such processes
underwrite particular claims (say, the relation between some significant practice, e.g., dam building or oath-taking, and the processes that lead to its natural, artificial, and/or unconscious selection)?

24.6 Disturbances

Crucially, both kinds of mediation can be thwarted and diverted, perturbed and parasited, and subject to disturbances more generally. See Table 24.2d. Indeed, the possibility of going awry, or at least of being judged so, is arguably the essence of such processes (Serres 2007[1980], Kockelman 2010, 2012). In the case of representations, there is unconsciousness (being unable to represent some particular object) and misrepresentation (representing something incorrectly, or in a highly refracted fashion). Similarly, in the case of conditioning, there is repression (stopping a cause from having its effect) and rechanneling (creating conditions for causes to have unusual or unintended effects). Needless to say, the political stakes of these kinds of processes, especially when crossed with embedding and reframing, are, or at least seem to be, enormous.

To take up sign-object disturbances first, from the standpoint of some relatively transcendental frame, we may talk about relatively important objects for which there are no signs. In the terms of critical theory, this is understood as being unconscious of something. Similarly, sign-object relations can not only be blocked, they can also be distorted (and thus refracted instead of reflected) - we represent an object, only we do so incorrectly. This may range from falsity (our representation is false) to simple transformation (certain features are missing, added, distorted, etc.). Needless to say, there is huge literature on these sorts of topics (hegemony, false consciousness, bad faith, etc.), stemming out of ideas from Whorf (1956a, 1956b), Goffman (1959), Kant (1964[1781]); Marx (1967 [1867]), Sapir (1985[1927]), Nietzsche (1899[1887]), Boas (1899a[1889], 1910[1910]), Hobsbs (1994[1651]), Heidegger (1996[1927]), Bacon (2000[1620]), Freud (2008[1900]), and so on.

It should be stressed, and thereby subject to critique, that both of these processes may be understood in terms of Frege’s (1997[1892]) intensionality or the sense-reference distinction (think indirect and direct reported speech, and meta-representations more generally), and so linguistic anthropology is hilariously well-poised (or rather suspiciously presupposedly primed) to be good at it. In particular, some relatively immanent individual or collective agent (qua reported speaker, local villager, or other linguist) has not represented, or has represented poorly, some representatum that some relatively transcendental agent (qua reporting speaker, observing analyst, or linguistic anthropologist) has represented correctly (and has represented as being unrepresented or represented poorly by the relatively immanent agent in question). Indeed, there is perfect resonance between
our discipline's topical focus on issues tightly linked to reported speech (shifters, meta-language, intensionality, etc.) and language ideology as its current paradigm. In particular, both the choice of topic, and the style of critique, come down to Frege-like statements: *Dave thinks he's a waiter (but I know him to be a spy)*. Indeed, our entire discipline might be summed up as follows: They say it's a symbol (entity, intermediary, relatum, cause, mode of abstraction, etc.), but we know it's an index (process, mediator, relation, effect, mode of interaction, etc.).

Similarly, there are disturbances of cause–effect relations. For example, Austin's (2003[1955]) account of felicity conditions was essentially a way of describing all the ways a speech act could fail – by not having the normatively appropriate roots (*qua* conditions) or by not having the normatively effective fruits (*qua* consequences). But also, more simply, our actions (*qua* intentions that give rise to states of affairs), which include our speech acts (and conversational moves more generally), can be thwarted or co-opted. Such disturbances are especially easy to spot when cause–effect relations are intentional (or selected more generally), insofar as the function or purpose of anything may be defined in terms of its capacity to fail (to serve that function or fulfill that purpose). However, one can also obstruct and redirect relatively natural, serendipitous, or atelic cause–effect relations. For example, any time one incorporates an affordance (such as wood) into an instrument (such as the handle of a hammer) one is doing this. And so any technology that "exploits nature" (including technologies of the self, as well as technologies designed to control [dominate, exploit, surveil, etc.] the representations and actions, and hence signs and effects, of others) is of this variety. Semiotic technologies in the stereotypic sense, such as media, usually work on both forms of mediation at once, and are thus subject to both kinds of disturbances simultaneously (a fact which should really ground our theories about them).

### 24.7 Meta-mediation

Issues of blockage and distortion, and disturbances more generally, are particularly important (or at least particularly salient in the imaginary of linguistic anthropologists) when they reflexively feed back into the foregoing kinds of embedded and enframed processes. In particular, the real move for linguistic anthropologists is to propose forms of meta-mediation, which turn on these last kinds. For example, what are some of the conditions for, and consequences of, distorted or unrepresented objects? \(^{13}\) Similarly, what are some of the conditions for, and consequences of, unintended effects or failed efforts? See Table 24.3a.

Pushing further, the objects that are distorted or unrecognized may be precisely other sign–object relations, or their conditions and consequences. For example, many want to say that metalinguage is never an adequate
Table 24.3 Some key modes of meta-mediation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expression</th>
<th>Paraphrase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>a) Conditioned Disturbances</strong></td>
<td>Conditions for, or consequences of, unrepresented or distorted object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C \Rightarrow (S \rightarrow / O)_C$ or $(S \rightarrow / O)_C \Rightarrow E$</td>
<td>Conditions for, or consequences of, blocked or redirected effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C \Rightarrow (S \rightarrow / O)_C$ or $(S \rightarrow / O)_C \Rightarrow E$</td>
<td>Misrepresented, or unrepresented, representations (and/or their conditions and consequences)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C \Rightarrow (C \rightarrow E)_C$ or $(C \rightarrow E)_C \Rightarrow E$</td>
<td>Misrepresented, or unrepresented, conditionings (and/or their conditions and consequences)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>b) Embedded Disturbances</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$S \Rightarrow (S \Rightarrow / O)_O$ or $S \Rightarrow (S \Rightarrow / O)_O$</td>
<td>Distorted (or blocked) representation of conditions for distorted (or blocked) representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$S \Rightarrow (C \Rightarrow (S \Rightarrow / O)_O)_O$ or $S \Rightarrow (C \Rightarrow (S \Rightarrow / O)_O)_O$</td>
<td>Distorted (or blocked) representation of consequences of distorted (or blocked) representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$S \Rightarrow (C \Rightarrow (C \Rightarrow E)_O)_O$ or $S \Rightarrow (C \Rightarrow (C \Rightarrow E)_O)_O$</td>
<td>Sign–object relations misrepresented as cause–effect relations (reification)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$S \Rightarrow (C \Rightarrow (C \Rightarrow (C \Rightarrow E)_O)_O$</td>
<td>Cause–effect relations misrepresented as sign–object relations (reification)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>c) Circular Disturbances</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$S \Rightarrow (S \Rightarrow / O)_C$ or $S \Rightarrow (S \Rightarrow / O)_C$</td>
<td>mediation across seemingly disparate domains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$S \Rightarrow (S \Rightarrow / O)_C$ or $S \Rightarrow (S \Rightarrow / O)_C$</td>
<td>mediation within seemingly simple domains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$S \Rightarrow (S \Rightarrow / O)_C$ or $S \Rightarrow (S \Rightarrow / O)_C$</td>
<td>Others’ theories of mediation are mediated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$S \Rightarrow (S \Rightarrow / O)_C$ or $S \Rightarrow (S \Rightarrow / O)_C$</td>
<td>Own theory of mediation is mediated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$S \Rightarrow (S \Rightarrow / O)_C$ or $S \Rightarrow (S \Rightarrow / O)_C$</td>
<td>Does other epistemic formation’s understanding of the mediation of linguistic-cultural process itself mediated (formal linguists, cognitive scientists, other linguistic anthropologists we don’t like, etc.)?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
representation of the language it represents (Silverstein 1981, Lucy 1993). Similarly, the objects that are distorted or unrecognized may be cause-effect relations, or their conditions and consequences. For example, depending on how one understands a wish or desire (qua mode of intentionality or qua causal drive, and thus in terms of representation or in terms of conditioning), Freud’s [2008[1900]] unconscious can be understood in either way. See Table 24.3b.

One can get even trickier, via circular or self-referencing processes. For example, the objects that our signs distort may themselves be precisely the cause-effect relations that give rise to our distorted signs. Loosely speaking, what I cannot envision is precisely that which blocks my vision. And, more generally, one can make very bold claims, e.g., the systematic misrecognition of the origins of mediation is both cause and effect of the very system that mediates. This is one way to generalize Marx’s (1967[1867]) classic statements as to the wily nature of value. See Table 24.3c.

Depending on how the distinction between sign-object relations and cause-effect relations is understood (say, as mind versus world, or as convention versus nature, or as subject versus object, or as mediator versus intermediary), two key kinds of misrecognition are often invoked, especially by scholars working in Marx- or Freud-inspired traditions: fetishization, or treating objective entities as subjective entities; and reification, or treating conventional entities as natural entities. For example, to return to Grice (1989a), treating natural forms of meaning as intentional (or non-natural) modes of meaning (for example, omens, oracles, auguries, and the like), or treating intentional modes of meaning as natural. See Table 24.3d (and recall Table 24.2b). Needless to say, these sorts of claims are legion in anthropology: we used to apply them to the people we study, now we apply them to the people who think about the people we study (for example, missionaries, tourists, and colonizers, other linguists, anthropologists, and scholars, and even the community members themselves).

One can study inter-mediation: ask how any of these domains (or mediating relations between domains) mediate other domains (or mediating relations between domains). See Table 24.3e. For example, and to return to section 24.2, what about relations between modes of reproduction and modes of communication, or language acquisition and socialization? And what about the relation between modes of production and modes of communication, or between economy and language? For example, we might put Marx (1978[1845]) and McLuhan (1994[1964]) together as follows: for any particular mode of production or mode of communication, the issue is not so much what is being produced or what is being communicated (qua contents, in the sense of obvious effect or object), but rather how are these modes of production and communication themselves conditioned by and conditioning of social relations, cultural values, and conceptual categories? It’s not so much that “mediation is the message” (which at least has the benefit of not reifying mediation as “media”), but
rather that “mediation is the message’ is itself a mediated message (about mediation).”

Similarly, one can also study intra-domain mediation: take what at first seems to be a single or simple domain and ask how it is internally mediated. For example, rather than talk about the mediating relations between language and economy, ask about the ways in which language self-mediates. As an instance of this, as noted in the last section, linguistic anthropology has taken up as its foundational axiom Bourdieu’s (1977 [1972]) famous claim that practice (qua parole) mediates both structure (qua langue) and ideology (qua langue and parole about langue and parole), which themselves mediate practice. See Table 24.3f.

Crucially, as noted above, all of these issues not only apply to the kinds of social formations we study (and the actors implicated in them), they also apply to the other scholars and scientists who study those social formations. And so linguistic anthropologists are constantly critiquing other analyses of mediation – as undertaken, say, by formal linguists, philosophers, cultural anthropologists, cognitive scientists, their own dissertation advisors, and so forth – as themselves being mediated in precisely the foregoing kinds of ways. See Table 24.3g.

Finally, we can make self-reflexive claims, and thereby ask epistemological questions, such as: How is our understanding of what domains there are to be mediated, and what kinds of mediating relations there are between them, mediated? See Table 24.3h. Indeed, to even play the mediational game at all, and thereby disclose modes of representation and influence, requires that one have already enclosed two or more domains: here is language and there is culture; or here is economy and there is society; so now let us study their relations. Indeed, in some sense, to find such relations is to dissolve the boundaries between domains. And so the game is often like this: presume a distinction between two domains; find a relation between them; and so propose there is no distinction between two domains, and thus that the original distinction was an illusion or ideology.

24.8 A critique of mediation as critique

To conclude, it should first be emphasized that all the moves detailed above are really a single move, generatively applied: treat any mediated relatum as a mediating relation. (Indeed, we might even recast it in Freudian terms: where there is an “it,” there “I” should go.) It should also be emphasized that this style of critique resonates with the other key move made by linguistic anthropologists, as described in section 24.2: take any mono-dimensional account and recast it as a multi-dimensional terms, and thereby deliver us from Flatland and lead us to Textureville.

Such moves, however simple (or simple-minded) they may be, seem to provide a huge amount of leverage. In particular, all other moves (made by
other disciplines, our colleagues, our teachers, etc.) become both partial (there is some form of mediation they didn’t take into account) and reifying (in so doing, they took what was relatively fluid and made it seem fixed, relatively contested and made it seem constant, relatively constructed and made it seem natural, relatively complicated and made it seem simple, relatively partial and made it seem total, relatively textured and made it seem flat). This allows us to almost effortlessly generate an infinite number of critiques (you are not wide enough in your vision), while simultaneously granting some kind of “agency” to the people so studied (they are deeper than you imagined). We thereby grant agency, openness, and creativity to actors in a world that other analysts made seems structured, closed, and predictable. In this way, one can almost feel as if one’s work is political, in that it seems to simultaneously unmask villains (other analysts) and liberate victims (those who are so analyzed).

But there is a secondary set of payoffs as well for those who adopt this kind of critique. In particular, to really show a form of mediation (and not just state it) is very difficult work – ask anyone who have ever tried to write a careful descriptive grammar of a language, or provide a careful account of the moves made in a conversation. And so the people who really want to show such things (referred to above as scientists and scholars) by necessity bracket off a whole set of possible mediations. (Indeed, how could they not? Everything mediates everything else at some degree of remove.) And, in so doing, they prime themselves to be critiqued by critical theorists qua “meta-mediationists.” Concomitantly, the latter’s generative system of meta-mediation makes stating complicated claims about mediation incredibly easy, but showing them quite difficult. It simultaneously allows meta-mediationists to claim that “high-level” mediation is involved in research undertaken by scholars and scientists (themselves trying to show mediation at a “low level”), and protect themselves from return critiques – especially critiques from people who are committed to showing what they state in, say, nomothetic terms. In particular, such claims are often made at a level that’s abstract (or vacuous) enough that it’s not so much that they cannot be shown to hold, but rather that they cannot be shown to not hold. In this way, the people making such claims never have to defend themselves. In short, one can simultaneously attack others and protect oneself from attack.

All that said, it should be remembered that what is at issue here is not whether some particular claim about mediation is right or wrong. My interest is only in the style of argumentation itself. With such seemingly huge political and epistemic benefits (unmask and liberate, attack and never have to defend), and with essentially minimal costs (it can be learned with a year’s worth of introductory graduate courses, summarized in seven pages, and generated with a context-free grammar), it’s no wonder linguistic anthropologists have adopted meta-mediationism as the dominant frame underlying their form of life. And no small worry either.
Notes

1. Note, then, that as used here the term critical theory is meant to include
the Frankfurt School (and thus the ideas of scholars like Adorno,
Horkheimer, and Benjamin), but also be much wider in scope.

2. This is, of course, a highly schematic summary. With my sincere apolo-
gies to the living, and to keep this from being a citation fest, only dead
authors are mentioned, or particularly salient edited collections.
Chapter 29 of this volume discusses a key part of the first half-century
of linguistic anthropology (linguistic relativity) as well as tries to divine
a key part of the next half-century of linguistic anthropology (language
automata). Many of the other chapters in this volume take up related
claims in much greater depth. For example, Chapter 25 by Stasch is
particularly salient in highlighting key connections between linguistic
anthropology and cultural anthropology, which is the other subdisci-
pline most heavily indebted to critical theory.

3. There are other failings, in my opinion, but they are not so systematic,
and so might simply be listed. For example, via our reliance on practice-
theory, we got a blank-slate theory of mind. Via our reliance on
Goffman and Bourdieu, we got a dramaturgical (and only a dramatur-
gical or distinction-oriented) account of the subject: as if actors’ main
intention is to one-up each other. Via our Saussure-directed uptake of
Peirce, we mainly took on iconicity and indexicality of the latter, and
forgot all about interpretants (or simplified them as “concepts” and
“responses”). Via the critiques of scholars who had simple-minded
understandings of language, we keep insisting that language is “mate-
rial” and “embodied” (as opposed to ideational or enminded), whereas
we should have said those are also folk-categories.

4. See the important essays in Mertz and Parmentier (1985) for a different
take on this topic.

5. Saussure-like forms of mediation (any particular sign–object relation is
mediated by an ensemble of other sign–object relations, insofar as such
signs can combine with each other or substitute for each other) are a
special case. As are Marx-like forms of mediation, themselves rooted in
Aristotle: a relation between people is mediated by a relation between
things.

6. It also is fundamentally important for intentional communication, or
so-called non-natural meaning (Grice 1989b, 1989c; Sperber and Wilson
1995[1986]; Levinson 2000; Tomasello 2008), but linguistic anthropolo-
gists in the critical tradition have not spent much time on this topic.

7. For example, if I believe cats meow and have long whiskers, then I may
infer that the animal that just meowed behind the sofa is a cat and also
expect that, when it appears, it will have long whiskers.

8. Note that this is not the same as natural meaning versus non-natural
meaning, in the usual Gricean way (Kockelman 2011), as the selectional
agencies involved are only sometimes intentional (in human terms), *qua* purposefully expressed for the sake of another's interpretant. (Crucially, the meaning-nn versus meaning-n distinction doesn't really cut it – for the real issue is the degree to which the cause–effect relation becomes a sign–object relation, on what timescale.)

9. These may seem closely related to framing.

10. Other examples include interpretants, themselves signs, which have as their dynamic objects the sign–object relations that gave rise to them. More generally, when one realizes that the sign that stands for the sign–object relation does not have to be of the same domain as the sign in the sign–object relation (*qua* meta-language and language), most semiotic processes turn on precisely this kind of relation.

11. Note, from these examples, how reframings are closely related to embeddings.

12. See, for example, the important early insights of Silverstein (1979, 1981), as well as as subsequent substantial work by scholars such as Gal and Irvine (1995), and Schieffelin et al. (1998), inter alia.

13. More generally, this means we can ask questions of the following kind: What are the conditions for, or consequences of, a group being able to signify (or represent to themselves and others) a particular sign–object or condition–consequence relation? That is, how conscious are they of it, and what are some of the roots and fruits of this (lack of) consciousness? Concomitantly, we can ask how accurate (as opposed to distorted) or true (as opposed to false) a representation is (in particular a representation of such condition–consequence relations); and what are some conditions for, and consequences of, this relative accuracy or distortion?

14. Compare naturalization and conventionalization, or downshifting and upshifting, as used by scholars like Parmentier (1994); and compare projection and iconicity, as described above.

15. Indeed, Boas and Sapir were the ur-theorists of this, via alternating sounds. And so, in a sort of Bacon-Marx-Freud tradition, they have taken up these kinds of questions – a kind of canonical nineteenth-century theory of the self and society, sometimes called a “hermeneutics of suspicion.”

16. And we have an infinite number of buzzwords to describe this: emergent, fluid, dialogic, relational, partial, underdetermined, interactional, fractal, etc. Crucially, it is also usually fetishizing, in that they project too much causal explanatory power onto the wrong place.

17. For every scholar who does painstaking work to show how complicated the actual theories of mediation really are, and does empirical work to show how subtle the mediation can be, there a dozen other scholars who simply state X is mediated (constructed, emergent, relational, contexted, dialogic, etc.).
18. Phrased another way, because it is truly hard work to not just, say, write a grammar, write an ethnography of a people who use a grammar, write an account of the relation between the two, or between various historical conditions, but to also write an account of the distortions, and an account of the distortions of others who have studied the group, they have more or less given up on correlations of the lower types and focused their efforts on correlations of the higher types.

References


